FLASH
Shkruar nga Dalia Dassa Kaye
Israeli leaders understand that the near-simultaneous killings of Shukr and Haniyeh — and the fact that the methods of their elimination humiliated Iran — are likely to prompt Tehran, and perhaps other armed groups it supports, to retaliate on a scale. wide.
The 10-month war between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip has rapidly expanded its influence, triggering dangerous military escalations across the Middle East. Thus, we have seen deadly clashes on the Israeli-Lebanese border, attacks by Houthi rebels in the Red Sea and Tel Aviv, attacks by other Iranian-backed militias against US forces in Iraq and Syria, and even direct clashes between Israel and Iran. .
Meanwhile, Israel last week claimed responsibility for the killing in Beirut of Fuad Shukr, a senior Hezbollah commander, in retaliation for a rocket attack on the Golan Heights. But also of Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of Hamas, in Tehran.
This double blow made many observers fear the outbreak of a regional war with even more catastrophic consequences. And why is Israel now escalating its actions in such a dangerous way? Of course, her latest attacks are not in themselves unprecedented.
The country has a long history of assassinating Palestinian leaders, having killed hundreds of Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon and Syria. Also, Israel has long demonstrated the great capabilities of its secret services, which enable it to penetrate deeply into Iran.
Previous rounds of escalation over the past 10 months have not led to an all-out regional war. But nothing is guaranteed, because the rational calculations of any state that foresee the self-restraint of the affected party can be suddenly overridden by events on the ground, leading to miscalculations or even deliberate strategic decisions to provoke a deeper conflict. wide.
Israeli leaders understand that the near-simultaneous killings of Shukr and Haniyeh — and the fact that the methods of their elimination humiliated Iran — are likely to prompt Tehran, and perhaps other armed groups it supports, to retaliate on a scale. wide.
To understand Israel's current calculations, it is important to appreciate how the country's psychological state has changed since October 7, 2023. Before the Hamas attack, Israel's self-confidence had reached its peak. He had come to believe that the Arab states would finally accept him as a state, even if he did not resolve his conflict with the Palestinians.
It also believed it could strike Iran and its allies with virtually no consequences, or risk the support it enjoys from the United States. Then, almost overnight, that confidence turned into a feeling of great weakness. During a late June visit to Tel Aviv, security experts and former defense and intelligence officials repeatedly told me that October 7 had overturned many of Israel's earlier beliefs about its power.
The attack by Hamas overturned key Israeli assumptions: that their military and technological superiority can deter opponents, that they can live safely behind fortified walls and borders, and that they can prosper economically without making major advances in the peace process with the Palestinians.
Now, many people in the security establishment are admitting that "Israel is not as strong as it thought," as one former national security official told me bluntly. Many Israelis who study or work in national security agencies are angry with their government for major failures during and after October 7.
But they are also angered by the impunity of the leaders, who failed to keep the country safe. Distrust of the government is widespread. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may have received a standing ovation during his speech to the US Congress in late July, but his national security adviser, Tzachi Hanegbi, could hardly say two words during the Israeli security conference in Herzliya a few weeks ago. seen.
Those present criticized him and accused the government of neglecting Israel's security, and of failing to free the hostages still languishing in Gaza. Even within Israel, there is a widespread perception that Netanyahu may be prolonging the war only for his own political survival.
The Israel Defense Forces are engaged on many fronts, from Gaza to the West Bank to northern Israel and beyond. Netanyahu's attempt to reform the country's judiciary in the first half of 2023 had created serious rifts between civilian leaders and senior military leaders.
Thousands of reservists threatened not to report for duty. On the other hand, the military still faces unprecedented threats from domestic extremists, including from within its ranks and the government. Just last week, right-wing activists and politicians stormed an Israeli army base to protest the detention of reservists accused of abusing Palestinian prisoners.
Israel is losing international support significantly, due to the high number of deaths and destruction in Gaza. The effect of Iran's attack on Israel in April with hundreds of rockets showed that Tel Aviv miscalculated when it targeted Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps personnel in a building in Damascus that the Iranians saw as a diplomatic headquarters.
The Israelis did not foresee such an unprecedented, massive and direct response, which included hundreds of drones and missiles launched from Iranian territory. Many Israeli security analysts are concerned about the weakening of Israel's regional position.
They worry that Iran and its allies are gaining strength, and that it could be further pushed to bolster its nuclear capabilities if it believes it is not sufficiently capable of deterring Israel through conventional means. And yet Israel's political leadership continues to tell its people that their country is winning.
Cautious Israeli analysts speak of a sense of existential threat that they describe as different from what they have felt since the country's independence in 1948. So unlike 1948, noted one former senior official, Israel is not heeding the teachings of its prime minister, Israel's founder, David Ben-Gurion.
The best ways to compensate for weakness, Ben-Gurion advised, were to strengthen social cohesion, deepen diplomatic relations and pursue peace. Sadly, Israel is moving in the opposite direction on all fronts. On my last visit, a former government official told me that "the people are changing".
But given the perception and reality of increased vulnerability—and Israelis' confidence that they will retain the support of the United States—Israel is likely to maintain an aggressive posture in the region, even if it increases the risk of a wider regional war. .
Ending the war in Gaza would help reduce the dire threats Israel now faces, although the current round of escalation is unlikely to bring any closer to a cease-fire agreement or the release of the remaining Israeli hostages. Impressive military operations may give the illusion of victory, but only a lasting peace with the Palestinians can bring real security./ Adapted "Pamphlet" from "Foreign Affairs".
*Note:Dalia Dassa Kaye, Fellow at the Burkle Center for International Affairs at the University of California.
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