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Putin expressed solidarity with the Venezuelan people
Clandestine US military forces are not the only foreign troops operating in Venezuela. Russia has quietly sent its military advisers to the country, taken steps to bolster Venezuela's air defenses, and signaled a willingness to deepen military cooperation.
While Donald Trump has authorized the CIA to conduct covert operations on Venezuelan soil and just a few days ago approved the seizure by US troops of an oil tanker leaving Venezuela, Vladimir Putin has pledged his support for Nicolas Maduro.
In a phone call with Maduro on Thursday, after the tanker was seized, the Russian president “expressed solidarity with the Venezuelan people.” Putin also “confirmed his support for the Maduro government’s policy aimed at protecting national interests and sovereignty in the face of growing external pressure.” Maduro visited Moscow earlier this year, attended a military parade and signed a partnership agreement with Putin.
The close military ties between the two countries are clear, with Russian soldiers appearing in Venezuelan parades and the Venezuelan military circulating posters of its men armed with Russian weapons. But the force Russia has sent to the ground is too small to be meaningful in a conflict. What, then, is Russia’s ultimate goal?
Russia’s military cooperation with Venezuela matured into a strategic partnership during the Chávez-Putin years, when Caracas became one of Moscow’s biggest arms customers. Venezuela’s military is built almost entirely on old Russian equipment dating back to the Soviet era, including Russian fighter jets, tanks, missile systems and armored vehicles.
At the center are Russian-made air defense systems. These range from long-range S-300 missile batteries to medium-range Buk and Pechora systems and Igla portable launchers. The country’s equipment also includes Su-30 fighter jets that Venezuela recently displayed carrying anti-ship missiles. Some old American F-16s from the pre-Chávez era still fly, but they are no longer a significant part of the force. In total, Venezuela’s armed forces number just over 120,000 people. “It is estimated that the regime has invested at least $12 billion in weapons and military equipment from Russia,” says David Smolansky, a senior security and foreign affairs adviser to Maria Corina Machado, the leader of Venezuela’s opposition.
While Putin may want to project power, Russia’s war in Ukraine has reduced the Kremlin’s ability to intervene meaningfully in Venezuela. “Before Putin helps anyone, he needs peace with Ukraine. It’s not clear what he thinks he can do militarily, maybe a little sabotage of the Wagner Group, but it’s quite small,” said Vanessa Neumann, a Venezuelan-American diplomat.
The limits of Russian power should be no mystery to Maduro. Just last year in Syria, a country where the Kremlin spent years supporting Bashar al-Assad militarily, diplomatically and on the ground, Moscow was nowhere to be found when rebel forces finally closed in. Assad fled to Moscow, his government collapsed, and he joined the growing list of Russian-backed strongmen now shivering in exile after fleeing to much warmer climes.
As U.S. B-52 bombers and warships circle Venezuela’s coast, Washington insists its goal is to destroy drug routes, not the regime. Drugs are a major source of income for Maduro and his inner circle. Opposition groups claim the regime earned more than $8 billion from drug trafficking last year. But the assembled U.S. military appears poised for an invasion, blurring the distinction between destroying drug routes and toppling the regime. “The worst possible outcome is to have this force assembled, then somehow dissolve and have accomplished nothing on the ground,” warns Douglas Farah, president of the national security consulting firm IBI Consultants and a longtime Latin America observer.
This is not the first time the Trump administration has focused on Venezuela. In 2019, the United States lent its support to opposition leader Juan Guaido, recognizing him as interim president. For a time, Guaido mobilized mass protests and enjoyed broad diplomatic recognition. But the military never moved, the opposition quickly splintered, and momentum waned. When the Biden administration took office, it paid little attention to Caracas, and the interim government slowly faded, allowing Maduro to declare victory.
This time, the American campaign is asking the same question. What is the point?
“You can take all the little boats out of the water you want and it won’t make any strategic difference,” says Farah. Washington has positioned itself between elections without fully committing to any of them. A full-scale intervention is unrealistic, limited attacks risk appearing symbolic, and financial pressure remains only partial. The result, says Farah, is ni quita ni limonada — neither fish nor fowl. “If the strategy remains undefined and the pressure fades, then the regime wins. And that is a bad option. Maduro will say he has defeated the United States.”
That is precisely what Moscow hopes. Russia cannot save Maduro militarily, but it may not be forced to. If the American campaign fizzles out without a result, the Kremlin could claim a victory and claim, once again, that even a war-weary Russia can outlast American attention. /Adapted from The Spectator/
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