FLASH
Shkruar nga Pamfleti
The US sends a general whose clear task is to "explain" to his Israeli colleagues all the unknowns of an urban war in Gaza, distilling the lessons learned by the Americans in Iraq. If the Israeli army had not studied them...
It is sensational but disturbing that Israel receives "advice" from the United States on how to conduct anti-Hamas operations in Gaza. Who knows the situation on the ground better than the Israeli army? What more could the soldiers sent from Washington to "help" know?
The Pentagon's dispatch of General Glynn to Israel, the many other hints and warnings that the White House and the National Security Council reveal to the press, are not episodes of ordinary administration. They mark one of the many anomalies of this war, which from the very beginning with the surprise attack of Hamas has exhausted the prestige of the Israeli intelligence and armed forces.
The alliance between Washington and Tel Aviv has been a geopolitical constant since 1947 (the establishment of the state of Israel) and especially from 1967 (the Six Day War) onwards. It is normal for allies to exchange information and advice; even more so if one of the two is under permanent siege and the other historically exerts strategic influence in the Middle East. Nor should the aid be understood as one-way: when America suffered the tragic defeat of September 11, 2001, American intelligence was hungry for information and received a lot of help from Israel's Mossad.
However, in normal times, mutual aid and consultation takes place in secret, discreetly. Today, however, we witness a Biden administration flaunting its surrogate role in the media around the world, with an almost humiliating disregard for its ally. He sends a general whose clear task is to "explain" to his Israeli colleagues all the unknowns of an urban war in Gaza, distilling the lessons learned by the Americans in Iraq. If the Israeli army had not studied them...
In the American media, leaks abound, inspired by the White House or the Pentagon, on the danger that Israel's military response will be "emotional, vindictive, without a long-term strategy."
Various American experts with ties to the current administration wonder aloud whether the Tel Aviv government and armed forces have a plan that foresees the second, third and fourth chapters of this story after the initial offensive against Hamas. They question whether all the strategic implications of a possible expansion of the front towards Hezbollah in Lebanon, or towards Iran, have been calculated. They worry that Israel is not incorporating into its strategy the need to unite a front of quasi-friendly Arab countries, ranging from Saudi Arabia to the Emirates to Qatar, including of course Egypt and Jordan. All this is not happening in a closed-door debate between Joe Biden, Anthony Blinken and the war cabinet headed by Benjamin Netanyahu, but in some kind of public a priori process of what Israel will do.
It is not a normal situation. The anomaly that marks the relations between Washington and Tel Aviv in the last days is not reduced even by comparing it with the first stages of the war in Ukraine. Yes, the similarities are obvious, very strong. Even in February 2022, Ukraine was initially surprised by Putin's aggression, and in that case was guilty of not heeding the warnings of American and British intelligence, which had predicted that invasion.
From that moment on, the early stages of the Russian offensive were marked by America's deep distrust of Kiev, and especially of Zelensky. Zelenski, like Netanyahu, also inherited a poor relationship with Biden. The Pentagon had serious doubts about the durability of the Ukrainian military. This initial phase was overcome thanks to the behavior of Zelensky and his soldiers. But the parallel stops there: the reputation of the Israeli military and intelligence certainly cannot be compared to that of the Ukrainians; Moreover, the US-Israel relationship is much older and deeper.
Today, Israel is suffering from a decline in credibility associated primarily with Netanyahu. There are many accusations against him and he has never done anything to answer the criticism coming from American Democrats: indeed, since the time of Barack Obama he has acted as if only the Republican Party existed in the United States. His preferred axis with Donald Trump is one stain that adds to many others.
Finally, the White House is also concerned about the fate of the American hostages and wants to keep several lines of communication active with Hamas (especially through Qatar) for their release. More than anything else, the keen awareness of global stocks shines through in the "undervaluation" that emerges from the many news leaks fueled by Washington.
Biden's team takes seriously the risk that an anti-Western axis of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea could have more conflicts in store. The White House believes that the rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia — and with it the tremendous potential for peace in the Middle East — can still be salvaged if the counteroffensive in Gaza is kept within acceptable limits to moderate Arab leaderships.
As shown by the unprecedented story of Hamas fake news on the bombed Palestinian hospital, the Arab streets are ready to light up on command, influencing those leaders who wish to reason and act with coolness. The Biden administration is afraid of loneliness. Watch how the Palestinian cause is bringing the global South closer than ever to the sphere of influence of China, Russia and Iran. He notes that in the case of Ukraine he managed to organize a fairly cohesive and coherent response from the Europeans, while in the Middle East Europe is irrelevant. He observes growing Chinese provocations in Asia (most recently against the Philippines) as a worrying sign of the third front that may be opening. / Adapted "Pamphlet" from "Corriere della Sera"
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