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An investigation based on over 100 interviews with intelligence officials, military personnel and diplomats in several countries shows that the US and Britain accurately predicted the invasion scenario of February 24, 2022, but clashed with distrust in Europe and political hesitation in Kyiv...
A lengthy investigative article by The Guardian describes how the CIA and MI6 provided, months before February 24, 2022, a detailed picture of Vladimir Putin's plans to attack Ukraine, and why many European governments, as well as the Ukrainian political leadership, did not take the warning seriously until the last moments.
The article places emphasis on two parallel realities: on the one hand, the success of intelligence gathering by Washington and London; on the other, the failure of political and institutional assessment in some capitals to treat a full-scale war in Europe as a realistic scenario.
1) Burns' phone call and the "yes" that changed the tone in Washington
According to the story, in November 2021, CIA Director William Burns traveled to Moscow to deliver a direct warning to the Kremlin: the US was reading the military buildup as preparation for invasion and would react with severe economic and political consequences.
Burns did not get to meet Putin face-to-face. He held a secure phone call, where Putin, according to The Guardian, did not respond to the American concern, but returned to his arguments about Russia’s “strategic vulnerability” and the threat from the West. Burns left Moscow more convinced that war was coming and communicated this conviction to President Joe Biden. In his memoirs of the moment, Burns says Biden asked him if he thought Putin “would do it” and he replied: “Yes.”
2) How the US and Britain built a credible picture
The Guardian investigation challenges the simplistic idea that “the West found the plan” thanks to a single source. The account suggests that the conviction came as a result of a mosaic of data:
Satellite imagery (including commercial imagery) showing extensive troop movements and positioning near the border.
Signals intelligence (SIGINT), with intercepts and operational indicators that "made no sense" without a real use-of-force plan.
Additional data on preparations within Russia (such as mobilization of reservists) and activity of pro-Russian networks in Ukraine.
The article mentions that some sources allude to interceptions linked to Russian military planning structures and that there has been speculation about human sources in the Kremlin circle. But, according to the account, the “core” part of the footage came mainly from US/British satellites and intercepts, while human sources served more as a side check than as the “sole key.”
3) Momenti kur SHBA dhe Britania u përpoqën ta bindnin NATO-n: Brukseli nuk u bashkua
Në mesin e nëntorit 2021, drejtoresha e inteligjencës kombëtare amerikane, Avril Haines, shkoi në Bruksel dhe paraqiti vlerësimin se një pushtim në shkallë të gjerë ishte real. Kreu i MI6, Richard Moore, e mbështeti vlerësimin. Sipas rrëfimit, reagimi në sallë mbeti kryesisht skeptik: disa e hodhën poshtë skenarin e pushtimit, të tjerë shprehën frikën se një reagim i ashpër i NATO-s mund ta “provokonte” Rusinë.
Në këtë fazë, administrata amerikane e shtyu edhe një strategji tjetër: deklasifikimin selektiv të informacioneve për t’i bërë paralajmërimet më të besueshme pa komprometuar burimet. Sipas artikullit, SHBA shpërndau më shumë inteligjencë të “zbutur” se zakonisht, madje edhe në hapësirën publike.
4) Pse Europa dyshoi: “arsyeja e Irakut 2003” dhe supozimi i racionalitetit
The Guardian rendit disa arsye pse disa shërbime europiane dhe qeveri e panë grumbullimin e trupave si presion negociues, jo si vendim për luftë:
Kujtesa e inteligjencës së Irakut (2003)
Sipas rrëfimit, disa europianë e lidhën hezitimin me përvojën e “rastit Irak”, kur pretendime të inteligjencës u përdorën për të justifikuar ndërhyrje dhe më pas u kontestuan gjerësisht. Kjo trashëgimi, sipas burimeve në artikull, e ulte gatishmërinë për t’i besuar SHBA-së kur detajet nuk mund të shpjegoheshin plotësisht për shkak të sekretit të burimeve.
Analiza e ndryshme e “çfarë ka në kokë Putini”
Sipas rrëfimit, disa shërbime europiane e konsideruan Putinin aktor racional dhe e panë pushtimin e plotë si veprim me rrezik shumë të lartë dështimi. Pra, ata pranuan faktin e grumbullimit ushtarak, por nxorën përfundim tjetër për qëllimin.
Blloku psikologjik i “luftës së madhe në Europë”
Artikulli sugjeron se një pjesë e komunitetit europian të inteligjencës nuk e konceptoi një luftë tokësore në shkallë të gjerë në shekullin XXI si diçka të mundshme.
5) Kyivi dhe dilema e Zelenskyt: paniku ekonomik kundrejt përgatitjes ushtarake
Sipas The Guardian, CIA dhe MI6 nisën memo paralajmëruese drejt Kyiv-it që në fund të tetorit 2021 dhe zyrtarë perëndimorë e shtuan presionin për përgatitje. Por presidenti Volodymyr Zelensky, sipas rrëfimit, e lidhi rrezikun e alarmit publik me një krizë ekonomike dhe politike: ai kishte frikë se paniku do ta dobësonte vendin përpara se të shtihej një plumb.
Artikulli përshkruan se Zelensky u irritua nga paralajmërimet publike perëndimore dhe në janar 2022 u bëri thirrje qytetarëve të mos hynin në panik. Rrëfimi e cilëson këtë si këshillë të gabuar, sepse shumë civilë u gjendën më pas në zona lufte ose nën okupim pa përgatitje.
At the same time, Ukrainian services were reporting signs of Russian activity: massive recruitment, infiltration attempts, covert contacts, and preparations for a “fifth column.” According to the article, some Ukrainian structures began silent planning “without political blessing,” while military commanders sought measures such as a state of emergency or martial law to move troops and prepare defenses.
6) Last week: when the warning became ultimatum, but not everyone reacted the same way
The narrative describes how in the final days before February 24, 2022, several Western embassies evacuated personnel, while some European leaders continued to trust the space for negotiations.
A symbolic episode the article mentions is the visit of the head of the German foreign service (BND) to Kyiv on the night of February 23, when Allied intelligence indicated that the attack orders had been given. He did not join the diplomatic evacuation convoy during the night and was later escorted out of the city with the help of Polish intelligence, according to the article.
7) February 24, 2022: the prediction for “Kyiv” and the turn of reality
When Russia launched its “military operation” in the early hours of February 24, the US/UK warning of a multi-pronged attack on the country was confirmed. According to the narrative, Zelenskyy took up residence in the presidential compound, declared martial law, and began acting as a warlord.
But the article points out that the US and Britain, while predicting the invasion, were wrong in predicting the dynamics of the first days: they expected Russia to advance quickly towards Kyiv and for the Ukrainian government to end up in exile. According to The Guardian, the West overestimated Russian efficiency and underestimated Ukrainian resistance – a mistake that, in another form, the Kremlin itself made.
8) Four years later: intelligence "success", but open debate about political decisions
The Guardian presents the story as a combination of success and failure: Success in gathering indicators that led to an accurate assessment of the invasion.
Failure to convince allies and, especially, to translate the warning into broad institutional preparation in Ukraine.
The article also mentions the aftermath of the war and the internal Ukrainian debate over whether martial law should have been declared earlier. Some officials argue that delayed preparation cost too much in the beginning; others suggest that early warning would have caused panic and weakened the country. /Adapted from The Guardian /
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