FLASH
Shkruar nga Eric Alter
Faced with the strategic disengagement of the US and the rivalry with China, Europe must define its sphere of influence. A new defense doctrine is the only way to avoid the continent becoming a playground for foreign powers...
In a world where spheres of influence are constantly being reshaped, there is no reason why Europe should not have its own. If the 1930s were considered the most turbulent period of the 20th century - immediately following the Great Depression - the year 2025 may go down in history as the time when the world desperately tried to avert a looming catastrophe.
Earlier this year, the Trump administration's efforts to pressure Venezuela, neutralize its president, or even its ambition to buy Greenland can no longer be seen simply as internal matters of the Western Hemisphere.
This approach has not only taken on worrying proportions, but also poses a major challenge to all global powers, with potentially catastrophic consequences. The fragile architecture of collective security is crumbling and the balance of power that it guarantees is changing once and for all.
The current rivalry is not limited to the United States and China; it has now spread between two different versions of the West (the United States and Europe). This conflict has reached European shores, where the main risk remains the possible withdrawal of Washington from NATO - a move that would threaten the very existence of the European Union.
NATO, the transatlantic alliance created in 1949 as a product of the Cold War, is suddenly looking like an anachronistic structure. Why invest blood and resources in protecting the Baltic borders or the independence of Ukraine, when today's threats stem from migratory waves from the south or economic crises in Latin America?
The United States is now seeking freedom of action, arguing that the fiscal burden and strategic footprint have become unsustainable. This process, which began with troop reductions, is expected to affect even the highest pillars of allied solidarity: command structures, military exercises, and shared intelligence networks.
As these ties weaken, tensions are set to rise further. Efforts by France and Germany to create a more independent European army are also exposing the EU's own internal divisions. The European Union remains the most vulnerable link in the system, especially after this year's National Defense Strategy (NDS), which suggested that Europe should no longer aspire to the role of a global power, but rather focus its resources within the continent.
Beyond the consequences of Brexit and the rise of populism in Hungary and Italy, the stability of the EU is directly threatened by an American “Monroe Doctrine” that undermines NATO’s security architecture.
Transatlantic trade relations are extremely strained, while the US is focusing on hemispheric alliances, perhaps revitalizing the Organization of American States to challenge Chinese influence in Venezuela and Brazil.
European exports risk facing retaliatory tariffs. In this climate, southern European countries are looking towards Mediterranean agreements, while northern ones favor Nordic-Baltic coalitions - developments that threaten the unity of the common market.
The question that arises is: under what conditions can a disengaged America serve as a catalyst for a stronger Europe? Europe has the means, but it lacks the political will.
First, it must recognize that it needs its own version of the Monroe Doctrine: a framework that clearly defines its sphere of influence, including EU members, associated territories like Greenland, and strategic regions like the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership.
Second, the remaining parts of NATO after a possible US withdrawal should be integrated into a new Common Security and Defense Policy structure, to create a genuine European defense union.
It remains to be seen whether this process of “risk reduction” can continue without relying on Washington, creating a hybrid model where Europe autonomously manages territorial threats.
The real danger is that a slow disintegration could produce a mosaic of mini-alliances – a Visegrad bloc here, a Franco-German axis there – making each of them vulnerable to external pressures.
History teaches us that when alliances weaken rapidly, as happened during the isolationist period between the two world wars, the risk of a major conflict increases significantly.
Third, Europe must show unity through collective resolve, as it did with sanctions against Russia after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. To succeed, it must overcome internal differences and concretize the idea of a European army, proposed by President Emmanuel Macron.
Fourth, Europe should assess geopolitical shifts and leverage its economic power to counter both the US and China. A Monroe Doctrine-like declaration would strengthen the continent's negotiating position, enabling a coordinated response through the EU's Anti-Coercive Instrument or reciprocal tariffs.
This approach would serve as a shield against US extraterritorial sanctions and protect vital industries, such as technology and defense. As for China, this doctrine would address critical dependence on raw materials and manufactured goods. Europe could seek reciprocity, blocking Chinese state-subsidized capacity or coercive measures in sectors such as electric cars and solar power, using its own regulatory mechanisms.
Regardless of the discussions about the Arctic or long-term defense plans, the final outcome will depend on diplomacy and the ability to adapt. If the Greenland crisis reopens, the most likely scenario is a semi-autonomous Europe: capable of dealing with regional crises, but still dependent on the United States for strategic support. In the long run, this hybrid model could change the transatlantic relationship by sharing responsibilities more fairly. In the most pessimistic scenario, Europe must be ready to defend itself at all costs.
This requires not only a change of tone, but also an acceptance of reality: taking responsibility
full commitment to military spending and defense capabilities. A “European Monroe Doctrine” would make the continent’s global ambitions more realistic. Without it, Europe risks remaining simply a playground for the interests of other powers. /Adapted from Pamphlet by “National Interest”
Note: Eric Alter is dean of the Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy in Abu Dhabi, professor of international law and diplomacy.
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