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Russia is using criminal networks to sabotage across Europe, recruiting Russian-speaking criminals via Telegram. The goal: destabilization and retaliation against the EU for its support for Ukraine.
Russia has created a network of agents for the purposes of its hybrid war against Europe, where state institutions are closely linked to the criminal world. According to a joint study by the NGO GLOBSEC and the International Center for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), people with a criminal past who speak Russian are being recruited to carry out sabotage operations across Europe. The results were presented in Brussels at a meeting of the European Parliament's Special Committee on the Defense of Democracies (EUDS).
The study links these tactics to the war against Ukraine, noting that “hybrid operations are not a sideline, but a mainstay of Russia’s strategy.” The researchers compare these tactics to the methods of the Islamic State (IS), which has previously recruited criminals in Europe.
"This time, it is not a terrorist organization, but a state that leads recruitment and operations," the study says.
Criminals and sabotage
From January 2022 to July 2025, 110 sabotage and attack attempts linked to Russia were recorded in Europe, mainly in Poland and France. Of these, 89 were successful, while 21 were prevented in time. The authors of the study believe that the number of prevented attacks is likely higher, because intelligence services do not publish all the data.
131 people have been identified as being linked to the incidents, at least 35 of whom had previous convictions and were recruited in prisons or through criminal organizations. The Kremlin most often recruits men in their 30s from post-Soviet countries who speak Russian and are in difficult living circumstances. Recruitment is often done online, via Telegram, but also through relatives and friends.
The main motive for participating in sabotage is money – from a few euros for distributing pro-Russian leaflets, to large sums for attacks on critical infrastructure.
Revenge on the EU for Ukraine aid
To finance these activities, Moscow is also using illegal methods to circumvent Western sanctions over Ukraine. “These channels allow the Kremlin to evade restrictions and more deeply involve criminal networks in its hybrid warfare strategy,” the study says.
“Illicit money flows, crime and hybrid operations are not separate, but elements of a single plan of action.” Also: “Russia’s military campaign – bombings, arson attacks, assassination attempts – should be seen as punishment for the EU’s support for Ukraine, but also as preparation for a possible larger conflict.”
Crime as a state tool
Dominika Hajdu from GLOBSEC explains that the use of criminals by Russian authorities is nothing new. Citizens who lived “east of the Iron Curtain” remember how shortages in the USSR created a dependence on the illegal economy. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, unlike other post-communist countries, the fight against corruption in Russia was not a priority. Instead, corruption became the norm and the way state institutions functioned.
According to Hajdu, in 1994, over 500 criminal groups were active in Russia, controlling around 40,000 companies. In the early 2000s, former KGB officers consolidated control over the state, and their connections to the criminal world became part of the state system.
The EU must react
Polish politician Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, a member of the European Parliament from the European People's Party (EPP), believes that the Kremlin has long used criminal methods and the underworld to recruit agents in Europe.
"The problem is how to react," he tells DW, citing the example of drones that have paralyzed airports. "Nobody has shot them down. We want to act against recruits, but activities on Telegram have not yet been banned, although the EU should control such platforms," warns Sienkiewicz.
Recommendations for the EU
The study’s authors propose a number of measures for the EU’s response, including better monitoring of online platforms, particularly Telegram. They also suggest broadening the definition of “hybrid threats,” because many national strategies do not sufficiently take into account the role of “informal actors such as criminal groups, ideological intermediaries, or individuals acting in self-interest.” It is precisely this legal loophole that allows Russia to deny responsibility for attacks and sabotage.
Dominika Hajdu emphasizes the importance of cooperation between the public and private sectors: “They should be partners, because private companies in Europe have more sophisticated mechanisms for detecting Russian criminal activities.” That is why she supports the creation of a coordination platform to prevent Russian hybrid attacks on European countries./ Deutsche Welle
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