FLASH
Shkruar nga Pamfleti
Tareq Baconi is the chairman of the board of directors of the Al-Shabaka think-tank group, the Palestine Policy Network.
He worked with the International Crisis Group in Ramallah and is the author of the 2018 book Controlling Hamas, a text in which, drawing on interviews with the organization's leaders as well as the group's publications, he traces the thirty-year transition of Hamas from marginal military resistance to a group that, in Baconi's words, "has used two elements that characterize its history—strategy and patience—to transform itself into a sophisticated movement to the point of carrying out an attack like the one on October 7".
Tareq Baconi's interview for "La Stampa":
"No, I didn't expect it. I don't even think Hamas imagined it would go this far. In some ways, the belief that Israel has an invincible army, that it has equally valuable intelligence, persists, and the idea that the blockade of the Gaza Strip was truly impenetrable. The fact that Hamas was able to do what it did, how it did it, and sustain an operation in Israeli towns and villages for hours, has a major effect on the security statements Israel has been making for years. And I don't think Hamas anticipated the fact that Israeli artillery and weapons would allow this. I'm not saying they didn't believe they could get behind the fences, but I think they themselves were surprised by the scale of the attack, how long it lasted, and how weak the Israeli defense system was. I believe that Hamas wanted to carry out an attack to activate a liberation strategy, but I think it did not foresee a start like this, which weakened the basic Israeli pillar, the myth of security."
"That policy was very clear from the beginning: they want to reject the idea that Israel can continue with impunity with forms of colonizing violence against the Palestinians. It opposes the idea that Israel can continue to enjoy the relations it has with Europe, the United States, and increasingly the Arab world, under the pretense of being a democratic Jewish state. And then they wanted to bring the Palestinian issue back to the center of the agenda, to overturn the assumption that the Palestinians could live indefinitely with what was happening. How they handle the coming weeks will depend on how much support they are able to mobilize outside the Beltway. Not in terms of support for Hamas, but in terms of protests. Hezbollah in the north can support in the West Bank. But these are still ongoing considerations."
"Yes, I think Israel is working with the goal of defeating Hamas. But I think it won't be possible. The Hamas organization can be destroyed, of course, by isolating Hamas, almost to the point of ethnic cleansing. But Hamas is much more than an organization, it is an ideology. And even if Hamas is destroyed at the organizational level, there will be another uprising, a kind of Palestinian mobilization for liberation, as happens in anti-colonial struggles. The reality is that Israel doesn't have a problem - Hamas, it has a Palestinian problem. To destroy Hamas, it must destroy Gaza, but if the uprising were to move to the West Bank, to Lebanon, Israel would be in a much more difficult position and it is not certain that it would emerge victorious."
"It is useful to remember that the Strip represented a challenge to Israel long before Hamas controlled it. Since 1948, Israeli authorities have been trying to encircle the Gaza Strip, but for years Hamas has been the perfect excuse to maintain the blockade. The challenge that Gaza represents is that two-thirds of the population are refugees seeking to return home to what is now Israel, and under international law they have the right to do so. What we are seeing, the preparation of the ground offensive by Israel, is not only a revenge for what happened on October 7, but it is also a demographic engineering plan, they are using this moment to remove the population of Gaza from the Strip to create a refugee problem in Egypt".
"The Palestinian Authority is no longer perceived as a legitimate body, it is seen as an extension of Israel due to security coordination. In 2021, polls showed that if there had been an election, Hamas would have won again, but most Palestinians would not vote for Hamas in support of its Islamic ideology, but because it represents the struggle of military resistance. Palestinians see Hamas as a party that protects them from Israeli aggression. After an attack of this type, after what is happening in the Strip, it is very likely that the support of Hamas will increase in the West Bank."
“Protestat janë shumë të rëndësishme sepse bien ndesh me idenë se çështja palestineze nuk është më një çështje qendrore për regjimet dhe qeveritë arabe. Jo vetëm kaq, njerëzit në këto protesta tregojnë se kjo deklaratë është e rrezikshme. Deri dy javë më parë, kjo situatë përdorej për të mbështetur marrëveshjet e normalizimit midis Izraelit dhe botës arabe. Analiza fillestare ishte se çështja palestineze nuk do të shfaqej si një faktor i aftë për të mobilizuar masat. Por protestat tregojnë se ekziston një dallim i madh midis asaj që mendojnë regjimet dhe asaj që mendojnë njerëzit në rrugë, dhe vazhdojnë të konfirmojnë rëndësinë qendrore të kauzës palestineze në botën e tyre”.
“Është shumë herët për të thënë, por është e qartë se ata kanë potencialin për të krijuar shumë presion. Historikisht, kauza palestineze ka qenë gjithmonë ajo në të cilën udhëheqësit arabë janë fokusuar për të larguar vëmendjen nga çështjet e brendshme. Njerëzit në këto vende toleruan regjimet shtypëse sepse mendonin se këta liderë po vepronin në mbështetje të Palestinës. Skenari ka ndryshuar në dekadat e fundit: këta liderë mendonin se fuqia e tyre, veçanërisht pas revolucioneve të 2011, mund të shtohej nga një aleancë sigurie, ushtarake dhe diplomatike me Izraelin. Tani, në një kontekst ku masat arabe po shfaqen në mbështetje të Palestinës, kjo mund të përkthehet në kundërshtim me vetë regjimet, kështu që unë mendoj se regjimet janë shumë, shumë të shqetësuar”.
“Kjo varet shumë nga ajo që do të ndodhë në ditët dhe javët në vijim. Në vende si Jordania apo Egjipti, të cilat kanë një histori më të gjatë paqeje, të ‘paqes së ftohtë’, njerëzit nuk i miratojnë marrëveshjet e paqes. Tashmë ka një presion të madh në Jordani për të dëbuar ambasadorin dhe për të minuar marrëveshjet diplomatike dhe kjo është një çështje që ka ekzistuar tashmë vitet e fundit sa herë që ka ndodhur përshkallëzimi më i vogël. Në vendet ku marrëveshjet janë më të fundit, si Emiratet e Bashkuara Arabe dhe Bahreini, mendoj se qasja ndaj popullsisë do të mbetet mjaft autoritare dhe besoj se regjimet do të përpiqen të rrëzojnë çdo lloj proteste në mbështetje të palestinezëve. Unë mendoj se ata përpiqen të drejtojnë valën dhe të mbajnë marrëveshjet. E njëjta gjë për Marokun. Një histori edhe më ndryshe për Arabinë Saudite, e cila po shkonte drejt një marrëveshjeje për të cilën kishte mbetur një skepticizëm i madh. Mendoj se tani do të jetë shumë më e vështirë për Arabinë Saudite të arrijë kushtet e një marrëveshjeje”.
"Netanyahu always comes back, but at the same time it was the biggest failure of an Israeli leader in history. October 7 represents the greatest loss of Jewish life since 1948 and the strategic and security failure is unprecedented. I don't know how Netanyahu can survive this, politically. It is the entire Israeli political structure that has stalled, a structure that is based on the idea that the security infrastructure, the militarization of society, the political reality of the occupation guaranteed the safety of Israeli Jews. There is no going back to that illusion now. There is no way that any Israeli Jew can truly believe that he is safe until the Palestinian issue is resolved. It's too early to say how this will shape the Israeli political and social fabric, but I really think it will change the minds of Israelis and the idea of being a safe haven forever."
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