FLASH
Shkruar nga Veton Surroi
In a strange way, few in continental Europe would agree with the prediction that Russia would enter a frontal war...
The night before the war in Ukraine began, at a dinner in Vienna, I asked a former European diplomat, previously involved in the Normandy format negotiations to end the war when Russia launched the first attack in 2012, whether Russia would enter a frontal war in Ukraine the next morning? With all her experience and the messages that were constantly coming to her phone, after a long pause, she sighed and said that she didn’t know. “I honestly have no idea.”
In a strange way, few in continental Europe would have agreed with the prediction that Russia would enter a frontal war. According to a long investigative article in The Guardian published this week, it was only the leaders of the US and UK, with their intelligence services, who knew in detail not only that the frontal war of conquest would begin on such and such a date, but also what the military plan of attack was in detail.
That dinner and those days before the invasion were a sufficient metaphor for a political order and culture that was based on common sense. The human reason of any ordinary European would show that it is incomprehensible that one European state would try to invade another and risk people, money, and international standing for this. And, since it is incomprehensible and goes against reason, it seemed to any European, from the ordinary citizen to the one in power, that Russia would not enter Ukraine head-on with its army.
The first lesson of February 24, four years ago, was that we have entered a historic change, where the previous convention of reason is broken; so yes, Russia enters Ukraine with tanks to simultaneously break the security order that has been built on the European continent since the end of World War II.
That day I was supposed to speak at a conference - with the game of chance, dedicated to the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia - and I condensed the arguments into two points that I think are still valid today. One, that the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine was a historical turning point of a dimension comparable to the fall of the Berlin Wall. And two, that this great tectonic movement will have a great impact throughout Europe, and consequently also on the process of normalization. When the Berlin Wall fell, Kosovo was determined for the historical Western spirit of democracy, freedom and self-determination, while Serbia for the continuation of political monism, the war against other peoples and a greater Serbia.
And here we continue with the lessons of the first four years. The second lesson, then, is that Russia's frontal war against Ukraine, no matter how irrational an action it may seem, is not only the destruction of an order (similar in historical weight to the fall of the Berlin Wall), but during these four years it is also the construction of the contours of a new international order. Those contours for the European continent seem to be a sentence that goes something like this: the war in Ukraine is Europe's business and the US will support this war and with it the security of Europe with a partnership (which means nuclear guarantees, intelligence assistance, etc.), but not as a party to a conventional war; consequently, the European continent (with Great Britain and Turkey included in it) takes responsibility for its own security, mobilizes defense spending and faces the need for more efficient collective decision-making. Because, as was seen with the first lesson, we have entered a period where things just because they are against reason do not stop happening.
The third lesson is the impact of such tectonic shifts on relations between Kosovo and Serbia. When the Berlin Wall fell, Serbia chose the wrong side of history - it was against democracy, the freedom of the peoples of the former Yugoslavia, and ultimately the peace that was being created in a Europe liberated from communism. From then until now, in one form or another, and especially during the 21st century, the border between Kosovo and Serbia has to a large extent been the dividing line between the Euro-Atlantic world and Russian geopolitical interests.
This risk has not been overcome and may recur in the global reconfiguration. Serbia should not do anything new, but continue with its current course, from denying the principle of equality of parties in agreements facilitated by the EU (from non-signing, oral and written reservations) to supporting or organizing paramilitary attacks against Kosovo as in Banjska.
And here, for the EU (and in the past years the US) the first lesson applies: just because Serbia's actions seem unreasonable, it does not mean that they will not happen. So, the fact that the US and the EU have tried to attract Serbia with a perspective of transformation that all former communist states in the EU and NATO have experienced, does not mean that Serbia will not link its future with Russia, which goes against reason. Or that it will decide to stay in the "four chairs" policy (an invention of former President Tadic): with the US, the EU, Russia and China. The current Serbia will leave Russia only when it feels it is forced to do so.
This brings us to the fourth lesson: the European continent has woken up to a feeling of insecurity about itself. So, four years later, there is not a war taking place somewhere in the East, where the Austro-Hungarian Empire once clashed with the Russian one; the entire system of security, life, and democracy of the European peoples is at stake. The choice is simple, between a space of security or European insecurity. What until yesterday was considered guaranteed by the world order now requires European responsibility and a rebalancing of responsibilities with the USA.
That space requires that there be no dividing lines within the European continent, such as between Kosovo and Serbia. And this means that the entire Western Balkans must be part of the European security space; a primary policy that must rise above dependence on the whims of any one of the Western Balkan states and the loss of the historical path.
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