FLASH
Shkruar nga Gabriele Carrer
A Swedish analysis reconstructs the evolution of espionage on the continent and confirms that Moscow remains the main threat, with 47 espionage convictions in the last 17 years. But this is just the tip of the iceberg...
Russia is not fighting alone in Ukraine. While drones and acts of sabotage challenge NATO's borders, Moscow is waging a parallel war, quieter but no less extensive: that of espionage in Europe. The figures, compiled systematically for the first time in a report by the Swedish Defence Research Agency, are very significant. Between 2008 and 2024, 70 final convictions for espionage were handed down in 33 European countries belonging to the European Union or NATO.
Of these, 47 cases, or nearly 70 percent of the total, involved activities carried out on behalf of Russia. China comes in second with just 6 cases, followed by Iran and Turkey with 3 each, while Belarus has 2 cases. This is the largest data set ever compiled on espionage convictions in Europe. The conclusion of the study’s authors, who worked under the mandate of three Swedish intelligence agencies, is clear: the large number of cases uncovered demonstrates the breadth and continuity of Russian activities on the continent.
Today, Russia represents the main espionage threat in Europe. But the most worrying fact is not what the report reflects, but what remains hidden. Estonia leads the ranking with 19 convictions, followed by Germany and North Macedonia with 8 each, Lithuania with 7 and Latvia with 6 convictions. So, the geographical epicenter remains the eastern wing of the Alliance. But what about the rest of Europe? Thirteen of the 33 countries considered have not registered a single conviction in 17 years.
The most typical case is Belgium, where Brussels serves as the headquarters of NATO, the European Commission and the European Parliament. However, in almost two decades, only two espionage convictions have been recorded there. The authors of the report note that it is almost impossible that a political and military center of such importance has been the target of only two prosecuted operations.
This “statistical silence” also applies to other strategic countries such as the Czech Republic, Ireland and Italy. In Italy, the only case that appears in the data is that of Walter Biot, the captain of a Navy frigate, who was arrested in March 2021 while handing over classified NATO documents to Russian officials in exchange for 5,000 euros. He was sentenced to 29 years and 2 months in prison, marking a serious but isolated case.
The report is reminiscent of Sherlock Holmes’ famous quote: “One should not doubt the noise, but the dog that does not bark!” The lack of convictions does not mean that there is no hostile activity, but may reflect legal loopholes, difficulties in gathering evidence, limitations in protecting sources, or a political preference for expelling diplomats quietly rather than in public trials.
The Swedish agency's work also shatters the stereotype of the classic spy. Only half of the convicts fall into the traditional category of people with insider access to secret information. The rest are mostly civilians, as 72 percent of the convicts did not belong to military or government structures. Their average age is 48 years and almost all are men; only 4 women are included in these statistics.
The report identifies 10 types of operations that go beyond the image of the secret agent. In addition to traditional collaborators, there are also ideologues motivated by Soviet nostalgia, observers recruited through social networks to photograph infrastructure, agents hired for a single mission, as well as intermediaries or criminals involved in trafficking and sabotage. This is a fluid ecosystem, where an observer can exploit freedom of movement in the Schengen area or be part of diaspora networks.
Regarding motivation, the classic model of money, ideology, coercion and ego still holds true. More than half of the convicts received financial rewards, sometimes accompanied by blackmail. In the Baltic countries, ideology and cultural ties to Russia remain important factors, while coercion is mainly seen in smugglers blackmailed by the Russian secret service, the FSB.
However, what is fundamentally changing are the methods of recruiting spies. Personal and diplomatic contacts are being replaced by digital platforms such as Telegram, Facebook, Discord and TikTok.
The report documents cases of individuals who volunteered as collaborators after being exposed to online propaganda. Since 2021, there has been a surge in willing agents who are quickly recruited online for limited tasks and then abandoned.
Russia's objectives are broad and include everything from NATO plans and weapons systems to energy infrastructure, transportation and political processes. The energy sector emerges in the Swedish report as particularly sensitive, as attacking energy networks could destabilize entire society.
Another surprising fact is that much of the information collected seemed innocuous or was public, but its value lies in the ability of Russian services to collect and process it to build complex maps.
Finally, the report identifies 4 structural vulnerabilities in Europe, such as differences in legal frameworks, diversification of the insider threat, the need to protect critical infrastructure, and digital recruitment that removes barriers to penetration.
Although these data only analyze the detected cases, they clearly show that the Russian apparatus operates with great adaptability and persistence. Closing the “doors” serves little purpose if the “windows” of the continent remain open and hidden activity continues to go undetected./ Adapted from "Pamphlet" By "Linkiesta"
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