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Last month, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stayed away from Ukraine for several days. He spent almost a week in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and Hiroshima, Japan. His goal: to win the support of Brazil, India, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, 4 important countries that are reluctant to align themselves in the Russia-Ukraine war.
These and other leading countries of the Global South have more power today than ever before. Reasons for their new geopolitical weight: They have more influence, they benefit quite a bit from regionalization, and they can fuel US-China tensions. Today, the middle powers have more influence than at any time since World War II.
These are countries with considerable geopolitical influence, but they are still less powerful than the world's two superpowers: the United States and China. In the global north, they include France, Germany, Japan, Russia, South Korea and others.
With the exception of Russia, these countries do not tell us much about the dynamics of shifting power and leverage, as they remain broadly aligned with the United States. Much more interesting are the 6 major middle powers of the Global South: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey.
These shaky states of the Global South are not fully aligned with any of the superpowers, and are therefore free to create new dynamics. All are members of the G20 and very active in both geopolitics and geoeconomics.
In turn, these 6 middle powers serve as a good barometer for broader geopolitical trends in the Global South. There are many reasons for the growing importance of these 6 countries, but they can be grouped into 2 categories: long-term, historical developments and the latest global trends.
As for the former, developments since the Cold War have given these powers more influence in international relations. The Cold War brought about a stricter division into opposing blocs, which attracted some of today's shaky states.
The ensuing era of US unipolarity necessitated some loyalty to Washington from nearly all states. Today's China-US bipolarity is weaker and all the middle powers have more freedom of movement.
The second category is found in the trajectory of history: The world has de-globalized in important ways during the last 2 decades, so new geopolitical and geoeconomic relations are being formed at the regional level. Fragile states are all regional leaders, and they become more important in conditions where power shifts to their regions.
The processes of moving supply chains closer to home and away from adversaries are slowly shifting some companies and trade relationships away from China to other regions, mainly in the Global South. Some of the fragile states of the Global South will become even busier centers of regional trade.
The best example is India, where some American companies are running new supply chains. Energy markets are also becoming more regional, and Saudi Arabia benefits from this.
Also, the Saudi capital, Riyadh, is emerging as a regional financial center. Even the International Monetary Fund has made it clear that the world is fragmenting, and in a fragmented world the middle regional powers logically play an increasingly important role.
Meanwhile, during the Cold War, India and Indonesia had just emerged from colonial rule, and this limited their global role during that bipolar era. Today, the 6 fragile states are fully autonomous actors.
But they are not just a new incarnation of the Non-Aligned Movement, or other groupings dominated by the Global South, such as the G-77 and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), where none have accumulated a lot of power. All these groups involve or involve some ideological affinity, which the 6 swing states do not have.
The lack of ideological proximity helps these states take a strong transactional approach to foreign policy, which in turn increases their overall influence in international affairs. The power of swing states is enhanced by the influence they gain from the competition and confrontation that increasingly characterizes US-China relations.
Each superpower wants weak states to come closer to it, creating opportunities for them to be pitted against each other. For example, India's power and influence has greatly increased since it joined the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, QUAD, the most important US-led effort to balance China's power in the region.
Brazil and Indonesia have benefited from China's eagerness to sign deals on essential minerals, particularly lithium, nickel and aluminium. A recent study shows that while each of the 6 states may swing toward the United States or China on a particular issue, most of them remain relatively balanced in their loyalties.
For now, they will be free in many areas to pit one great power against another. The only exception is fundamental technologies, including semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum technology, 5G telecommunications and biotechnology.
Here, the middle powers must perhaps make a choice between trade with the United States or China. The six shaky states have played an important role in sanctions and framing the optics of the war in Ukraine. From the beginning, they have refused to become part of Western military aid to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia.
They argue that the war affects only European and not global security, and that it does not advance their national interests in development, debt reduction, ensuring food security, energy security and other areas.
But the most important influence of these states in the war has been their leading role in opposing and in some cases undermining Western sanctions against Russia. Turkey is one of several countries involved in funneling large volumes of dual-use items to Russia, violating the spirit and possibly the letter of Western sanctions.
For these activities, the United States has already placed 4 Turkish companies under sanctions. Most of the other middle powers have remained completely neutral, although South Africa leans towards Russia. Since the beginning of the war, six of these countries have maintained or increased trade and other ties with Russia.
The IMF predicts that the Russian economy will grow by 0.7 percent this year. Fragile states have helped Russia blunt the impact of Western sanctions, and will continue to do so. They are one reason why the Kremlin seems to believe it can make a living by moving trade south and east.
The great increase in influence and leverage of the middle powers of the Global South is also evident in their mediation initiatives. Turkey is the single most influential outside power in the war in Ukraine. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been a key negotiator of the wheat deals.
He was also involved in peace talks from the beginning of the war, and is in a good position to facilitate future talks if the warring parties choose. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has come up with his own initiative, while India has positioned itself more quietly to broker a future peace.
Some may disagree with the idea that these 6 shaky states are the powers to watch in the future. All of them are still emerging markets, and with the exception of India, economic growth rates in these countries have not met expectations. This grouping also lags behind in terms of the development of institutions that support the rule of law.
Meanwhile, technological revolutions, including that of Artificial Intelligence, will hit the Global South harder than advanced industrialized democracies, as the former have fewer resources with which to fight against the politically dangerous effects of AI.
The most important consequence is that Washington needs to up its game towards these 6 countries in order to prevent a significant weakening of the US position in the global balance of power. Inviting most of these countries to the recent G-7 summit was a useful start, but much more is needed.
A better strategy would start with more high-level visits by top US diplomats. Also, an improved policy towards them would include a more agile trade strategy. Meanwhile, the United States must be able to better predict the reactions of the 6 swing states and the Global South to key US policy decisions.
For example, the extent to which the Global South distanced itself from Western policies over Russia's war in Ukraine caught Washington by surprise. Among these states, there are no discernible patterns of behavior beyond the intense pursuit of their national interest. This makes predictions of geopolitical results even more difficult./ Bota.al
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