FLASH
Shkruar nga Ivo Andriq
According to the secret supplementary part of the Treaty of Alliance between Bulgaria and Serbia of February 29, 1912, Serbia was recognized as having the right to take over the previously Turkish territory north and west of the Sharr Mountains. In connection with this provision, and trying to ensure its state's access to the sea, Serbian troops entered Lezha on November 15, 1912 and, step by step, occupied all of Northern Albania, up to Tirana and Durrës. In the London "Times", on November 25, Pasic's statement was published that Serbia wanted Durrës with the largest hinterland.
Continued from the previous issue
V– THE ITALIAN INVASION OF ALBANIA AFTER THE WAR AND THE FINAL WITHDRAWAL AFTER THE FAILURE AT VLORA
After the end of the war, based on a military decision of the Allies, Italian troops occupied the entire territory of Albania, even the northern part, which had been given to us by the Pact of London. Only Shkodra remained under the joint power of French and Italian troops. Due to the hostile attitude that Italy had at that time towards the state of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, we considered this Italian military occupation of Albania to be the greatest danger to our existence.
On Albanian soil, a fierce war was waged between us and Italy. The Italians then initiated the Montenegrin and Macedonian issues, as well as the idea of a Greater Albania up to Kaçanik. We carried out actions against them, sometimes secret, sometimes open, buying off the Albanian nobility with money and proclaiming the idea of an “independent Albania” and a “Balkans for the Balkan peoples”.
The dissatisfaction of the Albanian population, for which we also have the support, forced the Italians, at the beginning of 1920, to withdraw their troops from the interior of Albania and to stop only around Vlora, from where, in June of that same year, they were forced to withdraw and conclude an agreement with the Tirana government for their evacuation from all Albanian territory, except for the island of Sazan.
The evacuation from Albania was, therefore, done thanks to the organized resistance of the Albanians, but it should not be forgotten that Italy, at that time, was politically and militarily very weak. Even today there are Albanians who think that whenever they wanted they could expel the Italians from Albania. This self-confidence is fatal for them, because they do not see that today's fascist Italy is not what it was in 1920, under the parliamentary government of Niti, Gjoliti and Fakta.
V – ALBANIA BEFORE THE AMBASSADORS' CONFERENCE
Since the evacuation of Italian troops from Albania had cleared the situation on the ground, the Conference of Ambassadors, in November 1921, could decide to recognize Albania as an independent and sovereign state. Instead of the previous promises regarding Vlora and the mandate over Albania, the Great Powers recognized Italy only as having a special interest in preserving Albanian independence. Albania was also admitted to the League of Nations, in the hope that this would further secure its independence.
Before the Conference of Ambassadors we tried in vain once again to gain the right to correct the border towards Shkodra and towards the Drini, emphasizing historical reasons for Shkodra and economic and communication reasons for the Drini. The French expert at the Conference, Laroch, consoled us thus: “The royal government was wrong in not accepting the proposal for the division of Albania at the time. Pashiqi agreed to this, but the Belgrade government refused.” In order not to allow the Italians into Vlora, we were forced to give up Shkodra and the borders up to the Drini.
Since we always supported the idea of the non-division of the Albanian territory, which was determined in 1913, as well as the independence of Albania, it could be assumed that this solution of the Conference of Ambassadors was satisfactory to us. However, this is not the case. The difficulties in our relations with Albania, as well as in our relations with Italy because of Albania, are becoming increasingly serious even after the declaration of Albania as an independent state and member of the League of Nations.
Republic of Mirdita
While the Conference of Ambassadors was deciding on the borders of Albania and the organization of its independence, in mid-1921 we signed a cooperation agreement with the principality of Mirdita. It envisaged the formation of the free state of Mirdita, which would be protected by the military forces of the Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian Kingdom and whose interests in the outside world would be represented by the Belgrade government. The Tirana government suppressed this movement, and we were accused and condemned before the League of Nations.
VII. – PACT OF ROME, PACIFIC, MUSSOLINI AND ALBANIA
The Pact of Rome, of January 1924, by its spirit, imposed on Rome and Belgrade the respect for independence and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of Albania, as well as mutual information on events in Albania. Meanwhile, this was no obstacle for the Italian Government, in June 1924, to assist the uprising of Fan Noli against Ahmet Zog, nor for our government, in December of that same year, to make it possible for Ahmet Zog, from our territory, to enter Albania to seize power.
Neither Rome nor Belgrade could withstand the intrigues and demands of their Albanian "friends", who sought help to maintain power or to come to power and who promised loyalty and cooperation, while at the first opportunity they changed their orientation.
VIII. – THE PACT OF TIRANA AND THE SITUATION IT CREATED
The late Pashiq, giving instructions to our representatives for work in Albania, said: “we want Albania to be independent, but weak and unregulated”. Time has shown that this was impossible to maintain. A weak and unregulated Albania would definitely seek help and protection wherever it could find them. The regime threatened by Italy turned to us, and the regime we wanted to overthrow sought protection from Italy.
Weak and unregulated Albania, in 1926, requested protection and assistance from Italy. Ahmet Zog first received guarantees for his regime, and then, in 1927, agreed to conclude the Military Alliance for 20 years, received hundreds and hundreds of millions of lire for world work, completely subordinated Albania to Italy in economic and financial terms, accepted many Italian instructors. A relationship was thus created that closely resembled that protectorate, against which we fought at the Peace Conference.
The greatest danger that came to us from Albania in recent years was military organization, military fortifications and irredentist action. Everywhere we saw the danger from Italian action and that "offensive frontier" against which we had fought before the Allies in Paris, when they proposed that Italy be given a mandate in Albania.
It is interesting to mention in this place that we alone have protested and fought against the intervention of Italy in Albania and the Balkans. No other Balkan state supported us in this regard. The two Mediterranean naval powers, France and England, did not oppose the closure of the Adriatic Sea. Moreover, Austen Chamberlain, in his meeting with Mussolini in Livorno, in 1926, gave his consent to the Pact of Tirana. And all the French representatives in Tirana always advised King Zog not to enter into conflict with the Italians.
IX – ITALO-YUGOSLAV PACT OF FRIENDSHIP OF MARCH 25, 1937
Italy and Yugoslavia, pursuing a friendly policy towards each other, can come to an agreement regarding Albania on this basis: Italy has its vital interest in Vlora; this part of the Albanian coast cannot be endangered by us; we must understand this interest and respect it. Yugoslavia's vital interest is not to be endangered on the Albanian border with Southern Serbia, nor with Kosovo (inhabited by Albanians), nor with Shkodra and Montenegro.
Without a doubt, this was taken into account in the secret protocol of the Friendship Pact when it was foreseen that further fortification in the Librazhd and Milot areas would be stopped. As for the economic-financial action in Albania, we do not have nor do we wish to invest any special funds.
The Italians, therefore, remain without competition and without objections from our side, of course on condition that they remain within the limits of the other secret obligation they assumed towards us two years ago, that from a political, economic or financial point of view they will not seek any special benefits that would directly or indirectly compromise the independence of the Albanian state.
In this way, the Pact of Friendship, of March 25, 1937, created a tolerable "modus vivendi" between us and Italy on Albanian soil, where, in previous years, we had so many conflicts and disagreements. It is another question whether in Albania this calm could withstand the trials of a more serious and complicated situation in the Mediterranean Sea or in the Balkans.
X – MAINTAINING OR CHANGING THE STATUS QUOS
Albania's independence has been reduced, but not extinguished. The independence of a state towards the outside world is always a relative notion. Taking into account the circumstances, this independence is more complete or is reduced. For Albania today it cannot be said that its internal and foreign policy is independent of Italy. And yet, in the international community, Albania is considered an independent state. From an international legal point of view, the Albanian coast is not Italian, but is under the sovereignty of a Balkan state.
Italy has not yet set foot in the Balkans. It has its sovereignty over a part of the territory of Zadar, but this no longer gives it the opportunity for further development. Italy exercises its influence in Albania, but it does not have the freedom of action as in its own territory. The Albanians, however, oppose its intervention, cause it difficulties, slow it down.
"The Balkans for the Balkan peoples"
Serbia's traditional policy is "the Balkans for the Balkan peoples." This principle, in its time, was used in the war against the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Yugoslavia successfully used this against the provisions of the London Pact, which included Italy in Dalmatia and Albania.
In the application of this principle, we have always seen the best guarantee for peace in the Balkans, for cooperation between the Balkan peoples, for the normal development of the Balkan peoples. The presence of a great power in the Balkans is an open door for intrigue and invasion.
The expansion of Italy
Is it possible that Italy, becoming the sovereign owner of Central and Southern Albania, will remain alone in that narrow coastal strip? We did not believe it 20 years ago, when the great powers gave Italy Vlora with its hinterland. Even less can we believe it today, when Italy is showing so much dynamism and courage in its foreign policy.
A dangerous precedent
The seizure of a part of the Balkan territory by a major non-Balkan power, without any ethnic basis, is a dangerous precedent for all Balkan peoples, including us. Other major powers, from other directions, may present similar claims.
The case of Italy in Albania is particularly dangerous for us, because with the London Pact, by which Italy was first recognized as having southern Albania, northern Dalmatia was also recognized. The precedent for the revival of the provisions of the London Pact in one sector of the Balkans opens the door for the revival of other provisions.
The Partition of Albania
When evaluating this whole issue, we must bear in mind that we must in every way avoid any conflict, whether secret or open, with Italy. We must also avoid the occupation of all of Albania by Italy, as this would endanger our most sensitive areas – the Bay of Kotor and Kosovo.
Taking into account all that we said above, the division of Albania could only be considered for us as a necessary and inevitable evil, which we would not be able to withstand, and as a great harm from which we should derive as much benefit as possible, meaning that of two evils we should choose the lesser.
Our compensations
These compensations are found in the material elaborated 20 years ago, when the question of the division of Albania was raised. The maximum we demanded at that time was the border that would extend along the banks of the Mat and Drini rivers and that would give us the strategic security of Montenegro and Kosovo. It should also secure the valleys and lakes of Ohrid and Prespa, including Pogradec and the Slavic villages of Mali i Thatë, as well as those between Prespa and Korça.
The capture of Shkodra, in this case, would have great moral and economic importance. This would enable us to develop large hydrotechnical works and gain fertile land for the food of Montenegro. Northern Albania, within the framework of Yugoslavia, would enable the creation of new communication links between Northern and Southern Serbia and the Adriatic.
With the division of Albania, the center of attraction for the Albanian minority in Kosovo would disappear, which, in a new situation, would assimilate more easily. We would eventually have 200,000 to 300,000 more Albanians, but these are mostly Catholics, whose relations with Muslim Albanians have never been good. The resettlement of Albanians to Turkey would also take place under new circumstances, because there would be no stronger action to prevent it./ Memorie.al
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