FLASH
Shkruar nga Pamfleti
The US should undertake a broad intervention and then leave the rest to the Iranians
The Islamic Republic of Iran is at perhaps its weakest point since its founding in 1979. In June, Israeli and American attacks destroyed its uranium enrichment capacity and many of its air defense systems. In December and January, the country experienced the most widespread internal uprising since the birth of the Islamic Republic. In the meantime, it has faced escalating economic and environmental crises that it has failed to resolve. None of these developments have brought down the Islamic Republic. But there is no doubt that it has weakened.
Now, US President Donald Trump is threatening to attack the country. He has made it clear that he has little tolerance for the regime’s efforts to rebuild its nuclear program or for the extraordinarily brutal way it has suppressed protests. “If Iran violently kills peaceful protesters, as is their custom, the United States of America will come to the rescue,” he declared last month, adding that we are ready and prepared to act.
Since then, the president has been massing US air and naval assets in the region and is considering a range of strike options.
That doesn’t mean major strikes are guaranteed, however. So far, the administration’s decisions have raised more questions than answers about what Washington intends to achieve and how. Currently, Trump is practicing military pressure diplomacy, hoping that the threat of force will force the Islamic Republic to accept a better nuclear deal than the one he withdrew from in 2018. If that fails, he is considering operations to eliminate leaders or limited strikes to force the regime to surrender.
It is understandable why the Trump administration is prioritizing diplomacy and limited strikes. The Islamic Republic may be weak, but it remains dangerous and capable of harming American forces and civilian targets in the region. The president, meanwhile, has consistently shown reluctance to launch a protracted military campaign. But the reality is that, after decades of unsuccessful efforts to change Tehran’s behavior through sanctions, sabotage, and, most recently, isolated strikes, the time has come for a broad intervention. The regime is too ideological to be intimidated by a few waves of bombing. Meanwhile, the Iranian people have made it clear that they are ready to transform their country. The United States can and should help them, using its military might to neutralize the Islamic Republic’s military capabilities and weaken its domestic repressive apparatus.
Such measures could inspire the masses of Iranians who took to the streets in December and January to do so again. Just this week, Iran experienced smaller-scale protests in universities, showing that hostility to the regime remains strong. If regular protests resume, American military power could level the playing field between the street and the state, giving the demonstrators a chance to succeed.
Agreement or not
The Trump administration may have threatened Iran with major military action. But there is reason to think that, at least for now, it may have other ideas. For starters, the president’s comments this year have oscillated between threats of war and emphasizing the need for a nuclear deal.
"I hope Iran comes to the table quickly and negotiates a fair and equitable deal," Trump wrote on Truth Social in late January.
“I would prefer a deal, but if we don’t get one, it will be a very bad day for that country,” he tweeted a month later.
During his February 24 State of the Union address, Trump declared that while he "prefers to resolve this problem through diplomacy," he "will never allow the number one state sponsor of terrorism to have nuclear weapons."
Tehran claims the two sides have made progress in the talks. But so far, Iranian officials have refused to give up essential elements of their nuclear program, so there is reason to believe that Trump could be forced to strike, even as negotiations continue indirectly. If history is any indication, the action would be short and sharp. In his first term, the president ordered the assassination of the notorious Revolutionary Guard commander, Qasem Soleimani, in a drone strike in January 2020. In June 2025, he authorized the use of high-yield penetrating bombs against Iranian enrichment facilities. And the removal of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro from Caracas by US forces occurred in a single evening. Trump has mentioned the operation in Venezuela while threatening Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, declaring that the US military is “ready, willing and able to rapidly accomplish its mission, with speed and force, if necessary.”
But a single, final operation is unlikely to topple this regime, even if it succeeds in killing Khamenei. The Islamic Republic may once have been a state built on the personality cult of its founding leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. But over the past three decades, Khamenei has institutionalized his power by empowering loyalists in a much larger state bureaucracy and supporting competing centers of power. As a result, the system resembles more of a series of pillars than a pyramid, with a powerful deep state made up of security officials with a vested interest in preserving the regime.
In this light, many of the Revolutionary Guards’ leaders and veterans are more partners than subordinates to Khamenei. It remains unclear to what extent the 86-year-old actually runs the regime on a day-to-day basis. During the 12-day war with Israel in June, the Islamic Republic made rapid military decisions, even though Khamenei was probably in a bunker and, according to a report in The New York Times, was not using electronic communications. This was even after several senior IRGC officers were killed in a single night by Israeli strikes.
In other words, the Venezuela model does not work in Iran. A single blow to Khamenei could backfire: instead of fomenting discord, the remaining officials are likely to line up and seek revenge.
A broad intervention
According to the analysis, the fact that limited strikes will not work should not prevent the use of force. The author argues that Iran remains the leading state sponsor of terrorism, one of the most hostile governments to the United States, and the country with the largest arsenal of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. Nearly half a century of experience, he says, shows that the Islamic Republic will not fundamentally change its behavior.
The author proposes that the US begin with covert operations to prepare the ground, including providing communications technologies to the Iranians and information operations to weaken the cohesion of the security forces. Then, he suggests air strikes to destroy air defenses and underground ballistic missile bases, so-called “missile cities,” as well as missile production facilities near cities such as Isfahan, Khojiri, Parchini, Semnani, and Shahroudi.
He also argues for a crackdown on political and security institutions that have ordered or supported the suppression of protests, including the office of the supreme leader, the Ministry of Intelligence, and the IRGC and Basij structures.
A way out
Author Behnam Ben Taleblu acknowledges that the collapse of the Islamic Republic would be chaotic and that there is a risk of the emergence of a new authoritarian figure. However, he argues that the main source of destabilization in the region remains the current regime itself.
In conclusion, the analysis emphasizes that, according to the author, a combination of sustained American military force and domestic pressure from the Iranian people could lead to the overthrow of the Islamic Republic. He argues that the United States has the capacity to weaken the regime, while the Iranians have the determination to complete political change. /Adapted from Foreign Policy /
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