FLASH
Shkruar nga Nigel Inkster
They represent a flagrant violation of diplomatic norms and often operate illegally. Chinese officials insist that these entities exist to help their citizens with a variety of bureaucratic procedures. But isn't that what official Chinese consulates are for?
Most countries spy on others. In principle, there is nothing that can stop this. But China's intent to spy on the rest of the world goes far beyond anything Western intelligence agencies typically collect.
This practice includes a range of commercial intellectual property data, and is described by Keith Alexander, the former head of the National Security Agency in the US as "the largest transfer of classified data in history". In addition to collecting data from government websites, parliaments, universities, think tanks and human rights organizations, China also targets diaspora groups and individuals.
Chinese hackers have targeted British MPs and stolen demographic data from the UK Electoral Commission database. Meanwhile, in the US, Congress has just fined the Chinese company TikTok, which admitted that some of its employees had spied on American journalists.
Three Germans were arrested on Monday for trying to transfer military information, and to buy a special laser that was sent to Beijing without any authorization. On the same day, two British nationals, including an aide to a Conservative MP, were charged with breaching the Official Secrets Act by passing confidential data to China.
Xi Jinping talks as if China is at war. This week, he said on the occasion of "National Security Education Day" that every citizen should be alert for the signs of espionage. "Foreign spies are everywhere. They can disguise themselves as anyone!"- says a public message of the all-powerful spying agency, the Ministry of State Security (MSS).
The MSS is responsible for internal security, counterintelligence and intelligence gathering from foreign countries. Although officially a state institution and not part of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), its main task is to combat threats to the system.
An essential criterion for employment there is the commitment of absolute loyalty to the PKK.
As with many Chinese institutions, the structure at the headquarters of the MSS multiplies at the provincial and municipal levels, and it is the regional branches that do most of the foreign intelligence gathering and monitoring of states with which they have historical ties. , geographical or commercial.
Thus the Shanghai office mainly targets the US; that of Zhejiang focuses on Western Europe including Great Britain; the Tianjin office collects data on Japan and South Korea; while that of Guangdong over neighboring Southeast Asian countries.
The collected data serves different purposes. For example, stolen medical data is used for biomedical research, which almost certainly includes not only pharmaceutical but also biological weapons programs. Large amounts of foreign data are used to train Chinese AI models.
Also, PKK hires private cyber companies to complement its activities. The United Kingdom's Electoral Commission was hacked by Wuhan-based cyber science and technology company Xiaoruizhi.
A few weeks ago, it was revealed that Shanghai-based company I-Soon was hiring hackers for various missions run on behalf of the Chinese government. Its yield was impressive in scope and ambition: from 95 gigabytes of data on Indian migration to the passenger data of a Vietnamese airline.
Other targets included NATO, the British Foreign Office and the Chatham House think tank. China has been spying on an industrial scale for years. When Xi visited Washington 10 years ago, Barack Obama called for an end to the practice. In fact, China has strengthened its cyber capabilities, and the development is based on old-fashioned intelligence operations. In the past, Chinese secret services tended to rely almost exclusively on ethnic Chinese agents from the 60 million-strong Chinese diaspora community worldwide.
One such was Chi Mak, a naturalized American citizen who worked in the US defense sector, who was sentenced to 24 years in prison for trying to pass to China details of a radar system used to defend military ships.
But now China worries that its diaspora includes Chinese Communist Party activists and opponents, so another big part of the job of Chinese intelligence agencies is to monitor (and when necessary silence) Chinese abroad who are critical of the PKK.
Usually this takes the form of pressure on relatives at home, but can also involve actions by intelligence agencies and their proxies - criminal groups or local private detectives - taking more direct action to silence critics.
Then there is Operation Foxhunt, a global covert operation to track down and capture Chinese officials suspected of corruption who have fled to other countries. A report published this month claims that 12,000 people have been found during such operations in 120 countries over the past 10 years.
Pekini ka mjaftueshëm buxhet dhe angazhon edhe hetues privatë. Michael McMahon, ish-oficer policie në Nju Jork, u akuzua vitin e kaluar për “përndjekje ndërshtetërore” dhe sepse po vepronte si ”agjent i paligjshëm i Republikës Popullore të Kinës”.
Një nga objektivat gjeti një shënim në derën e shtëpisë:”Nëse je i gatshëm të kthehesh në Kinë dhe të kalosh 10 vjet në burg, gruaja dhe fëmijët tënd do të jenë mirë. Kështu mbyllet kjo çështje!”. Një pjesë tjetër e rrjetit global janë “stacionet policore” të fshehta, të ngritura në më shumë se 50 vende, kryesisht demokraci liberale.
Ato përfaqësojnë një shkelje flagrante të normave diplomatike dhe shpeshherë veprojnë në ilegalitet. Zyrtarët kinezë, këmbëngulin se këto entitete ekzistojnë për të ndihmuar shtetasit e tyre për një sërë procedurash burokratike. Por a nuk janë për këtë punë konsullatat zyrtare kineze?
Realiteti është se këto “stacione policore” ekzistojnë në përgjithësi për të monitoruar dhe shtypur aktivitetin kundër regjimit. Shumica e ambasadave kineze strehojnë një grup të MSS, që zakonisht nuk i deklarohet qeverisë pritëse. Po ashtu në to ka një zyrë të atasheut të mbrojtjes me mision mbledhjen e informacioneve.
Grupi do të plotësohen nga oficerë të maskuar si gazetarë apo biznesmenë. Por pjesa më e madhe e rekrutimit të agjentëve ndodh brenda Kinës, ku agjencitë e inteligjencës mund të shfrytëzojnë gamën e plotë të aftësive shtetërore, duke u maskuar nën role të ndryshme tek ndërmarrjet shtetërore, universitete, qendra kërkimore dhe një sërë organizatash partiake dhe shtetërore të ngarkuara me zhvillimin dhe mbajtjen e kontakteve me botën e jashtme.
Agjencitë e inteligjencës kinez,e ishin dikur të kujdesshme për rekrutimin e të huajve. Tani duket se kanë më pak kufizime. Ka dëshmi gjithnjë e më të madha se brenda Kinës, po afrohen tek studentët e huaj, me shpresën se me kalimin e kohës ata mund të vendosen në pozicione me rëndësi brenda vendeve të tyre.
Dhe ky është rasti më ideal për çdo shërbim sekret. Në shumicën e rasteve, objektivat afrohen nga dikush me një profesion në dukje të padëmshëm, që u bën një ofertë në para në këmbim të diçkaje deri diku normale. Në kohën e duhur, kërkesat shtohen.
Një qasje e ngjashme ndiqet edhe për objektivat jashtë Kinës, të cilët fillimisht kontaktohen përmes faqeve të mediave sociale si LinkedIn. U ofrohet një vizitë e paguar për të marrë pjesë në një konferencë akademike apo ngjarje të ngjashme. I tillë ishte rasti i ish-oficerit të CIA-s Kevin Mallory.
I zhytur në borxhe të mëdha, me një kredi për të paguar dhe pa punë, ai iu përgjigj një ftese në LinkedIn nga dikush që paraqitej si një agjent me qendër në Pekin. Ai nuk kishte shkruar në CV se më herët kishte punuar CIA, megjithatë linte pak dyshime për ata që dinin se çfarë kërkonin.
He was given a secure telephone communication system to report information gathered from his former colleagues to the liaison officer. But at some point he was discovered and sentenced to 20 years in prison. China's secret agencies are well-funded and agents' pay can be good.
The downside is that if you get caught, you're on your own. The Chinese offer no support, nor will they attempt to secure your release. Chi Mak was left to die in prison. The same is likely true of Xu Yanjun, the Jiangsu State Security Bureau official who was arrested in Belgium, where he went to meet a US agent employed in the aerospace sector.
It was a trap, he was caught, extradited to the US and sentenced to 20 years in prison. From China's perspective, it is now doing what the British and American intelligence agencies have been doing for years.
Note: Nigel Inkster, former director of operations and intelligence for MI6, the British secret service. /Adapted Pamphlet, taken from "The Spectator"
Lini një Përgjigje