Any slide towards a centralized "super-prime minister" model is not just an internal Italian crisis - it is an alarm for the entire European political architecture...

The ruling majority in Italy is more concerned than the opposition about electoral reform, while constitutional reform on the governance model remains in limbo. A clear plan appears on the horizon: the construction of a Meloni-style super-prime minister, which risks sliding the Italian system towards a post-democratic model.
In the middle of the legislature, the Italian center-right has put forward a proposal for electoral law reform, ahead of the constitutional reform itself. The aim is clear: to guarantee an automatic majority for the prime minister's party in both houses of Parliament, through vote bonuses and artificial representation schemes.
This model, linked to changes in Article 92 of the Italian Constitution, is not simply an electoral technicality. It is a political maneuver to concentrate executive power, directly linking the election result to the name of the prime minister. On the surface, a “desired stability”. In essence, a risk to representation and democratic balances.
A system designed to avoid Mattarella
Why the rush? Because parliamentary elections are scheduled for 2027, while President Sergio Mattarella's term expires in 2029. If the constitutional reform is put to a referendum, it would pit Meloni directly against Mattarella, who is much more popular and represents a symbol of institutional stability in Italy.
To avoid this clash, Meloni is attempting to first change the electoral law and then dictate the direction of constitutional reform. This approach is a strategic calculation, but one that carries great risks for the institutional balance.
The Constitutional Court has spoken: bonuses do not justify deformation!
Decisions No. 1/2014 and No. 35/2017 of the Constitutional Court have clearly established:
-A governing bonus that violates proportionality is not allowed.
-Preferential votes and minority representation must be protected.
-The electoral threshold must be reasonable and not penalizing for small parties.
So, any attempt to establish a system with a "bonus zone" in the service of the majority cannot go unpunished by institutional punishment. Meloni knows this. That's why he's trying to change the rules without smacking the Constitution squarely in the face - a slow but profound maneuver.
Electoral law is not the property of the majority
In any functioning democracy, the electoral law must be approved by consensus, not by force from a parliamentary majority representing a numerical minority of the country. Otherwise, it becomes an instrument of manipulation, not a rule of the game.
If Meloni tries to change it alone, without considering the opposition and the long-term consequences, she risks repeating the mistake of Matteo Renzi – who tried to reform in a hurry and was overthrown by a referendum.
A warning for Europe, not just Italy
Italy is one of the founding democracies of the EU. Any slide towards a centralized “super-prime minister” model is not just an internal Italian crisis – it is an alarm for the entire European political architecture.
The issue is not simply technical. It is political, it is cultural, and it is existential for Italy's very democratic identity./ Pamphlet
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