FLASH
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At this point America's main interest is to end the operation in Iran as soon as possible, a resumption of bombing should logically not be on the agenda. But logic is not always the most followed criterion...
The negotiations between the United States and Iran, mediated by Pakistan, oscillate between announcements and denials. The resumption of negotiations, eagerly awaited around the world, is not guaranteed, even if, amid the confusion and uncertainty of the American administration today, the prospect of a new attack on Iran seems to be receding. Many unknowns, excessive risks and Washington's desire to end the war in which Donald Trump has plunged the United States without a strategy, with an indescribable superficiality, form the backdrop of these days, before a second negotiating session. If at this point America's main interest is to end the operation in Iran as soon as possible, a resumption of bombing should logically not be on the agenda. But logic is not always the most followed criterion.
Behind the mutual declarations and threats, there are certainly deep concerns, especially regarding the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and its devastating impact everywhere. The conflict extends far beyond that important part of the sea; it affects the entire Middle East and the balance of power and security at a global level. This explains the more or less visible efforts at mediation and the dense network of consultations aimed at promoting a possible solution to the conflict. It is in Trump's interest to free himself from the trap he has gotten himself into (under Israeli pressure) without consulting anyone; it must be in the interest of the leadership in Tehran, certainly capable of extraordinary resilience after the severe blows it has suffered, but still at the helm of a country devastated economically and politically, not least by the war of recent weeks.
Pakistan is the main mediator, relying on its historical ties with Iran and its cooperation with the United States. Islamabad is not only the meeting place, but also the political center of a difficult confrontation, further complicated by deep mutual distrust. Moreover, the stronger party (the United States) must conclude the negotiations quickly, while the weaker party (Iran) can paradoxically afford to delay the process in order to secure better terms and, in the meantime, oppress its own people even more brutally.
China is acting decisively, behind the scenes, carefully measuring its moves and reactions as part of a long-term strategic plan. Next month, Xi Jinping may welcome Donald Trump to Beijing, with the satisfaction of presenting China as the standard-bearer of dialogue and multilateralism to a guest who lacks clarity and is dissatisfied with the world. But in such a momentous confrontation, other countries are also becoming active. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey have the interests and credentials to make their voices heard.
Initially, Riyadh welcomed the US and Israeli attack on Iran. Long-standing differences with Tehran were not resolved with the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 2023, thanks to Chinese good offices. Relations had been severed seven years earlier due to the attack by Iranian protesters on the Saudi embassy in Tehran. Then, with the destruction caused by Iranian missiles not only to US bases but also to essential infrastructure, and the lack of expected US defense support, Riyadh became increasingly concerned that the war would undermine the entire development strategy of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. Thus, Mohammed bin Salman’s commitment to a ceasefire and regional stabilization is understandable.
Turkey has a similar interest. In recent days, former Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu publicly recommended coordination among Turkey, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia as a facilitator of US-Iran contacts and negotiations. He also went so far as to propose a new security architecture, integrating the countries of the region, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and Iran, including Israel, modeled after the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the 1975 Helsinki Accords. It is significant that Israel’s inclusion in a regional stabilization plan is now being supported, and by a country like Turkey.
European countries prefer to be wary of Asian and Middle Eastern activism. Unconsulted about the war and unconnected to the US-Iran negotiations, they await developments from abroad, even though the game is essential for everyone. Awareness of the risks of the challenge weighs heavily. However, some European countries, above all Italy, thanks to its strong relations, can help actively seek a balance to avoid further violence. If not in Hormuz, then in the troubled Lebanon that has known and appreciated us for decades. / Adapted "Pamphlet" from "HuffPost"
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