FLASH
Shkruar nga Pamfleti
In the occupied Balkan countries, agencies were divided during World War II, for countries that were considered allies of Germany and countries that were its enemies. The Germans considered Albania and Kosovo as their allies and this is also appreciated by the discoveries of the opposing countries. Sandor Rado, Hungarian, during World War II, was in charge of a "red orchestra" espionage network that operated in Switzerland, in favor of the Soviet Union. After World War II, he wrote the book "The name of fighting - Dora". The essence of this book about Albania is about his activity in the city of Vlora.
Mario del Pero, in his book "CIA - the history of the American secret services", related to the clandestine operations in Albania, implemented immediately after World War II, was called the "Valuable" operation, planned at the end of of 1948 and implemented, between 1949-1951, constituted a clandestine operation of the paramilitary type. Infiltrations of small armed groups into Albanian territory were predicted.
Coordinated and directed from outside the country, they had to carry out military actions to destabilize the country and overthrow the communist leader, Enver Hoxha. The first director of the OPC (Office of Policy Coordination), Frank Wisner, called it a "clinical experiment", with which he could verify the capacity of the Westerners to reduce the area of influence of the USSR.
The choice of Albania, as the theater of this experiment, was mainly dictated by the geographical reason: Great Britain had its bases in the Mediterranean Sea, and Albania territorially, was not adjacent to the rest of the 'Communist Bloc', being limited to only two states opposing Moscow (Greece and Yugoslavia).
Operation "Valuable" was resolved with a resounding defeat from many directions, where it was suspected that within the Western secret services, there was a Soviet informant. This spy was Kim Philby, recently appointed liaison officer between MI-6 and the CIA in Washington and one of the two British members of the US-Great Britain commission responsible for the clandestine operation in Albania. In the end, the Albanian operation was canceled! Kim Filbi, from that position, gave Moscow important information, clandestine operations, in particular, about the "Valuable" operation in Albania.
Kim Philby
In his book "My Secret War", Kim Philby, among other things, writes: "Very soon after my arrival in Washington, the American and British governments sanctioned in principle the conduct of covert operations, which were intended to break up a from the Eastern European countries, from the 'Socialist Bloc'. According to the reason, it was Albania's turn. This was the smallest and weakest of the socialist states.
In the South, it borders Greece, with which, England and the USA, maintained allied relations and which, formally, was still in a state of war with Albania. Albania seemed isolated to our interests, and besides, it was easily accessible from Malta, by air and sea. Considering the possibility of numerous complications of a political nature, related to this project, the State Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs insisted on the strict control of this operation, from their side. The implementation of the plan was entrusted to the SIS and the Directorate of Political Coordination.
Both the Americans and the British had connections with Albanian groups and immigrants, therefore both parties began to mobilize their people for the implementation of the counter-revolutionary overthrow. The British gave Malta as an advanced base for operations, as well as small ships, necessary for the landing of agents.
The Americans secured the operation, mostly with money and material, and designated the airfield of Willus-field, in Libya, as a rear base and supply point. King Ideriz was not told the secret, and at this time he was only Emir. After endless Anglo-American discussions, Malta was our main refuge.
"We have to think of some subversive operation somewhere," Wisner once told me, "when we discover here that the English have an island nearby." The discussions concerned the issue of counter-revolutionary political leadership. At this time, the Dulles era had not yet begun and the US was afraid to act openly in support of very reactionary regimes. Therefore, the State Department intended to surround the counter-revolution with "democratic" attributes.
For this purpose, the Department of State, preceding us, forced a handful of Albanian refugees in New York to create the so-called 'National Committee', and to elect a certain Hasan Dosti as its head. Dosti was a young lawyer who, according to the Directorate of Political Coordination, had an unblemished reputation as a democrat, although I could not find any evidence of the justice of this view. Despite my repeated requests, I could not get a meeting with Dosti.
The Directorate of Political Coordination, as I was told, had to deal with him very delicately, because he was very cowardly. Good candidate for the role of leader!
Në qoftë, se Komiteti Kombëtar në New York, ngjallte dyshime, atëherë kandidati anglez për udhëheqës, me të vërtetë, mua më brengoste. Ky ishte prijësi i një klani të vogël, me emrin Abaz Kupi, mik i vjetër i Xhulian Emerit. Duke gjykuar nga fotografia, ky njeri mbante mustaqe dhe ishte i armatosur deri në dhëmbë, ishte produkt tipik i kujdestarisë britanike.
Unë, nuk dyshoja se ai ishte i aftë, njësoj si stërgjyshërit e tij, të kryente sulme mbi karvanet e paarmatosura, ose të qëllonte tinëz ushtarin turk, të çmendur nga vapa, të lodhur e që fliste përçart, në ndonjë Qafë Mali, por, unë asnjëherë nuk ndaj entuziazmin e xhentëlmenit britanik, me pamjen e përfaqësuesit të fisit të egër.
Meqë ra fjala, në qoftë, se Dosti ishte një njeri i dobët, atëherë, Abaz Kupi, ishte kopuk i vjetër. Diskutime pa fund të anglezëve me amerikanët, për meritat e të dy rivalëve, në qoftë, se lihen jashtë anët e tjera të çështjes, e ta shikosh vetëm si garë, problemi ishte, se kush duhej të zgjidhej, (?) – anglezët apo amerikanët, sepse do të përcaktonin politikën e qeverisë (në Shqipëri), në rast, se ajo do të formohej.
Kur më në fund, si njëra palë, ashtu dhe tjetra, u lodhën nga diskutimet dhe filluan të kërkojnë zgjidhje kompromisi, doli, se Dosti dhe Abaz Kupi, nën ndikimin e përkrahësve të tyre, zinin pozicione aq të ashpra, sa asnjërit prej tyre, nuk do t’i mbushej mendja, që të shërbente nën udhëheqjen e tjetrit. Kontrolli i përditshëm për operacionin, ishte në duart e Komitetit të Politikës Speciale, i cili mblidhej në Uashington.
Ai përbëhej nga 4 anëtarë, të cilët përfaqësonin Departamentin e Shtetit, Ministrinë e Punëve të Jashtme, Drejtorinë e Koordinimit Politik dhe SIS-in. Departamenti i Shtetit, caktoi në komitet Bob Xhojsi-n, djaloshin e shoqërueshëm, që kishte eksperiencë në problemet e Ballkanit, Erl Xheliko, nga ambasada angleze, gjithashtu, një djalosh simpatik, i cili përfaqësonte Ministrinë e Punëve të Jashtme; djaloshi i tretë, ishte Frenk Lindsei, nga Drejtoria e Koordinimit Politik dhe në fund anëtari i katërt i komitetit, isha unë.
Nuk është e vështirë ta marrësh me mend, se në sajë të kësaj përbërjeje, takimet tona ishin shumë larg karakterit jo formal. Lindsei, jepte tonin duke deklaruar në takimin tonë të parë, se të vetmin shqiptar, që ai kishte parë, qëndronte varur në paralele, me kokën poshtë. (?)…!
Bile në momentet më serioze, ne anglo-saksonët, nuk harronim, se, agjentët tanë, vetëm para pak kohësh, binin nga pemët. Megjithëse unë thashë, se Komiteti i Politikës Speciale, ushtroi kontroll mbi operacionin, ne asnjëherë nuk mundëm të vepronim si njerëz të lirë.
Shefat e mi në Londër, nuk më lejonin mua të harroja angazhimin e SIS-it, në lidhje me Abaz Kupin, ndërsa pas shpinës së shefave të mi, gjithmonë, dukej së largu formula e Bevinit: “Unë këtë nuk e duroj”, të cilën ai e përdorte, kur donte të ndalonte diçka. Frenk Lindsei, gjithashtu, padyshim ishte i lidhur me kufizime të tilla.
Perhaps strange, but nevertheless, the operation began even under these conditions. Finally, the SIS managed to land a small group of agents on the Albanian coast, with the task of penetrating deep into the country, collecting the necessary data and, moving south, to Greece. The English believed that the data collected on the way by the agents helped to carry out wider plans.
The operation, understandably, was hopeless from the start. SIS agents could only achieve something by infiltrating the cities. But the cities were under the strong control of the Albanian authorities. Therefore, in order to stay alive, the agents, you had to hide in the mountains, where they could derive some benefit, in case the country was engulfed in insurrection. Perhaps at the base of our adventure, there was precisely the unspoken hope for an uprising...!
In the end, however, some agents were able to cross into Greece, where they, with great difficulty, managed to escape the clutches of the Greek Security Service, who could shoot them as if nothing was wrong. The information they brought was almost always negative. At least it was clear that they, in no place, welcomed them with open arms. With the passage of time, without making a noise, the operation was forgotten, without any significant impact on the state of Albanians.
Perhaps it turned out for good, for the English and American governments, that their effort suffered defeat. In case of success, they would have endless troubles, with the young people they were protecting, not to mention the serious difficulties, with Greece and Yugoslavia, and maybe even with Italy…”!
In the interview given to the journalist Philip Knightley, in January 1988, we read: "Knightley - and you, don't you feel any remorse for the death of the people you helped? Eg Albanian operation? (Filbi coordinated the joint operations of the CIA and the SIS for the introduction in the late 1940s and early 1950s of agents in Albania, with the aim of inciting an uprising there. this operation, Filbi, informed the KGB and the agents, after landing on the ground, were captured and shot). / Memory.al
Lini një Përgjigje