FLASH
Shkruar nga Pamfleti
The Home Office used an informant's cellphone to listen to conversations with Israeli 007s, another used a pawn to get details on Shin Bet "safe houses."
In spy lingo I call it "caviar". He is the double agent, the man who works for two groups, useful to deceive. Hamas has managed to turn this element into one of its best weapons, convincing Israeli collaborators to act for the movement as well.
It is likely that, tactically, these obscure figures participated in a well-studied plan. Palestinian sources revealed to Reuters how the Ezzedine al Qassam Brigades managed to deceive the enemy by hiding their intentions.
Egypt, which has "eyes" on Gaza, had warned Jerusalem of "something big" to come, but was surprised by the Netanyahu government's lack of attention. We will see if this happened because of the mistakes of Mossad, Shin Bet and Aman, Jerusalem's military intelligence.
Hamas's first move was to convey a reassuring message: we are not interested in a new conflict, we are committed to managing Gaza, we are negotiating to increase the number of Palestinian workers working in the Jewish state. A note said and re-said, on multiple levels, both on and off the Strip. However, there were contacts in April with the Iranian Pasdaran in Lebanon, but they were interpreted as preparations for smaller actions, attacks that Israel learned to contain and tolerate.
The Jerusalem government, however, appeared more cautious at the official level about the direct involvement of the ayatollahs. There are times for specific fees. The chain of attacks in the West Bank also weighed on the overall assessment, the violence - combined with the government's ideological choice in favor of the settlers' demands - that pushed the increase of units in the West Bank, weakening the southern sector.
The second card was more obvious. Brigades conduct military exercises, evidence documented by videos published on the Internet. Everything seems clear. Their workers were the ones who showed the floor plans of the houses and the details of the areas that were attacked, a theater in which they would rehearse the mission. It is impossible that the Shin Bet did not notice. The analysis office will have thought about routine, propaganda activities. And what did their sources on the ground say? Did they confirm it?
Shortly after the birth of Hamas, al Majd, the initial counter-espionage cell, was created. The apparatus was replaced in 2007 by Homeland Security, which has become a key component. It hunted down traitors, studied its adversary and equipped itself with technological means with Iranian help. On several occasions, when he discovered a traitor, instead of brutally punishing him, he convinced him to cooperate in "intoxicating" the Shin Bet. It's a subtle game, but one that has an effect.
The double agent is used to pass accurate data and disinformation, it is possible to sacrifice something or someone in order not to arouse suspicion among the Israelis. In one episode, Homeland Security used the informant's cellphone to listen in on conversations with Israeli 007s, in another it used the hostage to get details on Shin Bet "safe houses." But there was one episode where the spy killed his intelligence contact, a gesture to completely atone for his guilt.
An endless dance of duelists. With losses, twists, infiltrations. In September, the arrest of a Brigade operative in Lebanon, but previously active in Turkey, was announced. A member of the technical department spied on comrades in Gaza and abroad, giving the Mossad details later used to eliminate explosives expert Hamza Shahi in the Gaza Strip in 2021. Economic hardships led him to betray one of the Israelis' favorite hooks for recruiting collaborators. / Adapted "Pamphlet" from "Corriere Della Sera"
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