FLASH
Shkruar nga Pamfleti
At the heart of autocratic regimes there is always something wrong. They do not incite dissent, work to suppress their opponents, and are accountable neither to real elections nor to a free press. However, they can fall at any time, often at the hands of those closest to them.
This is what Nikita Khrushchev thinks after the debacle of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
But Russian history provides evidence of other dangers for such regimes, nightmares that can become real with unexpected speed and produce violence. This translates as "disorder," but in the Russian context it means a violent break in traditional society. , including the old norms of passivity and compliance. In this anarchic situation, seemingly unchallenged systems face revolts, riots and murderous actions directed at all forms of existing authority, including those at the top.
Russia has seen such uprisings in the distant past.
In 1773–1775 Yemelyan Pugachev, a disaffected army officer led a rebellion against Tsarina Catherine II; in 1670–71 Stenka Razin did the same against Tsar Alexis.
Widespread peasant unrest led to the First Russian Revolution of 1905 and forced Nicholas II to make concessions for a new parliament. A few years later, the Romanov dynasty came to an end as socialists used nationwide attacks on landowners and the morale of World War I to bury 400 years of tsarist rule and later the tsar himself. Soon, and for more than a decade afterward, the Bolshevik rulers faced popular unrest challenging the regime.
Elite fear of social disintegration is one possible explanation for the strangely favorable deal Vladimir Putin cut with mercenary rebel leader Yevgeny Prigozhin. Moscow dropped criminal charges of sedition against Prigozhin and his men, and Prigozhin himself was allowed to seek refuge in Belarus. The troops of Prigozhin's private army, the Wagner group, can return to their base and even join the regular army if they agree to sign contracts.
That deal came practically moments after Putin accused Prigozhin of "state treason." He said there would be harsh treatment for all who followed him. For his part, Prigozhin claimed that it was not a coup, but a "march for justice" against the corrupt regime that was leading the country to disaster. Since his main targets were close allies of Putin (Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and the top Russian general, Valery Gerasimov), this could be nothing more than an attack on Putin himself.
After Wagner's troops left, Putin blamed Prigozhin for wanting Russia to be "a society that disintegrates and dies in a bloody feud." He placed the blame on Wagner's leader while justifying the actions of his troops, saying they made a "mistake" and had been lied to. That's remarkable patience from a regime that has jailed dissidents like Alexei Navalny for simply speaking out — and has been directly implicated in the poisoning and killing of political opponents.
Analogjitë historike janë gjithmonë të papërsosura. Asnjë sundimtar rus i kohëve të fundit nuk ka qenë më i zhytur në historinë e vendit të tij ose më i etur për të bërë krahasime sesa Putini. Ai u tërhoq nga këto për të mbledhur mbështetjen , duke krahasuar veprimet e Prigozhin me ata që "vodhën" fitoren e Rusisë në Luftën e Parë Botërore në 1917 dhe kërcënuan vendin me "trazirat më të mëdha". Në këtë analogji, Putini do të vendosej në rolin e carit që humbi luftën dhe jetën e tij, kështu që nuk është e pamundur të imagjinohet se lideri aktual i Rusisë ishte në kontrollin e një frike të tillë ndërsa përballej me përparimin e Prigozhin .
Prigozhin dhe trupat e tij ishin në gjendje të lëviznin nga Ukraina përmes Rostovit dhe Voronezhit në Rusi, më shumë se 400 milje drejt Moskës në më pak se dy ditë. Gjatë kësaj kohe nuk pati asnjë raportim të vetëm të banorëve vendas që sulmonin, ngacmonin apo përpiqeshin të pengonin përparimin e kolonës. Në të vërtetë, video nga Rostovi tregoi vendasit duke brohoritur me njerëzit e Prigozhin.
Kur Gjermania pushtoi Rusinë në vitin 1941, populli rus dogji shtëpitë e veta për të gjymtuar pushtuesit. Prigozhin ishte dy orë nga Moska dhe, përveç fluturimeve të dështuara me helikopter nga regjimi, asnjë dorë nuk u ngrit për ta ndaluar. Dështimi i rebelimit pas faktit mund të duket i qartë, por jo për objektivat në atë kohë.
Most observers see Putin as deeply wounded by this uprising. The scenarios outline an internal coup or, at the very least, a weakened and fragmented elite. Although this may be the case, our search for an explanation for Putin's uncharacteristic rush to resolve may consider the fact that the leader obsessed with Russian history is well aware of the consequences./ Taken from "THE HILL" , adapted " pamphlet"
Lini një Përgjigje