
The Atlantic editor-in-chief was part of a Signal conversation between senior Trump administration officials about the bombing of Yemen. But why were they using Signal in the first place and not WhatsApp or another messaging service?
It's simple: the app has a strong security structure, which has led to its use to discuss future military attacks in Yemen, because it uses end-to-end encryption and open-source technology.
End-to-end encryption is a method that allows only the sender and recipient to read messages. When a message is sent, it is encrypted using a 'key'.
This means that no intermediaries, including service providers, or even Signal itself, can access the message.
Signal also pioneered an open-source approach to encryption, called the Signal Protocol. Encryption is more secure when built on open-source algorithms, the OSI says.
Open source means that the code after encryption is made public and available on the internet for anyone to see. So any issues can be checked and reviewed for security.
Using strong encryption is a matter of national security. Failure to do so could expose people and infrastructure to significant vulnerabilities, Meredith Whittaker, Signal's president, said in a recent interview.
WhatsApp adopted end-to-end encryption in 2016, using the Signal Protocol as a foundation. However, it made the version closed-source, meaning outsiders can't see how it works — you just have to trust that it's secure.
Telegram, another often-mentioned alternative, does not use end-to-end encryption at all. It is known that a third party can intercept any Telegram message you send or receive.
Additionally, Signal operates as an independent nonprofit in the US and is not affiliated with any major tech company, according to its website. WhatsApp has been part of Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg's Meta since 2014.
Why institutions are switching to Signal
The signal's stronger security is why it is gaining traction in political circles, including Brussels.
The European Commission and Parliament recommend the app when staff cannot access secure communication tools that institutions are otherwise paying for.
In internal communications with parliamentary staff in February, IT services said Signal was the recommended messaging solution when using Parliament's corporate solutions was "impossible".
Parliament currently uses Microsoft Teams and Jabber, a messaging service operated by American technology group Cisco, for official communication.
The guidelines cite an "increased threat to commercial telecommunications infrastructure" and several recent incidents targeting major U.S. telecommunications companies.
One example is the "Salt Typhoon" attacks, in which Chinese hackers exploited "backdoors" with weak encryption built into US telecom systems to gain access to information on American citizens – including Donald Trump.
Similarly, the Commission confirmed to Euractiv that it recommends the use of Signal, as it is a "safe alternative" where there is no equivalent corporate tool, although there is "no obligation" to use it.
Ultimately, the leak of US national defense plans was not due to a problem with Signal's encryption, but to human error within Trump's inner circle. So, the right app – just the wrong people in the conversation. /Adapted from Pamphlet/
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