FLASH
Shkruar nga Fadil Lepaja 
After failing to do what "Hamas" did in the West Bank, Radojčič remained under nobody's jurisdiction. Not even Serbia can surrender him, and not even he himself can surrender...
One can even accept the idea that the Serbian state did not know what Radojčič was up to. He may have worked in the conspiracy. It may have had the help and logistics and operational support of the Serbian army or secret service, or any other external service interested in creating a crisis in northern Kosovo. All this, theoretically, could have been done without the knowledge of the political, military or security center in Belgrade. What is not accepted, according to the Serbian citizens themselves, is why official Belgrade continues to support it.
Serbian historical memory recognizes the case of Austria-Hungary, which had asked the then government of Serbia to hand over the suspected assassins of the heir to the throne Franz Ferdinand, which had been taken over by the militant, nationalist Serbian organization "Mlada Bosna" ("Mlada Bosna"). Youthful Bosnia").
Serbia had not agreed to hand over the assassins, nor had it allowed Austro-Hungarian justice to conduct investigations on Serbian soil. This had been enough to declare war. For the Serbs, this was the moment of the beginning of a historical epic, which they consider the most glorious in their history, which ended with Serbia joining the ranks of the winners of the first world war. Thus began the story of the Serbian state's escape from the territory and its triumphant return at the end of the war.
Some think that this was a scenario. The exit from the negotiations, the beginning of a new conflict, with the lightning invasion of the north and its return within Serbia, then, according to the model of Crimea, the continuation of the political or military war for the Serbian enclaves, especially those of strategic importance as in Anamorava, Sharr and Grçanica. But, somewhere this scenario had gone downhill. Perhaps when the German and Western secret services had intercepted the coded order of Vulin (Chief of the BIA) to attack the north, who later withdrew from the post.
Then, why doesn't Radojčič surrender?
Undoubtedly, the only solution is for him to surrender himself, because his surrender from the official Belgrade would mean acceptance that there is no sovereignty in Kosovo. His trial in Belgrade brings other, equally big problems with Serbian and international laws. It also brings political problems.
There are those who think that the reasons are quite different, and have nothing to do with integrity or sovereignty, they are simply a matter of money. No one knows exactly how much the structure around Radojčič benefited from the political mediation between Belgrade and Prishtina since the first negotiations, for the unblocking of the Bridge over the Ibar, where they were promoted as "peace-makers". This turned them into power in no man's land, between Kosovo and Serbia, a silent business agreement of billions of dollars which became the pillar of peace, "without status" between Kosovo and Serbia and which suited the conjuncture Europeans of the time, who preferred a buffer peace in the area rather than a hotbed of crises that could ignite not only the region.
Thus, Radojčič and his company became the owners not only of everything that could be monetized, the state funds of Kosovo, Serbia and the international community allocated for the north of Kosovo, but they also became de facto owners of the territory and the people, who followed without question group requirements. Anyone who objected, who touched the peace (business) built in the North,... was put to death.
Now, when under the influence of the developments on the eastern front, the group saw interest in connecting with wider projects and gaining regional importance and perhaps even more widely, as controllers of the second front, Russia-West, it got out of control as well of Belgrade and Pristina, as part of a wider project of opening fronts to the West, where Serbia was assigned a similar role, which was also assigned to Iran.
After failing to do what "Hamas" did in the West Bank, Radojčič remained under nobody's jurisdiction. Not even Serbia can surrender, and neither can he surrender himself.
However, its "Expropriation" in the North has happened. The north of Kosovo, politically and militarily, is no longer under the control of this group, as are the negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia. The decision on the dinar was the last major blow to this group and its absolute control in the North of Kosovo, and the international intervention regarding the dinar had only one meaning, to protect the Serbian citizens of Kosovo from the consequences of these developments.
The transitional period will create a legal way of money circulation between Kosovo and Serbia, from which the citizens themselves will benefit the most.
The Radojčič case is not closed yet. He owned a territory, a community and negotiated with two states regarding these properties. It is now de-factored. No solution seems in sight. However, the Byzantine tradition in Serbian politics can surprise./ Pamphlet
Lini një Përgjigje