
After two terms marked by protests and economic crisis, the president has chosen to delegate domestic politics to his prime ministers and focus on the international stage. The result is a paralyzed parliament, an executive branch incapable of governing, and a divided country.
It is not easy to understand the dynamics of the French political situation, so chaotic and extremely rigid they are. This is because not only are the far right of Marine Le Pen and the far left of Jean-Luc Mélenchon filled with rigid and dogmatic ideologies, but above all because dogmatic ideology has infected both the socialists and the neo-Gaullists, who are in crisis but remain deeply rooted in the region, to the extent that they control the Senate, elected by local governments. Their lack of flexibility and ability to play political games means that French parties act only by obeying abstract repetitive patterns and are no longer able to have a political impact. Even less are French parties capable of reasoning, in the face of a deep economic crisis, in terms of governments of national unity and certainly not in terms of Italian-style "caretaker governments".
But if we apply general political principles and look at recent history, the picture becomes simpler. Above all, it is not difficult to identify the main political responsibilities for the current chaos. First and foremost, those of President Emmanuel Macron.
In short, after two mediocre presidencies, that of the neo-Gaullist Nicolas Sarkozy and that of the socialist François Hollande, a very young Emmanuel Macron was elected president in 2017 because he managed to absorb a large share of the votes of both the neo-Gaullists and the socialists. His winning proposal was completely free of ideological sludge and filled with a vision that was at once liberal, centrist and progressive. But Emmanuel Macron had everything but a party rooted in the country: his organization, initially called "La République En Marche" and then "Renaissance", was and is supported only by the local roots of a few dozen prominent people, some neo-Gaullists, some socialists, with personal ties to the president.
After an unusual first term, marked in the country by sensational social and union protests, the yellow vests, riots in the suburbs, victorious strikes against pension reform, and characterized by a catastrophic collapse of public finances, Emmanuel Macron was easily confirmed for a second term in 2022, mainly because he faced Marine Le Pen in the second round, another confirmation of the durability of the "Front républicain".
However, a new phenomenon emerged in those elections: the emergence of that persistent ultra-populist bipolarity between the far right and the far left that the Leftists have been calling “bipopulism” for years. In fact, if you add together the votes won three years ago by Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National and those of Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s France Insoumise, you arrive at a robust figure of 45.1 percent.
All this while France is also suffering from the failure of the “Angela Merkel model” that the Chancellor had imposed on all of Europe during her sixteen long years in office. Due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the strategic advantage of Russia’s ultra-low-cost energy supply has been lost; the absorption of massive exports to China has been in crisis; and the excessive influx of immigrants who fail to integrate into European society has become unsustainable, with the rejection of the right wing by the popular classes.
Moreover, French neocolonial arrogance, exacerbated by Macron's presidency, has provoked a backlash in Africa and the humiliating expulsion of French troops throughout West Africa.
Last but not least, the failure of the “Merkel model,” which brought Germany to the brink of recession, led to a radical deterioration of the Franco-German axis, with both the Social Democrat Olaf Scholz and the Christian Democrat Friedrich Merz.
It was here that Emmanuel Macron displayed the full extent of his political immaturity, which, over five years, has led to the chaos of today's France. A mature leader at that moment would have thrown himself headlong and frantically into the domestic front, both within the government and within a party that had proven completely rootless in the country.
This is what Charles de Gaulle, François Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac have always been able to do: a direct engagement in domestic politics, driven by an institutional system like France's that gives the president great powers.
Instead, Emmanuel Macron narcissistically made the opposite choice: he did not exploit the economic crisis, except for the issue of the unpopular pension reform, but threw himself furiously and forcefully into the international arena, first into the Ukrainian crisis, then into the Israeli-Palestinian one and above all into the European one. He then completely delegated the management of France’s extremely complex domestic economic, political and social crisis to his prime ministers, first the former socialist Élisabeth Borne and then Macron’s prodigy Gabriel Attal. In effect, he repeatedly sent a clear message to the French: if things don’t go well, blame the governments, not me, who am above the storm and who prestidigitately manages the fate of Europe and the world.
Rezultati i shkëputjes olimpike, sovrane dhe të pamatur të Emmanuel Macron nga kriza e brendshme ekonomike, politike dhe sociale shpërtheu kështu në zgjedhjet evropiane, në të cilat koalicioni "Besoin d'Europe", i përbërë nga partia e Rilindjes e Macron dhe aleatët e saj, mori një shifër të vogël dhe ultra-minoritare prej 14.6 përqind të votave. Marine Le Pen, megjithatë, u rrit në 31.37 përqind, krahasuar me 18.68 përqind në zgjedhjet e mëparshme të përgjithshme.
Edhe një herë, dhe në mënyrë përfundimtare, Emmanuel Macron përsëriti vendosmërinë e tij kokëfortë dhe të papjekur për të mos riparuar dështimin zgjedhor dhe humbjen radikale të mbështetjes midis bllokut të tij mbështetës, tani pakicë. Ai refuzoi të rrezikonte jetën e tij për krizën e brendshme ekonomike, sociale dhe politike. Ai nuk i përveshi mëngët për të themeluar lëvizjen e tij të lëkundur në nivel lokal, dhe në vend të kësaj bëri një veprim thjesht të rrezikshëm. Pa u konsultuar me ndihmësit e tij më të ngushtë, pa ia përmendur as kryeministrit të tij, Gabriel Attal, i cili nuk do ta falë kurrë, ai shpërndau Asamblenë Kombëtare dhe thirri zgjedhje të reja.
Rezultati i zgjedhjeve të vitit 2024 e ka zhytur kështu vendin në kaos, i cili tani ka shpërthyer përfundimisht. Në raundin e parë, Tubimi Kombëtar i Marine Le Pen fitoi 33.21 përqind të votave, Fronti Popular i Jean-Luc Mélenchon, i udhëhequr në mënyrë efektive nga Jean-Luc Mélenchon, 28.06 përqind dhe koalicioni presidencial Ensemble mori vetëm një përqindje shumë të vogël prej 20.04 përqind.
Një mesazh i qartë kundër një presidencie që qartësisht po lufton për mbështetje. Në këtë pikë, nën drejtimin prapa skenave të Emmanuel Macron, votuesve iu paraqit një Front Republikan që, duke u mbështetur në tërheqjen e ndërsjellë, bllokoi rezultatin natyror të raundit të dytë: fitoren e Marine Le Pen në zonat zgjedhore. Një fitore taktike kundër populizmit të së djathtës ekstreme, por shumë jetëshkurtër, sepse kur vjen puna te kjo, në Asamblenë Kombëtare, për arsye objektive dhe subjektive, është e pamundur të formohet një shumicë qeverisëse.
Falë reformës kushtetuese të Charles de Gaulle të vitit 1958, e cila i lejon presidentit, i cili zgjidhet me votë popullore, t'i japë kompetenca të plota një kreu qeverie pa konfirmim nga vota e besimit e Parlamentit, megjithatë, Emmanuel Macron formoi së pari qeverinë e pakicës së Michel Barnier dhe më pas atë të François Bayrou, të dyja padyshim që dështuan pa pasur mundësinë të qeverisnin, të fundosura nga një shumicë parlamentare që ka ide të ndryshme për gjithçka, përfshirë ekonominë, por që ka fuqinë e vetme për të fundosur qeveritë, dhe e bën këtë.
Once again, Emmanuel Macron has had the opportunity in recent days to risk everything in an attempt to resolve an already dramatic political crisis. He could have personally led the negotiations at the Élysée Palace to find common ground, a minimal program focused on the economy that would allow his government to receive, even with abstention, the support of Macronians, neo-Gaullists, socialists and independents.
It would have been a far-reaching political undertaking, as leader of the nation, in which he could have thrown all his political weight and his ability to shape a new course. However, once again, the president has stayed away from the domestic political arena and has delegated, as always, all negotiations with the political forces to his trusted collaborator and friend, the Minister of Defense Sébastien Lecornu. The result of this action is predictable and certain. Sébastien Lecornu, the fifth prime minister in three years, an experienced politician but not with the political weight necessary for such complex negotiations with the parties, has no chance of preventing the rapid fall of Michel Barnier and François Bayrou, who share his identical political characteristics, although not very brilliant.
The new prime minister will therefore form a government and, most likely using the blackmail of the interim budget, will succeed in passing a budget bill that has been completely compromised by the opposition and therefore completely inadequate to address the severe economic crisis. Then, once the budget bill is passed, he will have a miserable life until he is overthrown. He will be replaced by a new Macronian prime minister without a majority in Parliament, and so on, until presidential elections are held in 2027.
Meanwhile, street riots, strikes, demonstrations, arrests and street fires like those we have seen in recent hours will intensify. Inadvertently, in the end, incredibly, Macron will continue to play Marine Le Pen's game./ Adapted from "Pamphlet" by "Linkiesta".
Lini një Përgjigje