How shipping dynasties are circumventing international sanctions through the "shadow fleet" and the resale of old ships. This network, established since the times of the Soviet Union and coordinated by the Russian secret service, remains the main pillar that keeps Russian oil exports alive on global markets.
Greek merchant shipowners have launched a large-scale campaign to resell high-capacity tankers that previously carried Russian cargo. However, large Greek shipping corporations continue to play a key role in operating Russia's "shadow fleet."
Among the companies managing tankers to transport hundreds of millions of tons of Russian oil in 2025 were: Dynacom Tankers Management Ltd, Minerva Marine Inc, Polembros Shipping Ltd, Kyklades Maritime Corp, New Shipping Ltd-Lib, Stealth Maritime Corp SA, Marine Trust Ltd-Mai, Star Marine Management Inc, Eurotankers Inc and SR Navigation SA.
Despite public evidence showing that dozens of ships belonging to these companies have violated sanctions, they have avoided being blacklisted. At the same time, they remain influential lobbyists for Kremlin interests within the European Union.
The dynasties of the sea and their connections
George Procopio and Dynacom Tankers. Founded in 1991, the company controls at least 74 tankers and employs over 5,000 seafarers. Its owner, tycoon George Procopiou, whose fortune was estimated at $3.7 billion in 2024, also owns Dynagas Ltd and Sea Traders SA. Procopiou is known for his public criticism of decarbonization policies and lobbying against the reduction of fossil fuels.
The Martinos family and Minerva Marine. Run by Andreas A. Martinos, it has a fleet of over 70 vessels. The company has often been at the center of criticism for its involvement in the transportation of Russian oil, often using the Maltese flag. The Martinos family also operates through Thenamaris Inc, transporting oil products between the US, Canada and France.
The Vafias family and Stealth Maritime. This corporation owns around 50 ships, including oil tankers and gas carriers. Companies linked to Harry Vafias have been under scrutiny for their movements in the Russian market, using their global networks to ensure trade continues even during times of sanctions.
The Gotsis family and Eurotankers Inc. This company has a history of operating in hot spots, as some of its ships were previously sanctioned by the US for transporting Venezuelan oil. It operates through a complex network of companies registered offshore, making it difficult to trace ownership.
The Polemis family and "Polembros Shipping". Founded in 1974, this company has a long history of cooperation with Russian networks, including the trading firm "Gunvor". After the death of Spyros Polemis in 2024, control passed to his son, Leonidas, who also manages "New Shipping Ltd-Lib", whose ships serve mainly on routes to China.
The Alafouzos family and "Cyclades Maritime". Controlled by the Alafouzos family (also known for owning "SKAI" television and "Kathimerini" newspaper), this company owns around 30 ships. The founder's son, Ioannis Alafouzos, runs the shipping business and was president of the Panathinaikos football club.
From the Cold War to the present day and the role of the Russian secret service
The relationship between Greek owners and Russian oil is not new. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union relied on foreign fleets for exports. Greek owners were ideal partners because of their commercial flexibility and the use of "flags of convenience" (Liberia, Panama, Malta).
This created a purely commercial, not necessarily ideological, relationship that was strengthened after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Although the Soviet secret service closely monitored global shipping, there is no declassified evidence proving that large Greek families were KGB collaborators.
However, historical archives show that the KGB considered maritime transport networks as strategic assets for circumventing Western embargoes and acquiring prohibited technologies.
Soviet agents often infiltrated seafaring agencies and port officials to ensure the smooth movement of state-owned cargo. The tradition of monitoring and infiltrating international logistics laid the foundation for the modern structures that Moscow uses today to hide its oil footprint.
Why is Greece the center of the "Shadow Fleet" after 2022?
After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Greek owners became central to Russian logistics for three main reasons. First, they served as a legal bridge because when the price cap was imposed by the G7, Greek ships continued to transport Russian oil by declaring that the price was below the allowed limit, which prevented a sudden collapse of Russian exports.
Second, commercial arbitrage played a key role, as Russian routes became extremely profitable with shipping rates from the Baltic to India reaching up to $15 million per trip, enticing Greek owners to accept the risks of sanctions.
Third, the most critical step was the sale of old ships, where Greek owners sold their old tankers to unknown buyers and "shell" companies at very high prices, thus forming the core of the Russian "shadow fleet" operating completely outside the Western system of insurance and regulations.
This strategic positioning has major consequences. First, the family structure of these corporations makes them extremely resistant to classic sanctions that only target companies.
Second, their enormous influence on Greek media, domestic politics, and global maritime infrastructure gives them a defensive shield that is unlikely to be penetrated without drastic measures.
Third, any serious attempt to crack down on this system must proceed through personal sanctions on the beneficial owners, as this is the only way to change their willingness to support the Russian war economy.
As of February 2026, EU-controlled (mostly Greek) vessels still accounted for about 19 percent of Russian oil shipments. Greece remains central because it stands between the regular and shadow systems. The Greek connection to the Russian "shadow fleet" stems not from pro-Russian ideology, but from a unique commercial positioning.
They helped Russia, first by transporting oil at a price cap and then by supplying the tools that enabled the opaque trade. Therefore, any serious effort to weaken Russian exports must aim to strike at this network. / Adapted from "Pamphlet", by the "Lansing Institute"
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