FLASH
Shkruar nga PamfletiA report from Britain, exclusively for Pamfleti, exposes the "Trojan Trades" scheme that hijacks business profiles on Google, defrauds British citizens with unlicensed workers and channels millions of pounds into Albanian shell companies, turning them into political towers and financing in Tirana...
A report drafted in London and submitted to British institutions documents the existence of an organized network, which operates through the manipulation of Google Business and shell companies to generate millions of pounds each year from British citizens. The document, obtained by Pamfleti , directly links Albanian individuals such as Çesk Ivanaj, Valentin Stojani and Ylli Ujka to this scheme, revealing operational bases in Tirana and money laundering channels linked to companies such as Ration 07, Radar Media Group and Xone.
The report describes the network’s operation as a standardized process that begins with the hijacking of legitimate British business profiles on Google. The profiles are altered to include phone numbers controlled by a call center in Tirana, while positive reviews are fabricated by employees engaged in British VPNs. In this way, British citizens seeking urgent services such as plumbers, electricians or car keys end up contacting the Albanian network without realizing it. They believe they are calling a reputable local company, but in reality they are connected to operators in Albania who distribute the work to unregistered workers, often undocumented immigrants who have no technical qualifications.
The first case documented in the report occurred in London on March 14, 2024, when a customer asked a locksmith to open his apartment door. The network technician replaced the cylinder with a cheaper model, but demanded a payment of £380. The payment was made by card and traced to an account registered in Albania in the name of Xone Digital Services.
In Birmingham, on May 22, a family was scammed after paying £250 for a faucet washer. The invoice listed the company as “1001 Solutions Ltd.”, while the transaction was processed by Radar Media Group. In Manchester, on July 3, a customer paid £410 to replace an electrical fuse, and the payment ended up in the account of Alo Pronto Sh.pk disguised as “online technical support.” In Leeds, on August 18, a small business paid £500 for a printer problem solved with a software installation, with the funds being transferred to Radar Media Group and then distributed to other accounts in Albania.
Në të gjitha këto raste, viktimat raportuan mungesë transparence, refuzim për të dhënë fatura dhe në disa raste edhe kërcënime të drejtpërdrejta. Klientë që vendosën komente negative në Google u bombarduan me telefonata nga numra të ndryshëm, ku iu kërkua të hiqnin vlerësimet. Një grua raportoi se operatorët iu referuan babait të saj të ndjerë, duke treguar se kishin hulumtuar jetën e saj personale për ta intimiduar. Të tjera dëshmi tregojnë se punëtorët e dërguar në terren refuzonin të largoheshin nga banesat pa u paguar, duke e kthyer çdo shërbim në një akt shtrëngimi.
Fluksi i parave është i dokumentuar me detaje. Pas mbledhjes së pagesës, gjysma mbetet në Mbretërinë e Bashkuar si shpërblim për punëtorin, ndërsa gjysma tjetër transferohet në Ration 07 Ltd. Kjo kompani ekziston në të dy versionet, në MB dhe në Shqipëri, dhe është regjistruar me të njëjtin drejtor. Nga Ration 07 UK paratë kalojnë në Ration 07 Albania dhe futen në sistemin financiar shqiptar si pagesa për shërbime digjitale. Raporti dokumenton se fondet përdoren për blerje pasurish në Tiranë, për investime në kompani si Radar Media Group dhe Xone, dhe për financimin e aktiviteteve politike. Ky është dimensioni më shqetësues i raportit: fakti se para të gjeneruara nga mashtrimi i qytetarëve britanikë kanalizohen në politikën shqiptare.
Struktura e komandës është e qartë. Çesk Ivanaj del si arkitekti i skemës, i përfshirë që nga themelimi i Alo Pronto në Shqipëri dhe Itali. Valentin Stojani shfaqet si menaxher financiar, i ngarkuar me llogaritë bankare dhe me sigurimin e kanaleve ndërkufitare. Ylli Ujka shërben si hallka që lidh terrenin me Shqipërinë, duke rekrutuar punëtorë, siguruar adresa për profilet në Google dhe transportuar para cash. Raporti tregon se një pjesë e fitimeve është investuar në ndërtime në Tiranë, ku prona të ndryshme janë përdorur si call center apo si pasuri të regjistruara në emra të tretë. Franceska Bitri shfaqet si përgjegjëse për dokumentacionin formal, për regjistrimin e kompanive guaskë dhe për administrimin e adresave të emailit e domain-eve që përdoren për të verifikuar profilet false.
Kompanitë guaskë të lidhura me këtë rrjet janë të shumta. Radar Media Group përdoret për reklamim dhe manipulim të profileve, Xone për shërbime digjitale të fabrikuara, 1001 Solutions për llogari bankare dhe pajisje, ndërsa Ration 07 është kanali financiar qendror. Alo Pronto, kompania e parë e regjistruar, ka shërbyer si platformë e hapjes së këtij aktiviteti, përpara se emri i saj të braktisej dhe rrjeti të vepronte në fshehtësi.
The pamphlet has seen documents showing how Google is being used systematically to destroy the competition of real British businesses. The profile of Kings Plumbing & Heating, a well-known company in Maidenhead, was hijacked by the network, losing it many customers. To eliminate rivals, the network uses bots that send fake requests, draining their advertising budget, and bombard them with one-star reviews to lower their rankings. In some cases, rival companies have lost thousands of pounds in a matter of days from these digital attacks alone.
The report does not stop at finance and money laundering. A special section of it shows the recruitment mechanism that the network uses to ensure the continuity of the fraud. At the center appears Nessar Khawaja, an Afghan national based in London, who uses TikTok and social networks to attract unemployed people, undocumented immigrants or unskilled individuals. He promises them large daily profits, over 300 or 400 pounds a day, and introduces them to a system where they work as “partners” of the network. In his videos, cited in the report, he teaches them to appear polite to customers, to always accept coffee or tea at home, and then uses this “psychological approach” to justify inflated prices several times above the norm.
Recruitment does not stop with motivational videos. The report also documents short 5-day plumbing courses, which are advertised on TikTok with phone numbers directly linked to the Albanian call center. Trainees are promised immediate employment upon completion of the course, and if they fail to solve a technical problem, they are offered a “video call” with instructors to guide them through the intervention. In this way, individuals without any qualifications are entered into the homes of British citizens to work on gas, water, electricity or critical equipment, creating a major risk to public safety.
The report has identified the key individuals and shell companies that keep the network active, documenting the links between the call center in Tirana, recruiters in the UK and money laundering channels. Çesk Ivanaj, Valentin Stojani, Ylli Ujka and their associates appear with clear and defined roles in the structure, while through recruiters such as Nessar Khawaja the network is constantly supplied with unlicensed workers, who are sent to the homes of British citizens.
This is the current photo of the file, submitted to British institutions and provided by Pamfleti. But the investigation does not end here. New leads on companies, bank accounts used and possible connections to other sectors in Albania are still being verified. New data will be published in the future, which is expected to further expand this file and bring to light the full scale of the network that has set up its base in Tirana and that now operates in several countries simultaneously. /Pamfleti
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