FLASH
Shkruar nga Michele Chiaruzzi
The Russian invasion and the choices made by America in recent years have highlighted the fragility of the European Union as a political actor. Without a common military force and without independent decision-making, Europe risks remaining simply an object of others' strategies...
The war in Europe and the rift within the transatlantic alliance make the need for a European strategic policy urgent. The invasion of Ukraine by the largest country in terms of territory is a “test by fire” for this policy, while American dominance makes it even more difficult.
This “fire” burns in the East and reflects in the West, because today there is a clear mismatch of interests between European states and their American protector. The US government seems ready to sacrifice Ukraine in the game of great powers, and this is an existential drama for a united Europe - especially for those who believe they can stay out of power politics.
Europe's problem is not a lack of power, but its management. The challenge lies in creating the conditions for it to unfold and serve common goals, such as collective defense.
European policy towards Ukraine is an original and yet simple application of Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union: "If a Member State is attacked on its territory, the other States shall be obliged to provide it with assistance and support by all the means at their disposal."
The main means of defense are weapons, which are needed today to defend Europe in Ukraine. This is where the transatlantic divide begins: for the United States, sacrificing the largest European state is seen as beneficial for relations with Russia.
For its part, Russia aims to impose dominance in Eastern Europe, as if it were naturally the continent's dominant power - against which Europe cannot create a counterweight without external help. This thinking is new, vague and not at all grounded in history.
Europeans know that societies cannot survive without devoting a large part of their wealth to security. That is why, on 19 December 2025, after a year of discussions and 17 hours of meetings, the European Council decided to use common European debt, guaranteed by contributions from 24 countries, to support Ukrainian resistance and European defense over the next two years.
Italy will contribute 12 billion out of the 90 billion, but this cooperation must continue until Russia ceases fire. If the war continues, even 90 billion will not be enough. Meanwhile, the occupation has entered its fourth year and the transatlantic gap has become officially visible.
Initially on the political level, with the speech of James D. Vance on February 14, 2025 at the Bayerischer Hof; then on the diplomatic level, with the first UN Security Council resolution on February 24, 2025, shared by the US with Russia and China, but not with the European allies; and finally on the doctrinal level, on December 4, 2025, with the US National Security Strategy.
Three moments that come together in what Italian President Sergio Mattarella called on December 15, in front of Italian ambassadors, an "irregular and unjustified aggression against the European Union."
It is well known that the great powers are the supreme arbiters of international relations. But this becomes even more serious today, when American hegemony appears as a grim parody of a responsible democratic power. And since it will not be the last time, Europe must make difficult decisions about a European strategic policy. The first decision concerns the inevitable vulnerability of Europe as a political entity, as long as it remains without strategic independence, that is, without a coordinated common conventional and nuclear armed force.
For this reason, the Kensington Treaty of July 17, 2025, between Germany and Britain, provides for "in-depth exchanges on strategic aspects of security policy, including deterrence, defense and nuclear issues."
The second decision concerns how to bridge the transatlantic divide, recognizing that there are no inevitable alliances and that allies can become rivals. The Atlantic alliance is a vital interest; but even vital interests erode with time.
Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said it very clearly: "If the US were to decide to militarily attack another NATO country, everything would fall, including NATO itself and the security architecture built since the end of World War II."
United Europe was born from war: first the world war, then the Cold War. If it is to exist, the future Europe will be no exception: it will be born from its own war. Therefore, the strengthening of a European strategic policy is urgent, within the spaces of freedom that the transatlantic gap and Russian expansion allow today.
This means confronting together the limitations of independent European political action, by establishing new perimeters of responsibility among political actors. Great powers, said Martin Wight, can also be “big and irresponsible”. Today it seems that this is the case and must be confronted with a strategic European policy./ Adapted from “Pamphlet” by “Linkiesta”
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