The fall of Viktor Orban marks the end of the illusion that Trumpism is a global movement and strikes at the Kremlin's strategy of dividing the continent. The victory of the conservative Peter Magyar does not undo nationalism, but pushes the European right towards a new sovereignty that sees the threat in Moscow and Washington, not in Brussels...
Sometime in the late 1800s, when the Austro-Hungarian Empire still stretched from the Adriatic Sea to present-day Ukraine, a Hungarian man walked into a bookstore in Vienna and said to the salesperson: "Can you sell me a globe of Hungary?"
This story, which perfectly described the arrogance of a people who saw their nation as the whole world, became a legendary anecdote over time. Of course, within a generation, Hungary would lose two-thirds of its territory with the Treaty of Trianon, making the pride of that globe-shopper less ridiculous and almost tragic in retrospect. But today the story takes on another meaning.
Because after the April 12 parliamentary elections in Hungary, it was not Hungarians who wanted to see the “Hungarian globe,” but foreigners. Liberal and moderate political observers around the world saw the crushing defeat of authoritarian leader Viktor Orban as a sign of the fading of global anti-Berlinism.
The hope was that where Hungary goes, the world will follow, that far-right candidates like Marine Le Pen will not win in France, and that the far-right German AfD party will not triumph in Germany.
But like that globe-shopper's perspective, this view is far from reality. Hungary's new prime minister, Peter Magyar, won on a wave of anti-establishment energy that could just as easily favor populists elsewhere.
For example, in the recent elections in Bulgaria, the party of former President Rumen Radev - whom Western media portrays as Russophile and Eurosceptic - won with an anti-corruption campaign similar to Magyar's.
This shows that strong anti-corruption rhetoric can bring to power not only Orban’s opponents but also leaders who are considered his allies. Moreover, nationalist populists in Europe will continue to look for ways to reshape liberal democratic regimes, and Orban’s political “manual” will continue to be seen as very valuable.
His defeat does not signal the end of far-right politics, but the end of the illusion that Trumpism is a global movement. By accepting defeat and not challenging the result – unlike Donald Trump in 2020 – Orban reaffirmed the democratic credentials of the new European right.
Dhe Magyar, si konservator, nuk përfaqëson refuzimin e nacionalizmit të stilit Orban, por evolucionin e tij. Fitorja e tij sinjalizon një epokë të re për politikën europiane. Duke u distancuar nga Trumpi, e djathta ekstreme europiane mund ta shtyjë kontinentin drejt një konsensusi të ri: një Evropë, ku elitat proeuropiane pranojnë rolin qendror të shteteve kombëtare në integrimin europian, ndërsa partitë nacionaliste pranojnë se kërcënimet reale për sovranitetin e tyre vijnë nga Moska, Pekini dhe Uashingtoni dhe jo nga Brukseli.
Në shumë aspekte, Orban - kryeministri më jetëgjatë i Europës - ishte bërë për të djathtën politike ajo që dikur ishte Fidel Castro për të majtën: udhëheqës i një vendi të vogël, por që kishte grishur imagjinatën e botës. Ai e shndërroi Hungarinë në qendrën intelektuale, institucionale dhe financiare të së djathtës së re europiane.
Nëse ishe intelektual i ekstremit të djathtë, Budapesti të trajtonte si mbret. Nëse ishe parti e djathtë radikale, bankat hungareze të ndihmonin me kredi. Revolucioni i parë elektoral i Orbanit në vitin 2010, ishte kryesisht një revoltë kundër korrupsionit të qeverisë socialiste. Por ishte kundërshtimi i tij i ashpër ndaj planit të Angela Merkelit për hapjen e kufijve të BE-së ndaj refugjatëve sirianë, ai që e bëri një figurë të rëndësishme në politikën europiane. Orban u pozicionua si ndërmjetësi i pazëvendësueshëm: aleat ideologjik i Trumpit, mik i afërt gjeopolitik i Vladimir Putinit dhe partner ekonomik i Kinës brenda BE-së. Në epokën e Trumpit, ky pozicionim dukej se i jepte Hungarisë ndikim të jashtëzakonshëm.
Budapesti vazhdonte të blinte gaz të lirë rus, ndërsa investimet kineze ishin më të mëdha se në Gjermani dhe Francë. Për Trumpin, Orban shërbente praktikisht si këshilltari kryesor për politikën europiane. Për Moskën, ai ishte si informatori kryesor mbi BE-në dhe propagandisti i narrativave ruse për luftën në Ukrainë.
Por ironia më e madhe ishte se, me të gjitha këto lëvizje, Orban u bë pikërisht ajo që dikur përpiqej të shkatërronte: një globalist. Në fushatën e tij të fundit, fokusi ishte politika e jashtme, ndërsa Magyar e përqendroi fushatën te standardi i jetesës dhe shmangu politikën globale.
Kur shpjegonte fitoret e tij të mëparshme, Orban bënte shaka se emri i tij ishte “Viktor”, pra fitimtar. Këtë herë, ai u mund nga dikush mbiemri i të cilit është “Magyar”, që do të thotë “hungarez”. U desh kohë që liderët europianë të kuptonin se presidenca e dytë e Trumpit nuk ishte thjesht transaksionale.
Për Trumpin, rendi liberal nuk ishte rend amerikan. Evropa, të cilën SHBA-ja e ndihmoi të ndërtohej pas Luftës së Dytë Botërore, ishte bërë sipas tij antiamerikane. Hipokrizia themelore e rendit liberal, sipas këtij këndvështrimi, ishte ideja e barazisë mes shteteve - pra fakti që Bullgaria trajtohet si po aq e rëndësishme sa SHBA-ja.
Trump represents a paradox. He is a nationalist who has difficulty understanding the nationalism of others. His anti-immigration agenda resonated in Europe, but he did not show his allies the respect they expected.
Trump's war with Iran and attacks on the Pope proved to be the turning point. He released AI-manipulated images of himself as the Pope, which prompted Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni to reject blind cooperation and criticize his statements.
That moment signaled that the electoral cost of associating with Trump had become too high.
Meanwhile, Orban remained silent. His defeat convinced many leaders of the European far right that the relationship with Trump is politically toxic. It risks labeling them as the new globalists.
But Orban's defeat is also a geopolitical earthquake that will change the Kremlin's calculations. Hungary was very useful to Russia, especially in blocking EU efforts to send 90 billion euros in aid to Ukraine.
The change of government in Budapest means that Kiev may finally receive the financial support that allows it to continue the war. When it comes to internal European dynamics, the political change in Budapest highlights two clear trends.
First, Europe's sovereign turn is here to stay. The big shock in Hungary came not from a classical liberal, but from another conservative who rejects corruption.
Second, the new European right is becoming less Eurosceptic. It is seeing Washington and Moscow - not Brussels - as the main threats to national sovereignty. Leaving the EU or abandoning the euro are now seen as losing ideas.
Leaders like Marine Le Pen or the AfD will focus on national agendas and distance themselves from both the US and Russia. In this context, Orban's defeat creates space for a new consensus on European sovereignty. So keep looking for the "Hungarian globe"./ Pamphlet from "Foreign Affairs"
Note: Ivan Krastev is the president of the Center for Liberal Strategies in Sofia and a permanent "Albert Hirschman" fellow at the Institute for Humanities in Vienna.
Lini një Përgjigje