FLASH
Shkruar nga Gabriel Elefteriu
The narrative of the inadequacy of German defense policy with shades of betrayal towards Ukraine and collusion with Russia is only getting stronger. Germany is an easy target for everyone else, and the "strategic community" likes to join in the attacks on Berlin.
Slamming Berlin for the military's neglect has become a very popular sport among pundits and officials across NATO. Chancellor Olaf Scholz, in particular, has drawn quite a bit of criticism with his cautious approach to arming Ukraine with weapons, often leading to contempt for what is seen as his weak stance on military matters and the confrontation with Russia.
Last year it was the "Leopard" tanks, which, although they helped, did not make a difference at the end of Ukraine's summer counteroffensive. Now at the center of the debate are the long-range Taurus missiles: a useful capability on paper, but like everything else, subject to the operational complexities of warfare, and likely not a miracle tool.
In any case, while Scholz is delayed for a long time before making a decision mainly for domestic political reasons, given his very fragile governing coalition, the symbolic value of the weapon in question increases in the whirlwind of international experts speaking on the subject. .
So the narrative of the inadequacy of German policy in the field of defense with the nuances of betrayal towards Ukraine and secret agreements with Russia is only getting stronger. Germany is an easy target for everyone else, and the "strategic community" likes to join in the attacks on Berlin.
Part of this behavior is clearly driven by deep (and justified) resentment of the Second and Third Reich's historical "engagement" with the rest of Europe. Certainly some are pleased to see mighty Germany - which has dominated Europe for decades - in the corner of the ring, at least politically. Another explanation for the anti-German spirit at the moment is that there are already great expectations from this country, which are not easily and quickly fulfilled.
These criticisms are often expressed in moral terms, related to what is commonly seen these days as the country's double guilt in relation to European security. The first accusation concerns Germany's policy towards Russia under Merkel's leadership, embodied by the "Nord Stream" gas pipeline project.
Germany was supplied with cheap energy, ensuring its industrial and economic dominance of Europe; while Putin gained not only a large amount of money that was later used to finance his war against Ukraine, but also gained political influence over German decision-making.
But Russian-German cooperation went much deeper - a large volume of trade between the two countries even in the period of "sanctions" after 2014 - but even further back in time, precisely since the time of Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik. All this makes Germany, in the eyes of many people, a big, if indirect, culprit in the tragedy that happened in Ukraine.
Berlin's behavior and self-imposed dependence on Russian gas are widely seen today as what encouraged Putin to escalate his aggression in Europe. But Germany did not implement this policy in a vacuum. There have been other European leaders who have long cheered that approach.
One of them was Mark Rutte, the incumbent Dutch Prime Minister, himself an enthusiastic Nord Stream supporter, who is now brazenly seeking the post of NATO Secretary General. The second charge against Germany concerns defense spending.
Germany has not spent 2 percent of GDP on the military since the early 1990s. And on average, it has spent only about 1.2 percent of GDP on defense over the past decade. Some European countries, such as Great Britain, took seriously meeting the 2 percent of GDP spending threshold.
Meanwhile, Berlin saved hundreds of billions of euros, which it injected into the economy, thus deepening its advantage over competing countries. There is no doubt that before February 2022, Germany had built for itself an extremely convenient and self-perpetuating system of economic supremacy in Europe.
It saved huge sums of money both in energy (due to its close alliance with Russia) and in defense (thanks to NATO tolerance), which only deepened its other advantages within the EU, such as the euro monetary system.
Therefore, Merkel's era was an era of abundance and budget surpluses. Putin's invasion of Ukraine overthrew Germany's entire geo-economic model, plunging the country into crisis. This forced Olaf Scholz, only a few days after the war, to imagine this change as a Zeitenwende or "end of an era".
As Germany's rapid de-industrialization from 2022 suggests, the chancellor's assessment was very accurate. And this brings us now to the present day, when - with the Nord Stream issue now on the back burner - the rest of the Western world is pressuring Germany to correct another "mistake" of its past. and rearm on a large scale.
But many analysts do not dwell enough on all the consequences of this rearmament. A Germany spending 2 percent of GDP on defense would have the largest defense budget in Europe. At this rate, it would spend around 82 billion euros in 2024, given that GDP last year was 4.121 billion euros with 0.3 percent growth this year.
Kjo do të tejkalonte ndjeshëm edhe shpenzimet e mbrojtjes së Mbretërisë së Bashkuar, duke e rrëzuar Britaninë nga piedestali i saj si shpenzuesja më e madhe për ushtrinë në Evropë. Me
kalimin e kohës, rindërtimi i fuqisë ushtarake gjermane do të nisë të ndryshojë në mënyrë të pashmangshme marrëdhëniet politike në Evropë.
Është e vërtetë që sot Bundeswehr është në një gjendje mjerane, dhe që vendi duket ende shumë i lidhur, psikologjikisht dhe kulturalisht me barrën e tij historike. Por këto gjëra mund të ndryshojnë, sidomos kur zbehet kujtesa e brezave të rinj.
Ata që bërtasin sot për riarmatimin e Gjermanisë duhet ta bëjnë këtë me supozimin se kjo do të forcojë parandalimin e NATO-s kundër Rusisë në një periudhë afat shkurtër (3-5 vjet), që është koha e mundshme për një sulm të supozuar rus drejt perëndimit në rast se kapitullon Ukraina.
Por gjermanët nuk do të jenë të gatshëm të luftojnë Rusinë brenda kësaj periudhe kohore edhe nëse do të donin, dhe gjithsesi nuk do t’i ndryshonin dot planet e Putinit, nëse ai do të jetë vërtetë i vendosur për më shumë luftë.
Pra, i vetmi rezultat real i detyrimit të Gjermanisë që ta rrisë ndjeshëm fuqinë e saj ushtarake, do të jetë grumbullimi i më shumë problemeve politike për Evropën në të ardhmen, pasi një shtet më i fortë, tenton natyrshëm që të mbrojë me më shumë energji interesat e tij.
Mbase avokatët e vendosur të kësaj politike besojnë ashtu si Francis Fukuyama gjatë viteve 1990, se ne i kemi shpëtuar disi historisë dhe cikleve të saj, apo se “popujt (njerëzit) ndryshojnë”. Kjo është një pikëpamje shumë bujare, por një marrëzi që injoron atë që kemi mësuar nga dy luftërat botërore.
Ka nga ata që theksojnë se gjatë Luftës së Ftohtë, Gjermania Perëndimore mbajti një ushtri të madhe - rreth gjysmë milioni trupa, plus rreth 700.000 rezervistë - pa ndonjë shqetësim të madh për sa i përket rrezikut politik që lidhet me këtë institucion ushtarak. Por ajo situatë ishte aq e ndryshme sa ishte e parëndësishme për të sotmen.
Së pari, në atë kohë Republika Federale kishte forca të mëdha aleate të dislokuara në tokën e saj, që ishin gati të përballeshin me sovjetikët, por ndërkohë po mbanin nën kontroll gjermanët. Më e rëndësishmja, vendi u nda, me Gjermaninë Lindore në duart e komunistëve, ndaj fushëveprimi i saj ishte tërësisht i kufizuar.
Në vitet 2020 dhe 2030, rivendosja e fuqisë së plotë ushtarake në nivele shpenzimesh më të mëdha se çdo komb tjetër evropian - në një Gjermani të bashkuar, do ta kthente orën pas jo në mesin e Luftës së Ftohtë, por në kohët e Bismarkut. Siç e kanë theksuar herë pas here Henry Kissinger dhe të tjerët, një Gjermani e bashkuar me një ekonomi dhe ushtri të plotë, e destabilizon automatikisht sistemin evropian, në sajë të mekanikës gjeopolitike bazë të ekuilibrit të fuqisë.
However, if a change of course were possible at this stage, what should the alternative policy be? Certainly, Berlin should not be allowed to shirk the defense of Europe. He must share the burden and contribute to the common cause, not only by building up his army mightily.
Instead of this approach, Germany could take on the role of "Europe's arsenal", financing new weapons factories, which could supply other European forces at lower prices and in large quantities. Finally, Germany can and must continue
to lead Europe in financial and military support for Kiev./ Adapted "Pamphlet", abbreviated "Brussels Signal"
Note: Gabriel Elefteriu, deputy director at the Geostrategy Council and fellow at the Yorktown Institute.
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