FLASH
Shkruar nga Pamfleti
The editor-in-chief of the American magazine "The Atlantic", Jeffrey Goldberg, has revealed further details from secret conversations between top US government officials, where military plans against the Houthi group were revealed.
The journalist was mistakenly invited to a group on Signal, where details were published about what would happen next, the US attack on the Houthi group.
“ SM,” who had not spoken before, joined the conversation. “As I heard it, the president was clear: green light, but we will soon make it clear to Egypt and Europe what we expect in return. We also need to figure out how to implement such a request. For example, if Europe does not reward us, then what will happen? If the US successfully restores freedom of navigation at great cost, there must be some further economic benefits in return.”
That message from "SM" — presumably President Trump's confidant Stephen Miller, the White House deputy chief of staff, or someone playing the role of Stephen Miller — effectively ended the conversation. The final text of the day came from "Pete Hegseth," who wrote at 9:46 a.m., "I agree."
After reading this thread, I realized that this conversation possessed a high degree of authenticity. The texts, in their choice of words and arguments, seemed as if they had been written by the people who supposedly sent them, or by a particularly skilled AI text generator.
I was still worried that this might be a disinformation operation, or some kind of simulation. And I was surprised that no one in the group seemed to notice my presence. But if it was a hoax, the quality of the mimicry and the level of foreign policy knowledge were impressive.
It was the morning of the next day, Saturday, March 15, when this story got really strange.
At 11:44 a.m., the account labeled “Pete Hegseth” posted a “Team Update” on Signal. I will not quote from this update, or from several subsequent texts. The information contained therein, if read by an adversary of the United States, could have been used to harm U.S. military and intelligence personnel, particularly in the greater Middle East, in the Central Command area of responsibility.
What I will say, to illustrate the shocking recklessness of this Signal conversation, is that Hegseth's email contained operational details of upcoming attacks in Yemen, including information about targets, the weapons the US would deploy, and the sequence of attacks.
The only person who responded to Hegseth's update was the person identified as the vice president. "I'm going to say a prayer for victory," Vance wrote. (Two other users later added prayer emojis.)
According to Hegseth’s lengthy text, the first explosions in Yemen would be felt two hours later, at 1:45 p.m. Eastern time. So I waited in my car in a supermarket parking lot. If this signal talk was real, I reasoned, Houthi targets would soon be bombed. At about 1:55, I checked X and checked Yemen. Explosions were then heard throughout the capital, Sanaa.
I returned to the signal channel. At 1:48, "Michael Waltz" had given the group an update. Again, I won't quote from this text, except to note that he described the operation as an "amazing job." A few minutes later, "John Ratcliffe" wrote: "A great start." Not long after, Waltz replied with three emojis: a fist, an American flag, and fire. Others soon joined him, including "MAR," who wrote, "Good Job Pete and your team!!" and "Susie Wiles," who texted, "Congratulations to everyone." Truly wonderful. God bless him." "Steve Witkoff" responded with five emojis: two praying hands, a flexed bicep, and two American flags. "TG" replied, "Great work and effects!" The discussion after the action included estimates of the damage done, including the possible death of a specific individual. The Houthi-run Yemeni Ministry of Health reported that at least 53 people were killed in the attacks, a number that has not been independently verified.
The journalist then points out that he left the group on Signal, realizing that this would trigger an automatic notification to the group's creator, "Michael Waltz," that I had left.
" No one in the conversation had noticed I was there. And I didn't get any follow-up questions about why I left - or, more fundamentally, who I was."
Today, I emailed Waltz and sent him a message on his Signal account. I also wrote to Pete Hegseth, John Ratcliffe, Tulsi Gabbard, and other officials. In one email, I outlined some of my questions: Is the “small Houthi computer group” a real Signal thread? Did they know I was involved in this group? Was I involved by accident or on purpose? If not, who did they think I was? Did anyone realize who I was when I joined, or when I left the group? Do senior Trump administration officials regularly use Signal for sensitive discussions? Do officials believe that using such a channel could put American personnel at risk?
Brian Hughes, the National Security Council spokesman, responded two hours later, confirming the authenticity of the Signal group.
"Ky duket të jetë një zinxhir autentik mesazhesh dhe ne po shqyrtojmë se si një numër i panjohur u shtua në grup", shkroi Hughes.
Ëilliam Martin, një zëdhënës i Vance, tha se pavarësisht përshtypjes së krijuar nga tekstet, zëvendëspresidenti është plotësisht në linjë me presidentin. “Prioriteti i parë i Zëvendës Presidentit është gjithmonë të sigurohet që këshilltarët e Presidentit po e informojnë atë në mënyrë adekuate mbi thelbin e diskutimeve të tyre të brendshme”, tha ai. "Zëvendëspresidenti Vance mbështet pa mëdyshje politikën e jashtme të kësaj administrate. Presidenti dhe Zëvendës Presidenti kanë pasur biseda të mëvonshme për këtë çështje dhe janë plotësisht dakord."
“Unë kurrë nuk kam parë një shkelje të tillë. Nuk është e pazakontë që zyrtarët e sigurisë kombëtare të komunikojnë në Signal. Por aplikacioni përdoret kryesisht për planifikimin e takimeve dhe çështje të tjera logjistike - jo për diskutime të hollësishme dhe shumë konfidenciale të një aksioni ushtarak në pritje. Dhe, sigurisht, nuk kam dëgjuar kurrë për një rast që një gazetar të jetë ftuar në një diskutim të tillë.
Me sa duket, Waltz, duke koordinuar një veprim të lidhur me sigurinë kombëtare mbi Signal, mund të ketë shkelur disa dispozita të Aktit të Spiunazhit, i cili rregullon trajtimin e informacionit të "mbrojtjes kombëtare", sipas disa avokatëve të sigurisë kombëtare të intervistuar nga kolegu im Shane Harris për këtë histori.
Harris u kërkoi atyre të merrnin në konsideratë një skenar hipotetik në të cilin një zyrtar i lartë amerikan krijon një kanal sinjali me qëllim të shprehur për të ndarë informacionin me zyrtarët e kabinetit rreth një operacioni ushtarak aktiv. Ai nuk u tregoi atyre mesazhet aktuale të sinjalit ose nuk u tha atyre konkretisht se çfarë kishte ndodhur.
Aplikacioni Signal nuk miratohet nga qeveria për ndarjen e informacionit të klasifikuar. Qeveria ka sistemet e veta për këtë qëllim. Nëse zyrtarët duan të diskutojnë aktivitetin ushtarak, ata duhet të shkojnë në një hapësirë të projektuar posaçërisht të njohur si një strukturë informacioni e ndjeshme me ndarje, ose SCIF - shumica e zyrtarëve të sigurisë kombëtare të nivelit të kabinetit kanë një të instaluar në shtëpinë e tyre - ose të komunikojnë vetëm në pajisjet e miratuara të qeverisë, thanë avokatët.
Normalisht, telefonat celularë nuk lejohen brenda një SCIF, gjë që sugjeron se ndërsa këta zyrtarë po ndanin informacione për një operacion ushtarak aktiv, ata mund të kishin lëvizur në publik. Sikur të kishin humbur telefonat e tyre, ose të ishin vjedhur, rreziku i mundshëm për sigurinë kombëtare do të ishte i madh.
Hegseth, Ratcliffe dhe zyrtarë të tjerë të nivelit të kabinetit me sa duket do të kishin autoritetin për të deklasifikuar informacionin dhe disa nga avokatët e sigurisë kombëtare vunë re se zyrtarët hipotetikë në zinxhirin e Sinjalit mund të pretendonin se kishin deklasifikuar informacionin që kishin ndarë.
But this argument rings hollow, they warned, because Signal is not an authorized place for sharing information of such a sensitive nature, whether it is stamped "top secret" or not.
There was another potential problem: Waltz decided that some of the messages in the Signal group would disappear after a week and some after four.
This raises questions about whether the officials may have violated federal data law: Text messages related to official acts are considered data that must be preserved.
At all times, members of the Signal group were aware of the need for secrecy and security of operations.
In his text detailing aspects of the upcoming attack on Houthi targets, Hegseth wrote to the group – which at the time included me – “We are currently clean on OPSEC.” /Adapted from Pamphlet/
Lini një Përgjigje