FLASH
Shkruar nga Pamfleti
About 60,000 American military personnel are stationed in Japan; nearly 30,000 American troops are stationed in South Korea.
President Donald Trump’s transformation of the United States into a deeply unreliable partner has prompted a radical rethinking of defense policy among NATO members. The implications for Washington’s allies in the Asia-Pacific have received far less attention but are just as profound. The rise of an authoritarian and assertive China that is far more powerful than Russia poses a broad challenge to democracies in the region that have long relied on U.S. power to keep them safe.
This challenge is particularly acute for Japan and South Korea. The alliance with the United States has been the central pillar of their security since the 1950s. About 60,000 American military personnel are stationed in Japan; nearly 30,000 American troops are stationed in South Korea.
On the surface, their ties with the US are strong. After a cordial meeting with Trump at the White House last month, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba even spoke of a “new golden era” in bilateral relations. China hawks in the Trump administration hope he will value Asian allies as Washington shifts its focus to the Pacific. Some in Tokyo were reassured by Trump and Ishiba’s joint warning against any Chinese attempt to use “force or coercion” to change the status quo in the East China Sea and their emphasis on the importance of stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Still, there are good reasons to doubt Trump’s commitment to Taiwan. The president shows no sign of being willing to spend American blood or treasure on an island he accuses of “stealing” the American semiconductor industry. But a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would end the Pax Americana in Asia and allow Beijing to dominate shipping lanes vital to the economies of Japan and South Korea.
So what should they do? Some in both countries would welcome a distancing from the US hegemon. But for these nations with distinct and democratic pride, avoiding falling under the influence of an assertive China will require greater defense spending. Doing so should also assuage US complaints about freeloading. Japan has dramatically increased its defense budget, but it is still set to reach just 2 percent of GDP by 2027. Despite being threatened by a nuclear-armed North, South Korea spends only about 2.8 percent.
To get more money — and to reduce dependence on the US — both need to work more closely with democracies across the region and beyond. Japan’s agreement with the UK and Italy to jointly develop a new fighter is a welcome step. New alliances among the region’s natural allies would also help. Ishiba has talked about creating an “Asian NATO.” But the priority should be to strengthen ties between Tokyo and Seoul, prickly neighbours that previous US presidents have had to like to work together on security issues.
The decline in confidence in the US nuclear umbrella will inevitably push some allies to consider their own deterrent forces, an option widely discussed in South Korea. Japan, haunted by the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is more reserved. The move would deal a serious blow to efforts to limit global nuclear proliferation.
It is not yet clear whether politicians in Tokyo and Seoul are prepared to grapple with such important issues. The formation of even the most rudimentary bilateral alliance will be complicated by Korean resentment of Japan’s past colonial rule and Tokyo’s pacifist constitution. President Yoon Suk Yeol’s failed attempt to impose martial law has cast doubt on Seoul’s recent rapprochement with Tokyo. Ishiba’s influence is limited by the loss of his Liberal Democratic Party’s parliamentary majority last year. Neither country seems willing to rethink its entire security strategy. But that is precisely what they should start doing. / Adapted from “Pamphlet” by “Financial Times”
Lini një Përgjigje