FLASH
Shkruar nga Richard Fontaine
The reversal of traditional military principles is prioritizing rapid air strikes and covert operations, avoiding the involvement of ground troops in protracted conflicts. But this approach risks producing long-term chaos and leaving no one accountable for the dire consequences of regime change.
When the bombs began falling on Iran last weekend, most Americans were as surprised as the rest of the world. Although American forces in the Middle East had been massing and preparing for a possible attack for weeks, negotiations between Washington and Tehran were still ongoing.
Even as the military prepared for the attack, the Trump administration glossed over the precise objective. There was little national debate, no discussions with allies, and no vote in Congress. Two days after the war began, officials have yet to articulate a vision for how it will end.
Instead of using decisive force, President Donald Trump is prioritizing flexibility. This approach reflects a new way of war that overturns traditional thinking about the use of force.
In many ways, Trump’s use of force is the “anti-Powell Doctrine.” Developed during the Gulf War (1990-1991) by General Colin Powell, this doctrine emphasized that force should only be used as a last resort, after nonviolent means have been exhausted.
If war is necessary, it must pursue a clear objective, with an exit strategy and public support. It requires a very large force to defeat the enemy, using every available resource.
Drawn from the bitter lessons of the Vietnam War, the approach aimed to avoid protracted conflicts and internal divisions. As Powell wrote, military leaders could not accept “wars fought half-heartedly and for half-baked reasons.”
The approach we are currently seeing began to take shape during Trump’s first term. In 2017-2018, he ordered strikes on the Assad regime and continued the fight against ISIS. In 2020, the US killed Qasem Soleimani.
Last year, Trump launched a war against the Houthis, destroyed Iranian nuclear facilities, and attacked militants in Nigeria. This year, he invaded Venezuela to depose Nicolás Maduro, and most recently launched a major air campaign against Iran.
The departures from tradition are striking. The Powell Doctrine says war is the last resort. Meanwhile, Trump uses uncertainty as an advantage to catch the enemy by surprise. The attacks on Iran last year and now occurred while negotiations were still ongoing.
There were no public ultimatums to Soleimani or Maduro. For Trump, force is not a last resort, but a means to increase influence and produce quick results.
He has also completely neglected an important factor such as public support.
While Powell sought a lengthy debate and congressional approval, no conflict initiated by Trump has been preceded by such campaigns. In fact, he has often insisted that he hoped to avoid war while preparing for it.
In Venezuela, the military buildup was disguised as an anti-drug operation. Even in his recent State of the Union address, Trump mentioned Iran in just a few sentences, despite the high risks.
So where the Powell Doctrine demands clarity, Trump values flexibility. The current administration has avoided articulating specific objectives. When it announced war with Iran, it said it aimed to “eliminate threats,” even though Tehran did not possess missiles that could reach the United States.
He later claimed the goal was “WORLD PEACE .” Without clear objectives, President Trump retains the ability to stop fighting without admitting defeat. This is his exit strategy. Finally, Trump favors “short and sharp” actions.
He uses air power and special forces, to the exclusion of conventional ground troops. If regime change requires massive ground forces, Trump has made it clear that the US will not pay that price. He will settle for less.
In some cases, this response has served history better than the dogmatic application of the Powell Doctrine. The limited use of force against the Houthis produced a better deal than ignoring them or open war.
“Good enough” outcomes, which minimize the risk of a “swamp,” may be the right approach for many situations. However, even this way of war has its limits. Attacking Iran is Trump’s most ambitious move.
Forcing regime change in such a large country without ground troops and no local allies is extremely difficult. The dire scenarios, from internal chaos to a military dictatorship even stricter than what we have seen so far, are real.
Here, Trump’s flexibility could serve as a way out. If the operation fails or the public tires, Trump could call off the war and declare victory, claiming that the objective was simply to weaken Iran. In doing so, he subverts Powell’s rule: “If you break it, you keep it.”
Trump has already declared that the US will not be held responsible for the consequences of this war. If the Iranian regime collapses, its people will have to pick up the pieces themselves. The major limitation of this approach is that it does not pave the way for long-term peace, but simply postpones the conflict for another day./ Adapted from "Pamphlet", from "Foreign Affairs"
Note: Richard Fontaine, director of the Center for a New American Security. He has worked at the State Department, the National Security Council, and as a foreign policy advisor to U.S. Senator John McCain.
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