FLASH
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Arben Malaj has harshly attacked the role of the commission led by Fatmir Xhafaj towards the Albanian Supreme Audit Office, describing it as a threat to parliamentary democracy and raising accusations about his political past.
Former Minister Arben Malaj has publicly exposed Fatmir Xhafaj. After Rama gave him a peripheral commission, Xhafaj is trying to make the law, thinking that he is above the institutions. The most controversial case is that of the Supreme State Audit Office, where Xhafaj wants to audit it with auditors appointed by the Parliament.
This has brought many reactions and the harshest has been Arben Malaj, who knows Fatmir Xhafaj well. On social networks, he tells how Xhafaj sold Nano to bring Rama to power. On the other hand, he has shown that there are accusations against him that during communism he tortured a girl to get gold.
Arben Malaj's full post:
The Xhafaj “Super-Commission” is killing parliamentary democracy! This practice is not found in any parliamentary experience of democratic countries.
The essence is clear: Xhafaj serves! Rama rewards him!
The rot of the SP, the government and the parliament. From the greedy for money and abusive power. So not from the simple and noble socialists, it is much deeper and much more serious than what appears on the surface. Xhafaj rushed to sell the Nano 2005 to serve Rama.
Then he rushed to serve Erion to take Rama's place. But this time he didn't predict it correctly: Erion ended up in prison, Xhafaj received several very profitable government concessions and within 4 days, a super commission.
But the past will haunt him every step of the way. An individual who is publicly accused of torturing a young girl to get gold during the communist era will find it very difficult to escape God's judgment.
When and how is a matter of time!
Here are the explanations for why super committees kill democracy:
The division you make between permanent committees (which follow the structure of line ministries) and temporary or ad-hoc ones (for specific, investigative or legislative issues with a limited term) is precisely the backbone of functional parliaments in Western democracies.
If we refer to the best parliamentary experiences (such as the model of the German Bundestag, the British House of Parliament or the French model), the practice of establishing a permanent "super-committee", which overlaps with regular committees and forces independent constitutional institutions to report directly to it, is considered a structural anomaly for several main reasons:
1. Violation of the Principle of Separation of Powers
In democratic countries, constitutional institutions (such as the Supreme Audit Office, judicial institutions or central banks) have a reporting channel well-defined in the Constitution, usually before the plenary session or specific line committees (such as the Laws or Finance Committee).
The creation of a parallel structure with forced administrative dependence "kills" the independence of these bodies and violates the constitutional principle of checks and balances.
2. Stripping of the powers of regular committees
If a new committee gains the right to oversee, filter, or inspect issues that belong to permanent sectoral committees, it automatically turns parliament into a centralized pyramid structure.
In best practices, standing committees are sovereign in their area of expertise; no committee can be “more equal than the others.”
3. The Model of “Ad-Hoc” Committees vs. Permanent “Super-Committees”
When democratic countries face the need for major structural reforms (such as European integration or judicial reform), they establish temporary or special commissions.
These committees:
They have a clear, specific and time-limited mandate.
They do not replace or overlap with the oversight role of existing committees.
They do not create new relationships of dependence or reporting with institutions that the Constitution has declared independent.
What you describe in the case of Albania shows a tendency towards "concentration of legislative control, creating a hybrid structure that does not simply aim at making laws, but at overseeing institutions that by law should be outside the direct political influence of the parliamentary majority."
This model risks turning parliamentary control from a tool of accountability into a tool of political pressure on constitutional bodies.
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