FLASH
Shkruar nga Pamfleti
While Belgrade refuses to amend the Constitution for a third presidential term, in Tirana, Edi Rama prepares the transformation of the system; from Prime Minister to President with full powers...
In a statement that surprised public opinion, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić announced that he will not change the Constitution to stay in power longer, stating that he will complete his current term and will not run for re-election.
This decision comes at a tense time for Serbia, with massive protests, a lack of a parliamentary majority for constitutional changes, and increased international pressure for institutional stability.
Anticipating a clash with the opposition and civil society, Vučić chose to step down, not out of democratic conviction, but due to a lack of arithmetic calculations in the Assembly.
Essentially, this retreat is an act of political calculation, a maneuver to preserve his personal image and avoid being labeled a dictator by the West. Vučić knows full well that with the West in focus and a resurgent opposition on the streets, any attempt to change the rules of the game would end in internal instability and diplomatic isolation. He chooses to pause, perhaps temporarily.
In stark contrast to this development, in Albania, Edi Rama is preparing the opposite. While Vučić is backing away from presidential ambitions with increased powers, Rama is testing the waters for a quiet but dangerous project: amending the Constitution to create a presidential system tailored to his political mass.
Under the pretext of justice reform and the need for a “more functional” system, Rama is extending his tentacles towards absolute institutional control, where the role of the President shifts from ceremonial to executive. This move, if realized, would mark an overturn of the parliamentary system that Albania has had since the fall of the dictatorship.
Unlike Serbia, where parliamentary mechanisms and civil society forced the government to step down, Albania is sliding towards an authoritarian model with silent institutional consensus and a paralyzed opposition. The difference is profound: in Belgrade, fear of punishment stopped Vučić; in Tirana, the arrogance of impunity drives Rama.
In both cases, it is clear that Balkan leaders, raised in fragile democratic systems, see the Constitution not as a contract with citizens, but as a manipulative instrument to prolong power. But while Serbia has shown an ability to limit presidential ambitions, Albania faces the real risk of a full-blown state capture. In the end, the question is this: will Albania have its own “Vučić” moment, or will it end up with a regime that resembles Turkey’s Erdogan more than a European democracy?/ Pamphlet
Lini një Përgjigje