FLASH
Shkruar nga Pamfleti
The Institute for the Study of War launched a research project in 2020 that aims to analyze how the United States and its main competitors, namely Russia and China, are adapting their armed forces by learning from recent conflicts. In particular, he identifies the main military modernization efforts carried out by Moscow and Beijing vis-à-vis the US.
Russian aspirations
Russian discussions of future wars focus particularly on the concept of management superiority, understood as the ability to make winning decisions by forcing the adversary to move within a framework of actions favorable to Moscow's forces, a concept learned from the armed forces of Kremlin during the conflict in Syria. The second key element of the reforms carried out by the Russian forces consists in the great importance reserved for the field of information. In particular, Russian theorists argue that kinetic military actions must be undertaken in the context of a broader campaign aimed at gaining information superiority. This strategy is particularly applicable in so-called "hybrid wars".
The definition of hybrid warfare refers to a strategic effort aimed at bending the governance and geostrategic orientation of a state in a direction favorable to its interests. This concept is understood by Russia in a defensive sense, since the Kremlin's rhetoric has never abandoned the idea of a Russian Federation at the center of a hybrid war waged by the United States to bend Moscow to American interests. Given Russia's military and economic inferiority compared to the West, the Kremlin has always understood information as an asymmetric tool aimed at balancing Moscow's weaknesses on a symmetrical front, where the main tools are military and financial resources.
In this context, kinetic military action is effectively subordinated to an information campaign. The Russian invasion of Ukraine should be considered the final kinetic stage of a broad information campaign, which, according to the Kremlin, would have created the conditions for regime change in the country. At the same time, Moscow's forces have also used their intervention in Syria as a model for future conflicts, using new tactics and new types of weapons. The Kremlin has simultaneously increased its ability to conduct integrated military operations with its partners through a long series of joint military exercises.
The invasion of Ukraine, however, showed the failure of Russian power. In particular, continued US intelligence support for Ukraine has made it possible to largely dismantle the Russian information campaign targeting the Ukrainian authorities.
Moscow's army also showed great limitations on the urban warfare front, being defeated by Ukrainian forces in several urban skirmishes such as the famous Battle of Hostomel, which led to the total collapse of the initial invasion plan. Basically, the Russian failure to take control of the information front in Ukraine, combined with various limitations in the military field, led to the failure of the invasion, which turned into a long conflict of attrition.
The standoff in Ukraine, however, has prompted Moscow to initiate new military reforms that take into account lessons learned during the conflict. In particular, Defense Minister Shoigu has stated that he wants to expand Russia's conventional forces, however this goal faces two obstacles, namely the need to allocate a large portion of the Russian federal budget net of economic damage sustained during the conflict, as well as the destruction of large amounts of weaponry and the death of a large part of the best units of the Russian army during the occupation of Ukraine.
Chinese aspirations
China's modernization plans and military doctrine bear a significant resemblance to their Russian counterparts. In fact, Beijing considers itself, like Moscow, as "vulnerable" to a hybrid war carried out by the United States with the aim of overthrowing the local regime, as happened in the context of the so-called "Color Revolutions". In this regard, the importance of information dominance is a priority for China, both from a defensive point of view, as the ideological strength and loyalty of the People's Liberation Army are considered essential to the survival of the regime.
Chinese modernization plans have been ongoing since 1993 and are significantly better financed and characterized by greater complexity than the Russian ones. According to Chinese theorists, victory in modern warfare depends on a strong chain of command and control, as well as the destruction of Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence and Surveillance (C4isr) capabilities. In this regard, Beijing is particularly investing in the use of Artificial Intelligence for military purposes, benefiting in particular from a solid partnership with the private sector. In fact, China sees AI as a tool to significantly increase its ability to locate the enemy and destroy it with extreme precision, allowing it to make decisions more quickly. However, the People's Liberation Army forces lack operational experience, having not fought a real conflict since 1979.
Prandaj, Pekini ka analizuar me kujdes konfliktet e zhvilluara nga kombet e tjera, në veçanti sjelljen e SHBA-së gjatë Luftës së Gjirit. Një rol kyç në përcaktimin e planeve të reformës së Kinës luajtën gjithashtu konfliktet në Çeçeni dhe Ukrainë, të cilat i lejuan Pekinit të mësonte taktika të reja për luftimin urban. Në të njëjtën kohë, trajnimi kinez është bërë më kompleks, falë përdorimit të vazhdueshëm të algoritmeve dhe simulimeve, duke alternuar me përdorimin e strukturave fizike të afta për të simuluar mjedise të ndryshme operacionale në një mënyrë jashtëzakonisht realiste.
Si mund të ruajë avantazhin Uashingtoni
Si Republika Popullore e Kinës ashtu edhe Federata Ruse e konsiderojnë dominimin e informacionit si një komponent kyç të strategjisë së tyre ushtarake, duke integruar strukturat e tyre vendimmarrëse me sistemet efektive “C4isr” në mënyrë që të koordinojnë të gjitha përpjekjet kinetike dhe jo-kinetike të nevojshme për të arritur qëllimin. Në këtë kontekst, trajnimi i kuadrove ushtarake dhe trajnimi i personelit të aftë për të marrë vendime shpejt dhe për të përshtatur planet e luftës në rast dështimi fillestar duket thelbësor. Megjithatë, pushtimi rus i Ukrainës tregoi dështimin e përgjithshëm të Moskës për të arritur mbizotërimin e vendimeve të dëshiruara, për shkak të aftësive të dobëta operacionale të forcave të saj të armatosura.
Si përfundim, aktualisht Shtetet e Bashkuara kanë një avantazh të rëndësishëm në teknologjinë ushtarake, mirëmbajtja e së cilës është thelbësore. Sipas raportit të Institutit për Studimin e Luftës, zbatimi i sanksioneve që kufizojnë mundësitë ruse dhe kineze për modernizim është thelbësor për Uashingtonin. Megjithatë, dimensioni që lidhet me trajnimin e kuadrove ushtarake, si dhe përcaktimi i saktë i aftësive ushtarake që duhen fituar, mbetet një faktor kyç për të lejuar përjetësimin e udhëheqjes amerikane, në mungesë të të cilit avantazhi teknologjik amerikan nuk mund të përkthehet në një avantazh efektiv operacional. Megjithatë, ISË identifikon një të metë serioze në politikën e mbrojtjes së SHBA-së në lidhje me formulimin e planeve afatgjata. Në fakt, nëse nga njëra anë procesi i vendimmarrjes në SHBA është më transparent se homologët e tij rusë dhe kinezë, si dhe i aftë për të integruar këndvështrime të ndryshme, duke qenë kështu më funksional në një nivel operacional, ai mbetet i prekur nga një paaftësi e rëndë për të formuluar plane afatgjata.
The decision-making process is actually slow, inconsistent and carried out by many actors present in different sectors of the bureaucracy. On the other hand, the Russian and Chinese decision-making process is highly centralized, which favors the formulation of long-term strategic plans. In conclusion, the perpetuation of the role of the US as the main global military power lies not only in maintaining a simple technological advantage in terms of equipment, but also in training human personnel, qualitatively superior to Washington's competitors, and in formulating plans long-term strategic plans, which are not hostage to the will of the interested parties responsible for their drafting. /Adapted "Pamphlet" from "Inside Over"
Lini një Përgjigje