The Israeli government has rejected the Biden administration’s proposals to replace Hamas with the Palestinian Authority in Gaza. It has dragged Lebanon into another war, rather than supporting its government to limit Hezbollah’s power. In Syria, it is missing the opportunity to reach a security agreement with the new government. Meanwhile, it is not clear whether Israel has any influence on the stalled negotiations between the US and Iran.
Not all wars are fought equally. One of the reasons Israel, a small democratic country in a largely hostile region, has survived for 78 years is that its leaders have long understood this fact. They saw that the greatest benefits come from preventing wars, but when they are inevitable, they should be fought quickly, with clear and realistic objectives. Short conflicts, they argued, should be a prelude to something far more valuable: a developed civilian life. In times of peace, a country can grow better, strengthening its economic and technological capabilities. For these reasons, for decades, Israel’s military doctrine has aimed to keep wars limited and based on prevention, early warning, and decisive action.
It is disturbing to see how Israel’s current leaders have abandoned this approach. As Israelis mark their independence anniversary this week, the country is embroiled in multiple conflicts, of varying intensity, that have lasted for more than two and a half years. The Israel Defense Forces are engaged on four fronts. The military has established “security zones” in the Gaza Strip, southern Lebanon, and Syria, while an increasingly harsh occupation continues in the West Bank. Together with the United States, Israel recently conducted a campaign of airstrikes against Iran, its second in less than a year. Despite some short-term operational successes, it remains unclear what benefits come from prolonging these conflicts; meanwhile, the costs are mounting.
The way Israel is waging war has become bloodier and less effective. The strong response to the Hamas massacre on October 7, 2023, and to Hezbollah’s rocket attacks the day after was justified. But the tactics used subsequently in the Gaza Strip and southern Lebanon have caused thousands of unnecessary casualties and continue to cause suffering for millions of displaced civilians. Despite years of fighting, Israel has not been able to eliminate the threats on its borders. Both Hamas and Hezbollah, although weakened, continue to retain influence.

These humanitarian and military failures are compounded by strategic ones. Traumatized by the events of October 7, Israel has aimed for an unattainable goal: total victory to guarantee total security. As a result, it has avoided more limited and achievable objectives that could have restored deterrence and paved the way for a more lasting solution.
The Israeli government has rejected the Biden administration’s proposals to replace Hamas with the Palestinian Authority in Gaza. It has dragged Lebanon into another war, rather than supporting its government to limit Hezbollah’s power. In Syria, it is missing the opportunity to reach a security agreement with the new government. Meanwhile, it is not clear whether Israel has any influence on the stalled negotiations between the US and Iran.
Israel’s defenders rightly argue that the Middle East offers no easy diplomatic solutions and that the Jewish state has earned the right to be constantly vigilant. However, its overwhelming military superiority is not a solution in itself. One consequence is that many people who were once sympathetic to Israel in Western democracies, especially in Europe and the United States, have become increasingly critical of it.
This situation is largely due to Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. Once, like his predecessors, he showed reluctance to enter war. Today, perhaps to avoid responsibility for the failures before October 7, he seems inclined to constantly escalate conflicts, in the hope of “changing the map of the Middle East.” Meanwhile, Israeli generals, who once restrained the excessive ambitions of political leaders, are now reluctant to speak out publicly.
The elections are expected to be held by the end of October. Could they bring about a new strategy? The election campaign will give Israelis the opportunity to debate whether it is wise to fight on so many fronts at once. However, many citizens feel insecure after the events of 2023 and are not inclined to listen to more moderate messages.
Voters and political opponents are not afraid to confront Netanyahu. They criticize him on constitutional issues, corruption and the dependence of his coalition on ultra-religious interests. But few are willing to ask the fundamental question: does Israel need to continue these wars for so long and with such severity? Leading opposition figures offer no convincing alternatives, limiting themselves mainly to criticism of the way military operations are conducted.
Israeli politicians are failing their citizens. Voters must face hard truths. Israel’s founding generations understood that wars must have borders. Even after the horror of October 7, those borders continue to exist. / Adapted from The Economist
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