The protests are fueled by a grand objective, the overthrow of the government, however their real objective is to create a spirit, a domino effect to create political momentum around the gravitational center that is Sali Berisha himself.
Beyond the nervousness and a generally pathetic discourse, the debate on the protests, and of course the opposition protests, does not have a linear logical line. On panels, the nalists explode, get angry and go viral on TikTok or Facebook reels.
And they're liking this a lot, and there are even politicians or balanced public figures who, upon discovering the virality of a reel, have abandoned writing. They mostly insert two or three sentences in capital letters without the "ë" and "ç" and then the video, where they act in a television studio.
In these days, which have become weeks and months since November, the main topic is how to overthrow Edi Rama and what the protests should be like. Someone says they should be strong, even very strong, adding metaphors of savannahs or the animal world that have recently become political symbols.
There are others who value duration, namely consistency, which can create a greater political effect. As are others, such as one of the most well-known politicians in the country, Dashamir Shehi, who never tires of emphasizing that the power of an opposition lies in the idea, platform, or reforms it promotes in a political action.
The protests are fueled by a grand objective, the overthrow of the government, however their real objective is to create a spirit, a domino effect to create political momentum around the gravitational center that is Sali Berisha himself.
To make the analysis more tangible, let's invoke analogy as a litmus test. Let's take as a model the protests of 2003-2004 and the so-called protests over Bashar Al Assad's chemical weapons.
The protests against Fatos Nano's government were organized by a group of associations, centered on Erion Veliaj's MJAFT and the organization led by Kreshkin Sspahiu. They had openly and clearly international support in terms of will and funding.
These protests created a fluid alliance with Sali Berisha's opposition, important media groups, but also politicians from the then-majority, which was divided and in internal strife.
The protests created a spirit, but also a political effect, as the majority was heading towards disintegration, which was sealed with the creation of the LSI. Prime Minister Fatos Nano also lost his majority in the Assembly, as some socialist deputies did not vote for the ministers and he governed with deputy ministers.
This atmosphere lasted for two years until the elections where the majority did not receive a third mandate and the opposition of Sali Berisha came to government. The protests, which were a means and form of communication, were a path towards a process that was consecrated with the elections. Their success, in addition to their massiveness and civic galvanization, also came as a result of alliances with society, politics, the media and even the majority.
In 2013, a few months after coming to power, Edi Rama was faced with an important request from the US that could provide the majority, but also the country, with major American support.
The destruction in a monitored process of an arsenal of Assad's chemical weapons. The US accompanied this action with promises of strong political and financial support.
Alarmed that this act would greatly and immediately strengthen Edi Rama, Sali Berisha and Ilir Meta, together with their allies, decided to strongly oppose him.
The DP organized and financed "civic" groups to protest strongly against these arsenals, to the point that for the first time some opposition environmentalists even managed to protest in front of the American embassy.
Ilir Meta, who was the head of the Assembly in the governing alliance with Edi Rama and politically conditioned the governing majority in the Assembly. He openly opposed this American proposal, speaking out against it. Ben Blushi, then a member of the Socialist Party who was critical of Edi Rama and his leadership, also spoke out against it.
After a few days of "reflection", Edi Rama made the political calculations and saw that his majority could be broken before he had even spent three months at the head of the country. And he came out publicly rejecting the American proposal. A "NO" that had a significant cost for the country, while the arsenals of Syrian weapons ammunition were quietly destroyed in Italy, which received the money.
But why were these protests successful? Because they had a stated objective, significant involvement in interest groups, and most importantly, strong political alliances.
What do Sali Berisha's protests aim to do today? To use the theory of "fait acompli" - the fait accompli - to create and generate a political process with forced resolution.
The lack of people is undoubtedly simply a clear and firm rejection of Sali Berisha. The DP in Tirana alone has over 10,000 members, where only those who take to the streets can hold full and massive protests.
But as is known, Sali Berisha's DP does not control the party, which is divided, troubled and frustrated by the violent process it provoked after the Non Grata declaration.
Frustrated by this rejection by those citizens who are clearly against the embezzlement, Sali Berisha seeks to produce a political process from above. He even brought in the "abalists" in his favor to create as an imperative the creation of a front against Edi Rama. A front that the opposition actually wants, but not with Sali Berisha, and they have shown this either by voting or by polls. The demand that people love him with force is precisely the cause of the failure of the protests. Why doesn't Berisha conduct an experiment, let's leave the organization, direction and platform of the February 10 protest to a new team and try it out to see if there is a change in form and content? He has nothing to lose, he has the draw in his pocket and maybe even overthrow Edi Rama!
Lini një Përgjigje