FLASH
Shkruar nga Pamfleti
For America, the benefits of war will not outweigh the costs
Contrary to the Trump administration’s relentless public relations campaign at the start of the offensive against Iran, war is not a movie or a video game. Starting a war is a decision to kill real people, destroy property, and divert limited resources from other priorities. For these moral and material costs to be acceptable, they must serve a good purpose. However, no purpose is sufficient unless it is accompanied by a strategy that can achieve it at an acceptable cost. Strategy implies a plan for how military power will produce the desired political outcome. The war on Iran has none.
A common danger in war is the displacement of goals, when the tactical demands of complex military operations achieve immediate objectives but do not serve the higher strategic and political purpose. Often, naive political leaders assume that military destruction of the enemy equates to strategic success. In Iran, goal and strategy must be aligned if war is to have any justification.
For the sake of argument, let’s set aside the fundamental political and moral question of whether the war was lawful in the first place. Even lawful wars must be waged in a reasonable manner, and that requires a match between means and ends. The key question is whether the administration has done so, or whether its way of waging war is as vague, capricious, and counterproductive as critics claim.
The stated goal of the war was to eliminate the Islamic Republic’s violent threat to American interests. The Trump administration has been criticized for strategic confusion, as it has declared several objectives: eliminating Tehran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons, destroying its missile and naval forces, and overthrowing the regime. An administration defender might argue that these are complementary rather than alternative objectives, and that the strategy is to pursue them all simultaneously. The ultimate outcome would be to almost completely resolve the Iran problem through regime change. Failing that, the minimum objective would be to manage the threat by weakening Iran and restarting the war from time to time to deter renewed threats. This approach is known as “mowing the lawn.”
The maximum goal of regime change seems impossible. The American attack not only failed to produce a liberal popular uprising that would overthrow the Iranian leadership, but may have had the opposite effect, creating an even more hostile government. As for the minimum goal, that too is problematic. Destroying Iran would not sufficiently reduce its ability or motivation to harm American interests. On the contrary, it would increase the resolve to retaliate.
The immediate achievement of the goals at an acceptable cost is debatable. Although the bombings have significantly weakened Iranian capabilities, it remains unclear how much weakening is sufficient to eliminate the threat. In theory, a verifiable deal could achieve this, if Iran sees it as favorable. But if the administration seeks such a deal, actions such as assassinating negotiating partners and undermining American credibility by abandoning previous agreements and launching surprise attacks during negotiations are not the logical path. Without a deal, the alternative would be to invade and occupy Iran, which is practically unfeasible given the country’s size and population. Another option is a periodic return to war, while another is a negotiated settlement. The former is unworkable and the latter is unlikely, leaving the United States with few alternatives.
High risk, no benefit
The benefit of periodically returning to war would be to slow Iran’s military and nuclear recovery. But without extensive on-the-ground inspections, it remains unclear how effective this would be. In June 2025, Trump declared that Iran’s nuclear program had been “destroyed,” but less than a year later another strike was deemed necessary. It is possible that the same problem will repeat itself. Containing the Iranian threat is an open-ended strategy. Iran has existential reasons to maintain the nuclear option, while the US and Israel have existential reasons to eliminate it.
Any strike requires accurate information about targets, but this cannot always be guaranteed. Meanwhile, Iran's weakening encourages defensive improvements and a desire for revenge. A combination of reduced but still existing capabilities and an increased willingness to use them does not constitute strategic success.
In the short term, US operations could fuel terrorism. In the long term, repeated cycles of strikes could lead to dangerous escalation. Even if the development of advanced nuclear weapons is prevented, the production of simpler weapons cannot be ruled out, especially by a desperate regime.
For Israel, this strategy can be justified by existential risk. For the US, the risk is not of the same level. Focusing on Iran distracts from other, larger threats like Russia, China, and North Korea.
The costs are high: billions of dollars in spending, impact on support for Ukraine, pressure on military arsenals, and shocks to the global economy.
Weakened, but not defeated
A negotiated agreement could be a solution, but it seems unlikely. The 2015 deal was abandoned by the US, and attacks during the negotiations have damaged trust. This makes it difficult for Iran to take US diplomacy seriously.
Even if the US declares victory and withdraws, the costs already outweigh the benefits. The Iranian threat has been weakened, but not eliminated. It may be less intense, but more likely to emerge.
The war appears to have been a miscalculation from the start. It has damaged U.S. moral credibility, exposed weaknesses in strategy, and linked American and Israeli interests in problematic ways. The war has demonstrated great tactical military power but a lack of a thoughtful strategy for the ultimate outcome. /Adapted from ForeignAffairs /
Për të zgjuarit e Foreign Affairs, lufta nisi që të rrëzohej rregjimi teokrat. Ndërkohë që shahun e rrëzoi CIA dhe lobi i naftës dhe solli Komienin në fuqi.Për çudi harrojnë dhe synimin e lzraelit për hegjemonin në lindjen e afërme. Kur e pyetën Hitlerin çështë Amerika, bankierë çifutët që shfrytëzojnë fermerët dhe puntorët amerikanë tha. Kenediin, presidentin më të mirë amerikan e vranë lobi çifut kur po i ndalonte ndërtimin e bombës atomike dhe lobi i armatimit, kur nuk po pranonte të niste ushtrinë në Vietnam. Thonë që Kenedi u vra kur kujtoi se ishte president , kur president është lobi çifut , lobi i armatimi dhe ai i naftës.
Paske hik nga trute. E interpreton historine si Radio Moska