FLASH
Shkruar nga Pamfleti
The US and Iran face a long conflict, with uncertain consequences for the region and the global order.
In war, what seems logical at first may turn out, in retrospect, to be reckless. After repelling the Iraqi invasion in 1982, Iran refused a ceasefire and went on a counteroffensive. The United States toppled Saddam Hussein within weeks in 2003, but then plunged into an insurgency that lasted almost a decade.
Both had their reasons: Iran aimed to overthrow the Iraqi government; the US wanted to install a friendly regime. Both overdid it and ended in long, drawn-out wars of attrition.
Now in its fifth week, the third Gulf War has dragged on longer than Donald Trump initially anticipated. The US and Iran have exchanged ceasefire proposals, but their positions remain far apart. Almost no one in the region is optimistic that indirect talks will lead to a deal. Some are talking about deploying thousands of US troops on the ground to take over Iranian territory; the Pentagon is reportedly preparing for weeks of ground operations. More weeks of fighting seem likely, a development that would suit Israel, the third party in the war.
Once again, each side has its own reasons for continuing. The danger is that both sides will overstep their bounds. Iran could miss its best chance to end the war on favorable terms. Trump could be drawn into a protracted conflict that he once criticized. Meanwhile, even as they fight side by side, Israel could seriously damage its most important relationship: that with the United States.
In Iran, the regime thinks it has the upper hand. It has weathered a month of war and maintained a steady, if reduced, pace of missile and drone attacks on Israel and the Gulf Arab states. It has already inflicted significant damage on the global economy. More consequences lie ahead: Trump may have temporarily lowered oil prices last week by exaggerating progress toward a deal, but the reality, a shortage of about 10 million barrels a day, is returning. A barrel of Brent crude now costs over $112.
Meanwhile, the damage to Iran, while significant, remains largely limited to military and nuclear targets. The regime even continues to export oil (and in some cases at prices higher than Brent).
This should be Iran’s moment to make the most of the situation and try to end the conflict. It could offer to give up control of the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for sanctions relief, add some other limited concessions, and promise to discuss other US demands in the future. This would be a less than ideal deal for Iran, but more favorable to it than to Trump.
The Islamic Republic, however, appears reluctant to make such a deal. Iran has been attacked twice in the past year while negotiating with the United States, making its leaders both vengeful and suspicious. They want not only to end the war but also to prevent another one, and they believe that more economic chaos could help them do so. Some officials hope to impose tariffs on the use of the Strait of Hormuz, charging ships that pass through. They are also demanding conditions that Trump cannot accept, such as closing American bases in the region and paying war reparations.
If the war drags on, two developments seem likely. First, it will become harder for Trump to declare victory. The closure of Hormuz is already a political issue in the US and is strengthening the positions of key allies in the Persian Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. If it drags on for a few more weeks, it will be difficult to present an incomplete agreement as a success.
Second, the damage to Iran will increase. On Friday, Israel bombed major steel plants in the country, at least one of which halted production. The impact of a prolonged disruption would be huge. Iron and steel are among Iran’s main non-oil exports, with revenues of nearly $7 billion a year — a significant source of foreign exchange, as oil exports have been limited by U.S. sanctions. The plants also supply domestic industries such as automobiles and construction.
For now, the US is deterring Israel from further such attacks, but that won't last forever. Iran's control of Hormuz may prove to be a temporary asset: if the regime doesn't use it for a ceasefire, it could end up fueling a more destructive conflict, likely including a ground invasion.
The Pentagon has already sent about 7,000 Marines and paratroopers to the region and could deploy 10,000 more. They could try to take islands at the entrance to the strait, such as Abu Musa and Tunbet, disputed between Iran and the Emirates. Some officials in the Persian Gulf are also calling for the US to impose a blockade to limit Iranian oil exports, although that could further raise global prices.
These steps may not be enough for a president who prefers spectacular action. Trump could be tempted by bigger options: seizing Kharg Island, home to Iran's main oil export terminal, or sending in commandos to secure its enriched uranium stockpile. Both would be risky and complex operations.
Whichever path it chooses, the US administration hopes for a decisive blow: either to force Iran to reopen Hormuz, or to give the president the opportunity to declare victory. But neither may happen. If the US takes islands and Iran does not surrender, it will have to hold them. If US troops suffer heavy losses, Trump may be forced to send in even more forces. Rather than ending the war, a ground intervention could deepen American involvement.
This would pose risks for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and for Israel. He hopes the war will help him in the next elections, but a prolonged conflict could hurt him. Much of the country is still under restrictions that hinder normal economic activity, at a cost of more than $1 billion a week. Public support remains high, but is falling.
A bigger concern for Israel is its relationship with the United States, which has already weakened after the conflict in Gaza. Polls show that for the first time, more Americans are sympathetic to the Palestinians than to Israel. Meanwhile, some Republicans argue that Israel has too much influence in American foreign policy.
If the war drags on for months, with American losses and rising inflation, new political tensions could arise in the US. The upcoming elections could turn into a referendum on relations with Israel.
In the end, each side believes it has something to gain from continuing the war. But the main question remains: who has more to lose. / Adapted from "The Economist"
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