FLASH
Shkruar nga Pamfleti
A more active approach would help strengthen Riyadh's regional influence.
The war between the United States and Israel against Iran has been a difficult challenge for Saudi Arabia. Already facing economic pressures, the kingdom has been forced to cut spending and postpone deadlines for major projects intended to symbolize its transformation. The Public Investment Fund will now focus on alternative energy, advanced manufacturing, logistics, water and renewable resources, tourism and the Neom project, the futuristic city being built in the northwest of the country.
Also, in line with the developments in the conflict, Riyadh will continue to invest in its defense industry and diversify its arms supplies. Saudi authorities plan to discontinue the golf league launched by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and have already sold 70 percent of the Al Hilal football club.
Regarding the war, Saudi Arabia faced public criticism in late February, when the Washington Post reported that Mohammed bin Salman, like Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, had lobbied US President Donald Trump to attack Iran.
Riyadh denied this. A few weeks later, as Trump declared that the war would end within days, the New York Times reported that the crown prince was again asking the US president to end the operation against Tehran. This time too, Saudi Arabia denied it. However, despite public statements that it does not want war, is not involved in Operation Epic Fury and supports a diplomatic solution, the country has been repeatedly targeted by Iran and its allies in Iraq. In response, Saudi authorities have stated that they “reserve the right” to retaliate, but have so far taken no concrete action.
This is not to say that Saudi Arabia should be drawn into the war, but the fact that a country that considers itself a rising power and a key player in the Middle East remains in an ambiguous position as the region faces crisis is significant. While others, including its adversaries, are influencing developments, Riyadh is largely limited to strong statements. In this sense, a more concrete approach could better serve the protection of its interests.
The situation is complex for Saudi Arabia. Having invested about $1 trillion in economic transformation, Saudi leaders seek regional stability above all. From their perspective, no actor is contributing to this direction, not Hamas, not Syria, not the United Arab Emirates, not Iran, and especially not Israel and the United States.
Faced with the fact that its main partner, the US, has contributed to destabilization along with Israel, Riyadh is trying to determine the best way to protect itself in a situation that could lead to three scenarios.
The first scenario is a stalemate: Trump tires of the conflict and declares an American victory without translating it into a strategic success, while American forces remain in the region and sanctions on Iran continue. This would not be the worst outcome for Saudi Arabia, although the threat from Iranian missiles and drones would remain.
The second scenario is a real US victory, which could range from weakening Iran's ability to threaten its neighbors to regime change. This would be the most favorable outcome for Saudi Arabia and other regional actors.
The third and most negative scenario is an Iranian victory, characterized by sanctions relief, a role for Tehran in managing the Strait of Hormuz, the survival of the regime, and a US withdrawal from the region.
Although all three scenarios are possible, the way Saudi Arabia is handling the conflict suggests that it is giving less credit to an American victory and is preparing for a stalemate or an outcome that favors Iran. This also explains its efforts to maintain a delicate balance: denying support for the war, distancing itself from reports of pressure on the US, and periodically threatening Iran without concrete action.
This cautious approach was supposed to be a thing of the past for the Saudi leadership. However, it reflects the difficult position in which the country finds itself: Saudi Arabia is not as powerful and influential as its rhetoric suggests, remaining dependent on the United States, which, together with Israel, is trying to reshape the Middle East. Mohammed bin Salman may agree with the objective, but not with the means of achieving it. In these circumstances, Riyadh is trying to keep options open for any development.
Given the risks to Vision 2030 and the country’s strategic interests, the analysis suggests that Saudi Arabia would benefit from a clearer and more proactive stance. Such a stance could include assessing Iran as a security threat, participating in efforts to ensure freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, and responding to attacks.
Ultimately, while Saudi Arabia has reason to be unhappy with the actions of the US and Israel, the analysis argues that the most effective way to limit the consequences of the conflict is to take a clear stance and accept a certain level of risk. In the absence of this, Riyadh risks being perceived as a less important actor compared to Israel and Iran in regional developments. /Adapted from ForeignPolicy /
Lini një Përgjigje