The investigations into the AKSHI stop at procedures and companies on paper, but avoid Armand Shara, who through TAG Engineering, ikubINFO, Infosoft and iNext has predetermined tenders, has benefited from tens of millions of euros from the budget and has channeled this money towards the "Durana Tech Park" tax evasion scheme, continuing the role in the criminal group previously held by Ermal Beqiri.
It is interesting that whenever law enforcement agencies launch investigations into the AKSHI, the focus is on the procedures, documents, contracts, and companies that emerge as winners on paper, but never on the person who connects all these elements and who plays a decisive role in how technology tenders are constructed and concluded, leaving Armand Shara out of any analysis, even though he appears in every link in this chain.
Investigations look at forms and firms, but they do not follow real ownership and do not follow economic connections, because the predetermination of a procedure does not happen by itself, someone drafts the conditions, someone controls the supply, someone decides who enters the competition and who emerges the winner, and in the case of AKSHI, these roles are not separate, but united around the same name.
Armand Shara owns 100 percent of TAG Engineering, a company registered on November 30, 2017 with NIPT L72407008S, and through this company he maintains control over companies that constantly appear in public technology procedures, never appearing as a frontal beneficiary himself, but always being behind the companies that receive contracts and payments from the budget.
TAG Engineering holds shares in INFOSOFT SYSTEMS, InfoSoft Business Solutions, ikubINFO and ikubINFO International, companies that appear as contractors and suppliers in projects that AKSHI pays from the state treasury, placing Armand Shara at the center of decision-making even when his name does not appear in the contract.
According to treasury data, ikubINFO alone has received around 30 million euros from public funds, distributed in over a thousand transactions, payments made mainly by AKSHI for IT systems and services, while control of this company passes through TAG Engineering and ends with Armand Sharra.

These payments do not represent a single episode, but a continuous flow of public money, where the same network appears sometimes as a winner, sometimes as a supplier, and sometimes as a competitor, while the real benefit remains concentrated in the same person.
Në dosjen e laboratorëve të shkollave “Smart Lab”, që ndodhet nën hetim, institucionet ndalen te kompanitë që dalin fituese në tender, por nuk ndjekin zinxhirin e furnizimit dhe faturimit, ku pajisjet kalojnë nga partneri distributor te kompani të lidhura me rrjetin e Armand Sharrës, më pas te ndërmjetës dhe në fund te pjesëmarrës që fitojnë me çmime disa herë mbi koston, ndërsa personi që kontrollon këtë zinxhir nuk përmendet.
Paralelisht me këtë rol në teknologji, Armand Sharra rezulton i lidhur me grupet kriminale që pastrojnë paratë në ndërtim, kulla dhe pasuri të paluajtshme, duke krijuar një bosht ku tenderët, paratë publike, projektet dhe toka qarkullojnë brenda të njëjtave rrjete.
Pas largimit të Ermal Beqirit nga qendra e skemës, roli i tij nuk u zhduk, por u trashëgua, dhe sot del qartë se Armand Sharra ka marrë përsipër vijimin e misionit të Beqirit, duke mbajtur të njëjtin model funksionimi, të njëjtat lidhje dhe të njëjtin kontroll mbi procedurat e AKSHI-t, por me më pak ekspozim dhe me më shumë mbulim përmes pronësisë.
Skema nuk ndryshoi, ndryshoi vetëm emri që nuk përmendet, sepse ndërsa Ermal Beqiri doli në dosje dhe në hetime, Armand Sharra mbeti në hije, edhe pse paratë, kompanitë dhe kontratat tregojnë se kontrolli real nuk u largua, por thjesht u zhvendos.
Pas largimit të Ermal Beqirit nga qendra e skemës, roli i tij nuk u zhduk, por u trashëgua, dhe sot del qartë se Armand Sharra ka marrë përsipër vijimin e misionit të Beqirit, duke mbajtur të njëjtin model funksionimi, të njëjtat lidhje dhe të njëjtin kontroll mbi procedurat e AKSHI-t, por me më pak ekspozim dhe me më shumë mbulim përmes pronësisë.
Skema nuk ndryshoi, ndryshoi vetëm emri që nuk përmendet, sepse ndërsa Ermal Beqiri doli në dosje dhe në hetime, Armand Sharra mbeti në hije, edhe pse paratë, kompanitë dhe kontratat tregojnë se kontrolli i krimit nuk u largua, por thjesht u zhvendos tek një tjetër aktor, Armand Shara.
Në këtë situatë, pyetja nuk lidhet me një tender dhe as me një kompani, por lidhet drejtpërdrejt me Armand Sharën, sepse pa u hetuar roli i tij si kontrollues i rrjetit të teknologjisë, si i lidhur me grupet e ndërtimit dhe si vijues i misionit të Ermal Beqirit, çdo hetim mbi AKSHI-n mbetet i cunguar.
Pse eshte lene ne hije kolosi i tenderave te teknologjise Z. Armand Shara ?
Lidhja e kompanive të Armand Sharës me aferën e “Durana Tech Park” është e drejtpërdrejtë dhe del nga dokumentet, jo nga interpretimet. Së pari, TAG Engineering SH.P.K., kompania që Armand Sharra zotëron 100 për qind dhe që shërben si qendra e kontrollit të gjithë rrjetit të tij, rezulton e përfshirë në listat e publikuara si një nga rreth 50 subjektet që janë regjistruar dhe kanë përfituar nga përfshirja në “Durana Tech Park”. Ky fakt tregon se Sharra nuk ka qenë spektator në këtë aferë, por pjesë aktive e saj që në fazën e ndërtimit të skemës.
Secondly, the company iNext SH.PK ., controlled by Armand Sharra through this network, was established with a registered address precisely within the “Durana Tech Park” , which is not a formal detail, but a deliberate choice, because it places the company from day one in a tax haven that provides for exemption from corporate tax and other facilities directly related to this park. This shows that iNext was not created as an ordinary market company, but as a structure located within a scheme that aimed at tax evasion.
Given that TAG Engineering and its network of affiliated companies are regular beneficiaries of public tenders worth millions of euros, mainly in the technology sector and through the National Agency for the Promotion of Innovation and Entrepreneurship, the situation takes on another dimension. On the one hand, these companies receive large funds from the state budget through public contracts, i.e. they receive taxpayers' money. On the other hand, through their involvement in the “Durana Tech Park”, the same entities avoid paying taxes, by not contributing to the same budget from which they feed.
This creates a closed cycle, where public money passes from the state treasury to companies controlled by Armand Sharra, then is concentrated in TAG Engineering as the parent company and, in the next phase, is channeled towards iNext, which is positioned within the tax evasion scheme of “Durana Tech Park”. In this way, the profits originating from technology tenders, including those of AKSHI, pass through a network of companies belonging to the same control and end up in a structure where taxes are not paid.
iNext, created and registered within the park, thus appears as a new portfolio for the network controlled by Armand Sharra, a company that does not need to go out to tenders itself in the initial phase, because it is fed by the money generated by other companies in the group, such as ikubINFO and entities related to Infosoft, money that initially comes from public procedures and is then moved within the network.
This mechanism explains why iNext has no history of its own in public procurement, but nevertheless immediately appears as part of a privileged fiscal structure, because it was not built to compete, but to absorb the profits generated by tenders previously won by the network of companies that Armand Sharra has controlled for years... (continued) /Pamphlet
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