
Will the war in Iran turn into a Ukraine-like crisis for Europe, exposing it to an energy shock that exposes its weaknesses and lack of unity? And what stance will China take after Donald Trump's visit is canceled or postponed?
There is a clear tendency to quickly close this conflict in narrative terms, declaring the defeat of the US and Israel. This is partly understandable, given that neither Donald Trump nor Benjamin Netanyahu currently enjoy widespread support, either in their own countries or internationally.
However, interpreting this conflict as a final historical retribution against the two Western powers remains hasty. The experience of recent years shows that wars are often accompanied by miscalculations. Russia, for example, failed to predict the viability of Ukraine in 2022. Similarly, the Iranian regime seriously misjudged the Israeli response to the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023.
It is not excluded that the US and Israel have also underestimated the Iranian regime's ability to resist. They may have been influenced by the domestic protests in Iran at the beginning of the year, considering the regime weaker than it is turning out to be in practice.
However, conclusions about a war are not drawn in its early stages. Historical examples such as Pearl Harbor, Operation Barbarossa or the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq show that the final outcome remains uncertain for a long time. At this stage, careful assessment is required.
In this context, China is acting with caution. The postponement of Trump's visit to Beijing represents an important diplomatic development, especially at a sensitive time for Xi Jinping, who is facing economic challenges and domestic political tensions. Beijing's response to the US actions has been moderate and without concrete steps towards escalation.
However, China remains vulnerable to crises in the Middle East due to its energy dependence. It imports a large portion of its oil from Iran, often on favorable terms, making it vulnerable to supply disruptions.
Trump's planned visit to Beijing was expected to address key issues including US arms supplies to Taiwan and trade relations. Its postponement could signal increased pressure on China to take greater responsibility for ensuring the security of its sea lanes, particularly in the Strait of Hormuz.
For Europe, the situation poses well-known risks. Restricting traffic in the Strait of Hormuz creates an energy crisis comparable to that of 2022. This highlights its dependence on external suppliers and exposes structural weaknesses.
Unlike the US, which has a high level of energy self-sufficiency, Europe remains more vulnerable to such shocks. Its response so far has been limited and fragmented. France, the UK and Germany have acted largely independently and conditioned by domestic political factors.
The debate in Europe is also taking place against the backdrop of real military constraints. Even if the political will to act exists, the capacity for intervention in the Middle East remains limited.
On the other hand, Donald Trump has raised the issue of the role of allies in ensuring the security of sea lanes. He points out that the US has for decades borne a disproportionate burden in ensuring freedom of navigation, even in areas that are not vital to the American economy.
The message coming from Europe is relatively unified: this is not considered its conflict. However, the lack of a common strategy and coordinated approach may limit its impact on future developments.
The experience in Gaza remains a recent precedent. There too, Europe distanced itself politically, but failed to influence concrete developments. In the absence of a common position, its role in the current crisis risks remaining secondary./ Corriere della Sera
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