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Tehran needs positive incentives, not just pressure
Despite intense negotiations that lasted through the night, peace talks between Iran and the United States have failed. Both sides had many disagreements to resolve, so reaching a lasting agreement was always going to be difficult. However, one issue in particular seems to have been crucial to the failure: Iran's nuclear program.
“The meeting went well, most points were agreed upon,” US President Donald Trump wrote on social media. “But the one point that mattered most, nuclear, was not reached.”
It is no surprise that the nuclear issue is at the center of Trump’s attention, nor that it has led to the collapse of the talks. Managing Iran’s nuclear ambitions has been a key challenge of global diplomacy for decades. But during his two terms in office, the US has tried to force Iran to give up its program entirely through economic pressure and military action. Each time, this approach has failed.
“We will make sure that Iran does not get a nuclear weapon,” Trump declared on February 28, the day Washington launched bombing raids on Tehran. But six weeks later, the fundamental challenge remains. The war may have inflicted significant damage on Iran, but it has not destroyed the country’s nuclear know-how or its long-term ability to rebuild the program.
This danger has now become more acute politically, even as Iran’s near-term technical capacity has been significantly damaged. The lesson that many in Tehran may learn from the war is not that restraint brings security, but that weakness makes one vulnerable to attack. This is not to say that a quick or covert attempt to build a nuclear weapon is possible; any serious move in that direction would take time and be easily detectable. But it does mean that the case for maintaining the possibility of a nuclear deterrent in the future is likely to have been strengthened.
These results confirm a clear reality: diplomacy is the only viable path to ensuring that Iran’s nuclear program remains peaceful. In fact, this approach has worked before. For more than a decade, American diplomats worked with their counterparts from China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the European Union to reach an agreement with Iran. The result was the 2015 agreement (JCPOA), in which Iran agreed to verifiable restrictions in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. One of the authors, Federica Mogherini, led the negotiations and implementation of the agreement; the other, Shah, worked for years on the policy architecture that supported it. These states did not negotiate with Tehran because they trusted it completely or because they were naive, but because they understood that the alternative to diplomacy is the chaos and destruction we see today.
However, the JCPOA did not last. In 2018, less than two years after taking office, Trump unilaterally withdrew from the agreement, even though the International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed that Iran was complying with it and the other parties wanted it to continue. This failure should not be seen as a reason not to try again. On the contrary, it shows that a new agreement must be more durable and more difficult for either party to abandon. The war has shown that Washington cannot force Iran to surrender. To prevent the development of nuclear weapons, the US must reach an agreement with the Islamic Republic and ensure that it actually works.
A series of failures
The authors describe the US-Israeli war against Iran as illegal and reckless. According to them, there was no evidence that Iran posed an immediate nuclear threat or that diplomacy had failed. On the contrary, negotiations were underway and some mediating parties assessed that progress was being made.
Even if Iran were close to producing a nuclear weapon, many analysts have argued that military strikes would not stop it, especially in the long term. The scientific knowledge and industrial capacity of a country of over 90 million people cannot be destroyed by bombing. The facilities can be destroyed, but they can be rebuilt more deeply and with greater determination.
The events following the attacks confirmed this analysis: Iran expanded the conflict, attacked Arab countries, and closed the Strait of Hormuz, causing a sharp increase in energy prices. Although Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed, he was quickly replaced by his son Mojtaba. The Revolutionary Guard lost parts of the infrastructure, but strengthened its control over the country. The war did not eliminate Iran's nuclear capabilities; on the contrary, it reinforced the argument for a nuclear deterrent.
The role of diplomacy and incentives
Negotiations have shown that they can positively influence Iran’s behavior. The JCPOA remains the leading example, but to succeed today, negotiations must address past weaknesses. The Iranian nuclear program is complex and requires deep technical and political expertise. The lack of this expertise in recent negotiations led to misunderstandings and misinterpretations.
The authors emphasize that negotiations should provide incentives, not just pressure. Sanctions and military pressure can only work if they are accompanied by a credible diplomatic path and concrete benefits. In the case of the JCPOA, Iran received gradual sanctions relief and the prospect of economic normalization. In recent negotiations, the US relied mainly on pressure, without offering a clear vision for the future, which made Iran doubt Washington’s credibility.
Towards a new agreement
The trust issue is no longer one-sided. The US withdrawal from the 2015 deal and military actions during the negotiations have affected the perception of Iran. However, according to the authors, Tehran remains willing to compromise, as economic isolation and war are unsustainable.
A future agreement must ensure mutual accountability and resilience to political change. It must include strong economic mechanisms and joint projects that create shared interests for its continuation.
A single road
To reach an agreement, the US must combine pressure with credible incentives and a clear vision of mutual benefits. Although mistrust and political dynamics make the process difficult, the expertise and experience to build agreements still exist.
Diplomacy with Iran is not a favor to Tehran, but a strategic interest in avoiding further conflict. According to the authors, the possibility of a new agreement exists, the question remains whether international actors will learn from the mistakes of the past. /Adapted from ForeignAffairs /
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