Iran has suffered heavy blows, but retains advantages in geography, time, and durability
War is a crash course in learning quickly. People who didn't know the difference between an AK-47 and an M4 now understand the intricacies of air defense systems; those who are close to combat learn to distinguish between a ballistic missile hitting its target and one that is neutralized in midair.
The first military phase of the US-Israeli campaign against Iran, planned in advance, carefully structured and methodically executed, appears to be drawing to a close. Judging by the numbers, the operational success is remarkable. After establishing air superiority, the operation involved hundreds of US and Israeli aircraft, two aircraft carriers, and the use of cruise and ballistic missiles.
Having been the target of more than 13,000 strikes in just two weeks, the losses in leadership and infrastructure in Iran have been enormous. US and Israeli officials give optimistic figures for the number of missiles and launchers destroyed on the ground.
So, who is winning so far?
The man with access to the best intelligence, Donald Trump, insists that the US and Israel are clearly winning, but he also expresses dissatisfaction that the Islamic Republic is not surrendering. Pure metrics and technological superiority do not tell the whole story of the progress of a war. Sending a Marine Expeditionary Unit from Okinawa, moving air defense systems from the Korean Peninsula and calling on the fleets of less-than-friendly countries to deploy to the Gulf are not signs of panic, given Washington’s vast capabilities. But they are not signs of accurate foresight or proper planning either. For every retired general who appears enthusiastic on television, there is another who quietly expresses skepticism.
Reactive defense requires resources, and its ongoing burden will be considerable and politically contentious. How many ships can be committed to escorting oil tankers, and will other countries contribute? How many aircraft and drones can be kept in the air at all times?
Good strategy requires a match between ends and means. By this standard, Iran has not performed poorly. Lacking sufficient capabilities to defend itself, Tehran has chosen to raise the cost for everyone and has focused its action deliberately.
Israel has been hit, but it is currently a less important target: with reduced missile capabilities, Iran cannot achieve decisive effect against a more protected country with a prepared population.
Instead, the United Arab Emirates has borne the brunt of the Iranian response, followed by Kuwait and Bahrain. Energy infrastructure, from production and refining to loading and transportation, has been at the center of the targets.
Saudi Arabia has been less affected, by comparison, although 1/3 of the drones launched at it have targeted the strategic oil facility at Shaybah. Above all, Iran’s ability to paralyze maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz has defied expectations that the US had fully anticipated this scenario.
Graphs showing high interception rates and declining entry projects do not show how many interceptors have been consumed or whether Iran’s accuracy has improved. Modern warfare between states is no longer fought primarily on the front lines, but in depth. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and its defense demonstrate that faulty assumptions can prevent victory for the force that appears stronger on paper; that no single weapon system is decisive on its own; that adaptation and innovation yield temporary advantages that are then neutralized; and that social stability underpins military power.
What will the second phase of the war look like?
For Israel, the focus will be on the continued destruction of Iran's military infrastructure and a deeper crackdown on its repressive apparatus to weaken the Revolutionary Guard and its associated militia, the Basij.
For the US, the goal will be to restore maritime traffic, more effectively defend Arab partners, and adapt to Iranian tactics. For Iran, this could involve using weapons that have so far been used less frequently. One of the mysteries of the war is why cruise missiles have not been used more.
One optimistic explanation is that they have been largely destroyed; another, more likely, is that Iran has stored them for use in closer confrontations in the Strait of Hormuz.
After the blows it has suffered, the Iranian regime is unlikely to retreat, as it retains several advantages: geography, time and asymmetry. Iran can strike more countries and areas from more positions. The longer the war lasts, the greater the cost to everyone else, and the Iranian regime has a higher tolerance for suffering. When the goal is survival, all means are used. /Adapted from FT /
*Director of Regional Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies
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